


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JPRS Report



Soviet Union

Military Affairs

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Soviet Union

Military Affairs

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Estonian 'Kaitseliit' Calls for Volunteers to Serve in Kuwait

91UM0082A Moscow NEDELYA in Russian
No 38, 17 Sep 90 p 4

[Article by Leonid Levitskiy, "Izvestiya" correspondent in Tallinn: "Kaitseliit Calls for a Military Campaign"]

[Text] A statement by "Kaitseliit," the Council for Defense, appeared in the Estonian press. Its staff announced that registration had begun for volunteers "who wish to defend the freedom of the country of Kuwait."

K. Eller, the head of "Kaitseliit" explained the unexpected initiative in the following way: "The reason is the solidarity of the citizens of the Estonian Republic, former member of the League of Nations, with the Kuwaiti people who became victims of aggression. The fate of the Kuwaiti people is similar to that of the Estonian people beginning with 1940. We believe that this appeal will impart a belief in the peoples of the world, who have adopted a waiting position, that they must resolutely bring an end to this aggression."

One Tallinn newspaper responded to this announcement with a caricature. Others reacted more seriously. Before I cite the views of observers, allow me to explain exactly what this "Kaitseliit" organization is. Its armed components were created in 1918. In 1940 the government of Soviet Estonia disbanded them. Now "Kaitseliit" has been created anew, but—so to speak—unofficially. In any case, there was no announcement about its registration, affiliation, or range of activities.

Nevertheless, there have been recent bits of information about actions it has taken. It was "Kaitseliit" members who tore down the statue of V.I. Lenin in Tartu. They also "transferred" the Estonian border to the territory of the Leningrad Oblast. This last action proved to be untimely, and the government of the republic even called it provocative.

So, according to a number of observers, the negative reaction resulting from the border episode has forced "Kaitseliit" to do something to enhance its prestige. This is what provoked the call for a military campaign to liberate Kuwait. Of course there are sceptics who believe that this registration of volunteers for a war against Iraq is simply an attempt by "Kaitseliit" to increase its own ranks. And there is one other fact: According to the newspaper EDASI, J. Toomepuu, Minister of Defense in the Estonian emigre government, a citizen of the USA, and a veteran officer of the "green berets," allegedly conferred the rank of colonel in the Estonian Army on K. Eller. Where this army is, remains thus far unclear, but in any case, a colonel always needs soldiers.

Who among the observers is right? To some extent the answer will probably be provided at the forthcoming All-Estonian meeting of "Kaitseliit."

Formation of Baltic Military Groups Noted

91UM0102A Kiev LENINSKOYE ZNAMYA in Russian
19 Sep 90 p 2

[Article by Lt Col N. Kotseruba: "The Peoples of the Baltic Are Not Mankurtas"]

[Text] Chingiz Aytmatov's novel "A Day Longer Than a Century" contains a parable describing invasions by fearsome foreigners—the Tuan Ruanis.

No one was safe from them, neither the old nor the young. But what the people feared most of all was a torment conceived by these enemies, after which the individual lost all of his memory, transforming into a mankurta [translation unknown] having no memory of mother, of home, of motherland, or of the terrible acts of the conquerors. The feeling was that nothing worse could ever be conceived. One mother, Naryan-apa, whose son fell victim to the enemy, decided to restore her first-born's consciousness, and he killed her with a shot from his bow. But the unfortunate woman transformed into a white bird, which rose into the sky and tried to save her son from there. "You are a Donenbay! A Donenbay! Remember your name!"

There was purpose to my bringing up this tale: Certain forces in the Baltic are trying to transform the people into mankurtas.

The national movements that were created two years ago—Sajudis in Lithuania and the popular fronts in Latvia and Estonia, which initially took a stand beneath the "banner" of perestroika as a cover for their true intentions and thus reduced the vigilance of not only the popular masses in their republics but also of many prominent politicians and state and party officials, played their ethnic "card." They managed to strongly politicize the population. But now, under the influence of their leaders—career-minded nationals—the national movements in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia are gradually losing everything that was good about them, everything that reflected the aspiration of the nation for independent development. Most such champions of national interests are satisfying their own personal interests first: They are receiving large apartments and dachas, and the possibility for regular trips abroad, not to mention the chances for personal commercial gain. There are more than enough facts in the press to support this.

The Baltic republics are presently experiencing a real political struggle, a class struggle if you like, although it is not currently fashionable to talk about this. And if anyone is appeased by Lithuania's moratorium or the 1.5-year transitional period announced by Latvia and Estonia, he is engaging in self-deception. New state structures supporting a transition to a bourgeois order, to a capitalist orientation, will be created during this time. According to the republic's present leaders these will be bourgeois democracies, and nothing is being said about any kind of socialist choice. Though judging from the

present monopoly the fronts enjoy in the Baltic republics in radio, television and the press, and if we judge from the "pluralism" that is suppressing all dissent, all we have is totalitarianism, and in no way democracy. Other more concrete details and facts confirm this as well. Formation of paramilitary organizations is continuing in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia despite the USSR president's ukase.

The old units and subunits of the local militia and border guards, security organs and customs departments have been resurrected in Lithuania. They are staffed by many who raised arms against Soviet rule, especially at the management level. And it wouldn't be at all astonishing if former criminal elements make their appearance even in the republic's new Supreme Soviet.

The Ayzsarg military-political organization, the members of which actively fought against the revolutionary movement in the 1920s and 1930s, is being revived in Latvia. They carried out the fascist revolution of 15 May 1934, they collaborated with German occupying powers, and numerous acts of terror, murder and plunder of the postwar era are on their conscience. Registration of volunteers is proceeding at full steam. The Ayzsarg leadership intends to form three regiments, to conduct its own congress, and to open a special school in Daugavpils. There are currently as many as around 40,000 members in the republic's volunteer detachments of "keepers of the peace."

The military organization Omakaytse (Self-Defense), which stained its standards with the blood of the Second World War, has been resurrected in Estonia. Extremist actions by the Green Regiment against Soviet Army soldiers have become commonplace in the republic. Activists of the newly created Eesti Kodukayset security service have attempted attacks upon officers and soldiers many times.

Conscripts, conscientious objectors and deserters, the number of which is climbing beyond the one-thousand mark, are being drawn increasingly more actively into the orbit of national separatist sentiments.

A campaign to rehabilitate fascist hangers-on—"forest brothers," volunteers of the Estonian 20th SS Division and the Latvian 15th and 19th SS Divisions—has been raised to the rank of state policy in the Baltic republics. This policy is widely supported by the mass media. Government bigwigs are lobbying for pensions for former SS members, who have now been elevated to the rank of "heroes of the struggle against Stalinism," "people resurrecting the spirit of the nation," "instilling the idea of national obedience and exclusiveness in the young." As we know, a monument to the Erna sabotage and espionage organization has been restored. It was erected by the Nazis and their local hirelings in 1943. Now the Estonian society for the protection of ancient monuments has begun restoring only the monuments commemorating those who fought on the side of the Whites, or in fascist legions.

All the world, all civilized mankind condemned fascism, but the Estonian government not only showed no desire to condemn the gathering mob, but it also financed it under the table, and now it is transferring everything from a sick body into a healthy one. It is being supported by the chorus of national-separatist and so-called independent Baltic mass media.

Articles about what happened in Tor were published in the weekly EESTI EKSPRESS, in Riga's city newspaper RIGAS BALSS and in many other Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian publications. Even though they visited the place, the authors of these articles naturally saw nothing dangerous about the rebirth of fascism. What they wrote about, you see, was the extensive cultural program prepared for former SS members, and they were sorry that it was never implemented. But on the other hand they don't hold back at all when it comes to describing the threat posed by Soviet paratroopers.

The ignorant reader is inundated by the storm of threats stated by officers of the Soviet Army and by the description of the terrible picture of tanks patrolling in the vicinity of Tor, life in which "...continued in its accustomed rhythm, despite the fact that helicopters were circling above it, army reconnaissance groups, from the smallest to the largest, were wandering through the streets, and from the forests this picture was complemented by the roar of tank engines..." (RIGAS BALSS, 10 July 1990). All of these actions by the military, the newspaper writes, inflicted damages estimated at 90,000 rubles. Impressive?! Especially when the story is told by an eyewitness.

But as it turns out, the aphorism "lies like a witness" fits well here. Surely, at least, according to the documents of local government organs. The first is signed by the chairman of the rural soviet of the village of Tor, Yu. Puust. Its text proclaims: "The rural soviet of the village of Tor has no complaints in regard to the use of roads by military subunits on the territory of the rural soviet during the exercise conducted from 4 to 8 July." The report bears an official seal.

The second document is an act drawn up on the instructions of the elders of the executive committee of Pyarnu District, identified as document No 78, 9 July 1990. Here is its text: "A commission consisting of...inspected the surface of the road over which the tracked vehicles passed during the troop exercise of 4-8 July 1990. The commission concluded that significant damage was not inflicted upon the road surface, and the executive committee of Pyarnu District has no complaints against the military unit." The act was signed by seven persons. It bears an official seal.

So that's the way things are!

But I don't think that it had any influence on such Baltic newspapers, which, unable to make any hay out of the false reports from Tor, tried to plant some new false reports on their pages, this time about similar events in Latvia.

This time the subjects of the reports were two red-starred fighters "which circled at supersonic speed at great height over Bauska."

No, what compelled the Supreme Soviet and the government of Latvia to call off the SS Black Sabbath in Bauska was not the fighters but the deep indignation of all honest people on Earth, of the country, of the republic's inhabitants, of former prisoners of Salaspils and other fascist concentration camps who could not tolerate the mockery of the memory of the 313,798 peaceful inhabitants (including 39,835 children) and the 330,032 Soviet prisoners of war destroyed by fascism in Latvia, and of the 279,615 persons forcibly carried off to Germany for slave labor, and persons who have no desire to be mankurtas of national separatism and neofascism.

Former legionnaires, police and Ayzsargs were guaranteed beer and "sport" at the Bezdeligas farmstead. But some are still alive who remember that these "hawks" engaged in sport of a different sort during the fascist occupation. From the first days of the war, before they formed into punitive bands, they began annihilating Red Army soldiers and their families, Soviet activists and peaceful inhabitants. By as early as January 1942, the German police and SS in Latvia had at their disposal around 14,000 persons who volunteered for police work. As of 1 September 1943, approximately 36,000 Latvian nationalists were working in various punitive organs.

There is a document drawn up by the fascists themselves concerning the conduct of special operations to create "a neutral zone 40 km wide on the Latvian border" with the purpose of hindering the partisan movement. Seven Latvian battalions, one Ukrainian and one Lithuanian company, special subunits and 700 wheeled vehicles took part in the operation, which was conducted in February-April 1943. Latvian troop subunits entered villages and gunned down all men from 16 to 50 years old; they were followed by Latvian special forces subunits that finished off all who survived. The elderly and the disabled who were incapable of a long journey were also gunned down. The rest, women primarily, were dispatched on foot to places of so-called secondary processing (the concentration camp in Salaspils, Fort No 9 in Kaunas and elsewhere).

Those who fell behind were shot. Then the women were separated from the children and sent to Germany. The villages themselves were plundered and burned.

"The shining memory of people martyred in fascist prisons should compel the republic's Supreme Soviet to impose a prohibition on this assemblage of executioners," reads an appeal of former prisoners of fascist concentration camps to the Latvian Supreme Soviet. This time it heeded the demands of the people. The SS rally in Bauska was cancelled. But still-influential nationalistic circles in Latvia and in the Baltic region as a whole are generally continuing along their separatist course. They foster the hope of revenge of fascist survivors under their wing.

All honest people should be aware of this.

As folk wisdom would have it, when God wishes to deprive one of reason, he deprives him of memory. But luckily the world remembers the misanthropic ideology and practice of fascism. And no one has reversed, or ever will reverse, either the judgment at Nuremburg or the United Nations resolutions. It has now become fashionable in the Baltic region to reject everything Soviet and socialist, to sing the praises of former SS soldiers, legionnaires, "Ayzsargs," "forest brothers"—the postwar bandits. But neither certain "politicians" nor "free journalists" will ever be able to erase from the people's memory the evil done by these turncoats. They will be unable to transform the people into mankurtas, into subjects of the Tuan Ruan. The peoples of the Baltic region are resolutely saying no to neofascism.

Col-Gen Gromov Open Letter to Kiev City Soviet

91UM0128A Kiev LENINSKOYE ZNAMYA in Russian
16 Oct 90 p 1

[Open Letter by Col-Gen B. Gromov, former commander-in-chief of the limited contingent in the Republic of Afghanistan and people's deputy of the USSR: "Open Letter to the Presidium of the Kiev City Soviet of People's Deputies"]

[Text] Pursuant to Resolution No. 26 passed by the Kiev City Soviet of People's Deputies on September 12th of this year, three apartment buildings on Staronavodnitskoy Street (altogether 258 flats) that had been designated for veterans of Afghanistan and disabled workers and soldiers, are being taken over for renting to foreign representatives for hard currency.

In connection with this I want to say the following:

Hundreds of thousands of Soviet people who participated in events in Afghanistan, many of whom lost their lives, lost their health, and were disabled, and also those who returned home not having suffered physically, have undoubtedly earned the esteem and respect of their Fatherland and their fellow citizens. They served their Homeland with faith and truth, and were subject to enormous physical and moral burdens. The absolute majority of them idolized their great country and people to the end, under the most difficult conditions.

Finding themselves in the Republic of Afghanistan (RA) and constantly risking their lives, these youths believed in all that was best and holy that they had left behind in their Homeland. They did not betray their oath in 50-degree [Centigrade] heat or in mountain passes that were higher than the clouds or in fierce battles against bands of cutthroats. And they remembered their Homeland when, after battle, they looked with tears at the youthful faces and bodies of their fallen comrades and when they looked at the Afghan villages whose inhabitants were all slaughtered by the bandits [dushman]. They loved and believed their own people, and they knew that

when they would return they would not be forgotten!
And now they have returned.

It will soon be two years that this happened. Applause has stopped and the fanfare has become silent. Life is not one big holiday. Happiness and sorrow, labor and oblivion, memories—all this is close to us and among us, just as are valor and cowardice, good and evil. All these qualities do not simply exist in neighborly peace, but constantly struggle against each other, with one or the other sometimes losing and sometimes winning.

The most extensive material about all that was seen and experienced leads one to a rather sad result that is far from being speculative. It would appear that the time of heroes has passed. It has sunk into the Lethe. Loud tirades in the periodicals have been replaced by "curses" and readers are being frightened by the shadow of the punisher and killer. In the muddy waters of this campaign, those whose exploits were just recently praised to the skies without sparing words and colorful depictions have been buried and committed to oblivion. Well, the war—no matter what you call it—was "little known" and "not sanctioned," and it is fading into the past; its episodes and glorious and tragic pages are being forgotten... It is possible to forget the war, but unpardonable to forget those who went through its pain, blood, and death. We cannot forget those who survived and those who perished in fulfilling their soldierly duty. I want to note that this is an entire generation of the sixties whose military contemporaries are its best representatives, the majority of whom constituted the core of the limited contingent. The example of the soldiers of the 40th Army did not vanish without a trace even in the education of the youth of the 80's. The future will take a terrible revenge on this forgetfulness; history tells us this!

The decision made by the Kiev Soviet with regard to the "Afghans" [veterans of the Afghanistan war] cannot be called anything short of shocking. Did not the experience of past years teach us anything? In our history we have trampled on a lot of things, including memory.

Yes, the war in Afghanistan was a mistake and was unconstitutional. But this mistake—to put it mildly—was the fault of the leadership of our country of those years. And what do the people who followed orders have to do with it? They deserved for people to be proud of them!

I and thousands of my combat comrades ask and demand this decision be reexamined. Debts should have been paid a long time ago, although even today it is not too late for the city fathers to do so.

Lithuanian Law on Alternative Service Liability

91UM0146A Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian
27 Oct 90 p 2

["Law of the Lithuanian Republic on Liability for Alternative (Labor) Service"]

[text]

I. GENERAL PROVISIONS

Article 1. Citizens of the Lithuanian Republic liable for service to defend the region, aged 19 to 27, who because of their convictions are unable to perform active service to defend the region, will be liable for alternative (labor) service.

Article 2. The law on liability for alternative (labor) service is enforced by the government of the Lithuanian Republic.

II. LIABILITY FOR ALTERNATIVE (LABOR) SERVICE

Article 3. Liability for alternative (labor) service is regulated by the interim law of the Lithuanian Republic on defending the region and by this Law.

Article 4. Those liable for service to defend the region who have expressed the wish to do alternative (labor) service must submit a written request to the draft commissions of city (or rayon) self-management, stating their reasons for the application.

Article 5. The draft commission of the city (or rayon) self-management is obliged to review statements from citizens requesting alternative (labor) service and issue their conclusions within 20 days from the time that the applications are received.

The applicant is invited to a session of the commission. In the event that he fails to show up for reasonable causes, the commission may reach a decision in his absence.

The draft commission will give notice of alternative (labor) service.

Article 6. If he has been informed of the commission's decision and disagrees with it, the applicant has the right to appeal in the courts and have a ruling within 15 days from the time the decision is handed down. The ruling of the court may be appealed in the Lithuanian Republic Supreme Court, whose ruling will be final.

Article 7. Deferment of alternative (labor) service is permitted in cases as envisaged in articles 23, 24, and 25 of the interim law of the Lithuanian Republic on liability for service to defend the region.

Deferment of alternative (labor) service in order to complete studies may be permitted by the draft commissions of city (or rayon) self-management.

Article 8. Citizens who meet even one of the conditions set forth in subclause "a" of article 23 and in article 25 of the interim law of the Lithuanian republic on liability for service to defend the region may be released early from alternative (labor) service.

Article 9. Citizens engaged in training and at assembly points for service to defend the region will not be called for alternative (labor) service.

Article 10. Persons liable to the draft for alternative (labor) service may, in the event of ecological catastrophes, natural disasters, accidents at production facilities, or in the event of a threat against the security of the state, be mobilized under the procedure laid down by legislation of the Lithuanian Republic.

Article 11. Citizens up to the age of 45 will be called for alternative (labor) service for a second time only in the event of mobilization.

III. ALTERNATIVE (LABOR) SERVICE

Article 12. Alternative (labor) service for citizens will take place at sites and projects assigned by the government of the Lithuanian Republic. The department charged with defense of the region will conclude a contract for alternative (labor) service with the organs of self-management and with enterprises, institutions, and organizations.

Article 13. Citizens performing alternative (labor) service are not allowed to occupy leading posts or hold official positions in any category, nor carry out administrative functions.

Article 14. Proceeding from the interests of the state and with the agreement of draftees, alternative (labor) service may, in accordance with a resolution of the Lithuanian Republic government, also be done outside the boundaries of the Lithuanian Republic.

In this case, the government of the Lithuanian Republic may establish the procedure for reducing the period of service.

Article 15. The duration of alternative (labor) service is 24 months.

The duration of the period of service for citizens who have graduated from higher educational establishments is 12 months.

One day of active service in defense of the region is the equivalent of two days of alternative (labor) service.

Article 16. A person who receives notification of service must report to a specified place of service. Travel expenses will be reimbursed by the state.

Alternative (labor) service commences from the first day that a city reports for work at an enterprise, establishment, or organization.

Article 17. Within five days the enterprise, establishment, or organization will report the arrival and able-bodied condition of citizens reporting for alternative (labor) service to the territorial branch of the department for defense of the region.

Article 18. Control over alternative (labor) service is exercised by the territorial branches of the department for defense of the region.

Article 19. Thirty days before the end of alternative (labor) service the territorial branches of the department for the defense of the region will inform of that fact the enterprise, establishment, or organization at which persons are doing alternative (labor) service.

Article 20. Labor relations between citizens doing alternative (labor) service and the enterprises, establishments, and organizations are regulated by the Lithuanian Republic Law on Labor, with the exception of cases as envisaged by this Law.

Article 21. Alternative (labor) service is performed by citizens in accordance with the terms of the contracts concluded with the department for the defense of the region. A contract may not be canceled at the initiative of the citizen or the administration of the enterprise, establishment, or organization without the agreement of the department for the defense of the region.

Article 22. Two days will be added to the duration of service for each one day of alternative (labor) service missed for no good reason.

Persons who refuse to perform alternative (labor) service are liable in accordance with the procedure laid down by law.

Article 23. Citizens performing alternative (labor) service will be given annual leave of 12 working days. At the request of a citizen leave may be increased by another 12 working days that will not be counted as part of the total duration of alternative (labor) service.

Article 24. Persons performing alternative (labor) service who express a desire to transfer to active duty in defense of the region shall submit an application in writing to the chief draft commission in the department for the defense of the region. This commission is obliged to respond to the applicant within 10 days.

IV. FINAL PROVISIONS

Article 25. Citizens who become unfit for work during alternative (labor) service are guaranteed social security by the state.

Article 26. The state provides accident insurance for persons doing service in accordance with this Law.

Article 27. Citizens performing alternative (labor) service are paid a sum equal to 85 percent of their wages, but no less than the minimum standard-of-living wage established.

[Signed] V. Landsbergis, chairman of the Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council. Vilnius, 16 October 1990.

USSR Resolution on Active Duty of Military Deputies Explained*91UM0081B Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
31 Oct 90 Union Edition p 6*

[Article by N. Burbyga: "How Is a Military Deputy To Serve?"]

[Text] The USSR government approved the resolution, "On Special Features of the Conduct of Active Military Service by Military Personnel Who Are People's Deputies Released From Their Duties as a Result of Their Election to the Supreme Soviets, Local Soviets of People's Deputies, or Their Bodies."

This document was developed in order to ensure a uniform procedure for the carrying out of active military service by military personnel who are people's deputies in soviets at all levels. There are more than 1,000 of them.

"Now military personnel who are people's deputies, elected for full-time work in the soviets, will be attached to the respective soviets," states Col Justice G. Lutsenko, chief of the legal service, Main Cadres Directorate, USSR Ministry of Defense. The basis for this will be the corresponding decision of the soviet, with mandatory indication of the time period for which the serviceman is to be attached.

Will these military personnel be awarded their regular military ranks?

Yes, in accordance with the Statute on the Conduct of Military Service by Officers in the USSR Armed Forces.

How much will they be paid?

Their pay will be established by the respective soviet. And at the end of the term of work of the military personnel in the soviets they will be sent back to the Ministry of Defense for further service.

Landsbergis: Soviet Draft Illegal in Lithuania*91UM1046B Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian
3 Nov 90 p 1*

["Statement of the Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council"]

[Text] The army of the Soviet Union in Lithuania is part of a militarist system and ideology of another state that is now in the throes of a profound crisis. Within that system the old mechanisms of compulsory military service are still operating, and they are still being unlawfully applied in Lithuania. The Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council has stated previously that citizens of the Lithuanian Republic are not obliged to serve in the Armed Forces of another state, and it is recommended that they do not do so; accordingly, most of the young men in Lithuania acted in that way during the spring draft for the Soviet Army. We hope that they will not respond to

similar drafts this fall and will not be frightened by bullying. The Lithuanian Republic does not forbid young men to carry out such service if they so wish, but it does call on them to recognize their proper duty as citizens and not serve in the army of another state. The Armed Forces of the Soviet Union have no right to use any kind of force in Lithuania against those who do not respond to the draft. Of course, neither psychological pressure, browbeating, or the threat of pressure should be used either.

The time is near at hand when the men of Lithuania will be called upon to serve their own motherland, and the Supreme Council has no doubt that all citizens will answer the call and willingly do their duty to the Lithuanian Republic.

[Signed] V. Landsbergis, chairman of the Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council, Vilnius, 30 October 1990.

Reform of Political Organs in Northern Fleet*91UM0089B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 3 Nov 90 First Edition p 2*

[Interview with Rear Admiral Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Penkin, first deputy chief of the Political Directorate of the Navy by Captain Third Rank P. Ishchenko, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "Military-Political Organizations: Experience Brings About Corrective Actions"]

[Text] The center of attention in military districts, groups of forces, and fleets is focused on the draft of the Regulation on Military-Political Organs in the Armed Forces of the USSR. Our correspondent spoke with Rear Admiral Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Penkin, first deputy chief of the Political Directorate of the Navy, about how this important document is being viewed in the Northern Fleet and what resulted from discussions about it.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Aleksandr Aleksandrovich, what in your view is the basic difference between this draft Regulation and the existing analogous document? What is your personal feeling about the reform of political organs?

[Penkin] The principal difference is embodied in the draft itself. While the present political sections constitute the directing party organs of the CPSU in the Armed Forces, future military-political sections are "designed to implement government policies in the areas of defense and security of the USSR, as well as education and the assurance of social protection for personnel..." In other words, we must, in resolving new problems, become used to both our new roles and to our new goals in the army and navy. At the same time, we must also work "on the principle of a partnership" with party and Komsomol organizations. The complexity in doing this is not only, so to speak, of a technical nature but is also a purely psychological one. Believe me, it is not a simple matter to go away from decades of existing norms. Of course we are not going to give up close cooperation, but it is going

to be structured on a totally different basis and not on the "chief - subordinate" principle.

As a principle, it is important that the basis of military-political work will be an educational, socio-legal, activity. This is written into the context of the perestroika process. Foremost is the differentiation in the functions of government and party organs. Experience has motivated us to make precisely this kind of turn. For example, at present the navy has representatives from 80 nations and nationalities (on ships and in units—20-30; in subunits—up to 15). Sociological research conducted by the political directorate shows that every fourth person who now joins the navy has to one degree or another participated earlier in conflicts based on nationality differences. Fifteen percent of them, up to the time they were drafted, had lived only in their own nationality environment. The level of social contacts among nationalities is low in many military collectives. Of the officers and midshipmen questioned, 63% of those who have subordinates consider themselves poorly prepared to work in multi-national collectives. Every other person, of the above persons, expressed the need to consult military sociologists and specialists in the area of interrelationships among nationalities. This is the real unexplored area of work for military-political organs.

Or, take a completely new function for the future military-political organs, that of assuring socio-legal protection for servicemen and their families. Yes, we also did this before, but not so much because we had to, but on our own initiative. It should have been done before, but it is high time that this work is placed on a real legal and professional basis. Thus, this year alone the navy political directorate received over one thousand letters and petitions. Every third letter has to do with people's dissatisfaction with decisions on personnel problems and every fifth letter is engendered by violations of the principle of social justice.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] How is the draft Regulation being accepted in the navy? Has sufficient time been allotted for clarifying all points of view?

[Penkin] I shall answer the second part of your question first. It is quite obvious that too little time has been allocated to discussion. In part, this probably can be explained by the high degree of activity caused by changes taking place in the Armed Forces and by the necessity of creating organs as quickly as possible, in accordance with the policy of dividing governmental and party functions. Nevertheless, in my view the draft has undergone a sufficiently rigorous social "expertise" in units and formations, as well as at meetings, conferences, and seminars.

The military council of the navy recently underscored the fact that the draft, as a whole, was approved and supported everywhere.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] You said that the draft was approved and supported "as a whole." Does this mean that there were also negative comments, or, as they now say, alternative proposals?

[Penkin] The draft has many positive features. First of all, these features mean that the draft responds to present-day reality, and also takes into consideration an incipient multi-party system and the growing politicization of the masses of servicemen. In addition, the concept of military-political organs, as embodied in the draft, increases their authority in the eyes of public consciousness. Personally, I also like the highly visible continuity that preserves the best traditions of the political workers of the Armed Forces.

On the other hand, the authors themselves hardly consider that their document consists of only positive features. Otherwise, why was it necessary to bring it out for such a wide-scale discussion? And there were many proposals and comments. In particular, many commanders and political workers noted the declarative nature of individual clauses in the document, the lack of clear formulations about how exactly military-political organs will function, say, in implementing government policy, selecting personnel, or implementing social and legal protection for servicemen, workers and employees, and members of their families. Also, there is no clear formulation of the mechanics of how close coordination between military-political organs and commanders and staffs will be effected.

We would have considered it logical to include, as one of the most important tasks of the Main Military-Political Directorate, the assurance of social protection for all representatives of the Armed Forces. In this case, the pyramid should be built to the very top.

We think that the definition of "unity of command, based on legal and democratic grounds," as well as on numerous proposals from all over, "leaves much to be desired." It erodes, as it were, the essence of unity of command and gives the freedom to interpret it in different ways.

Inasmuch as the draft provides for military-political organs to direct the newly-created socio-legal commissions, it would seem that it is necessary to define the status of this commission in the regulation. We consider it important that the regulation delineates not only the responsibilities, but also the rights of the chief of the military-political organ. Actually, this could also be done in general military regulations. The rights and obligations of military-political workers of a naval ship element should be included in the Navy Shipboard Regulations of the Soviet Navy. The functions of officers of military-political organs are not based on any legal premise.

It would also make sense, without going beyond the framework of the existing table of organization, to allow—in the beginning—an independent determination at fleet level as to exactly what specialists are needed in

military-political organs of various units and formations. It depends on what problems they have to resolve, the situation with military discipline, relations among the nationalities, etc. It would be extremely desirable to have lawyers included in the organizational structure of the military-political organ. In the beginning they should be at least at the level of the military-political directorate of the fleet, or higher.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] One of the obligations of military-political organs, pursuant to the draft, concerns the "directing of military resources of mass information." Do you think this directing should undergo any changes when compared to what we have today?

[Penkin] With regard to changes in directing military resources for mass information, they should correspond to laws and to the level and nature of changes going on in the country and in the Armed Forces. I am convinced of one thing: The connection among the military publisher, facility manager, and military publication should change from being a mechanical one to a more satisfactory one, based on a deep mutual understanding, commonality of goals, and a similar interest in successfully resolving issues facing the army and navy.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] And the last question, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich. Are there already any kind of steps being taken for working under these new conditions? The draft Regulation is aiming at this...

[Penkin] yes. At present the political directorate and political organs of the Navy are systematically selecting from among all the political workers who have the desired attitude and capabilities, candidates for retraining into specialists to conduct sociological and psychological work in military collectives. Beginning on January 1st of next year, a group of officers selected in this manner will begin training by taking special courses.

Not so long ago the political directorate created a super-numerary group for military-sociological research. This group has already proven by what they have done that their existence is urgently needed. We are also looking for other forms and methods of work which would meet the needs of the lofty purposes of the new military-political organs.

Working Group on Party Organs in Military

91UM0089C Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 3 Nov 90 First Edition p 2

[Unattributed article: "On the Course of Revitalization"]

[Text] Training for reforming existing party structures is being conducted within the framework of the radical perestroika of the system of party-political work in the Armed Forces of the USSR. In accordance with a decision of the CPSU Central Committee, a working group has been formed and is now actively at work. Commanders, political workers, party activists, delegates to

the XXVIII Congress of the CPSU, members of the CPSU Central Committee and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the RSFSR are all widely represented in this group.

At its meetings, members examine proposals from the troops, primary party organizations, communists in the army and navy, as well as local party organs. In accordance with the articles of the USSR Law "On Social Societies," they work out opinions on activities of party organizations under current conditions, including considerations of a multi-party system.

The center of attention for members of the working group revolves around problems of improving the mechanism for coordinating activities of party committees at different levels with activities of commanders and military-political organs in order to implement military reforms, complete tasks to support combat readiness and strengthen military discipline, and to assure social protection for servicemen, workers, employees, and members of their families.

At meetings of the working group, members analyze how discussions are progressing in military collectives regarding the draft of the new Instructions on the Work of CPSU Organizations in the Armed Forces of the USSR. Taking into consideration the views of primary party organizations, public opinion in the army and navy, and views of delegates to the XXVIII Congress of the CPSU, the members work out variation for presenting reports and conducting elections, and for electing delegates, including delegates to the All-Army Party Conference.

Deputy Butorin Defends Novaya Zemlya Test Range

91UM0081A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
3 Nov 90 First Edition p 6

[Interview of A. Butorin, RSFSR Supreme Soviet member, by Col M. Rebrov: "Echo of a Nuclear Explosion"]

[Text] The event itself took place on 24 October at 1800 hours Moscow time, at the nuclear range in the area of the Novaya Zemlya Islands. According to TASS the yield of the explosion was from 20 to 150 kilotons. Its objective was to confirm the reliability and improve the security of nuclear weapons. "The radiation situation in the area of the test," ended this brief report, "is normal."

Already the next day the echo of the underground explosion rolled all the way to the Russian parliament. Two deputies heard N. Vorontsov, chairman of USSR Goskompriroda [State Committee for the Protection of the Environment], who expressed his point of view on the danger of such tests to the environment. However, another opinion was also heard. Our correspondent met with A. Butorin, RSFSR Supreme Soviet member, and asked him to express his views on this subject.

"I spoke on this problem," stated Albert Nikolayevich, "and I must repeat that I view the statement made by Deputy Vorontsov as one more attempt to get us Russian parliamentarians into a clash with the Union parliament and government, and to acquire political capital for himself. The chairman of Goskompriroda should have known that the "Greenpeace team" that measured the radiation on Novaya Zemlya mixed up the scale of measurement, and erred a thousand-fold. (I am not even speaking about the gross violation by this team of our law, 'On the USSR State Border'.) Foreign scientists acknowledged that the actual level of radiation on Novaya Zemlya was surprisingly low.

[Rebrov] You are a deputy from this region. Therefore, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA decided to come to you. The echo of the nuclear explosion does not die down even to this day. Debates are even going on in the USSR Supreme Soviet.

[Butorin] Yes, this is so. There are many discussions and opinions, and they are most varied. But I do not understand those people's deputies who attempt to gain popularity, spend their efforts and time in vain, and divert many other busy people with their speeches and inquiries, in order to inflame passions about the range at Novaya Zemlya.

Novaya Zemlya is included in my electoral district, and I watch attentively the situation surrounding the Northern Range, and believe that here an intelligent and competent approach is needed.

[Rebrov] I believe that on 13 September our newspaper gave authoritative explanations about why the USSR cannot unilaterally halt its nuclear tests. I have in mind the statement by Professor V. Mikhaylov.

[Butorin] I agree. His arguments are entirely convincing. In contrast to the USSR, not a single other country has made the commitment not to be first to use nuclear weapons, or has carried out such unilateral moratoriums on its nuclear tests. Therefore, I would like to reproach our parliamentarians: Rather than add a "headache" to our government, would it not be better to appeal to the parliaments of those countries that are stubbornly refusing to support the peace initiatives of the USSR!? Our country has sharply curtailed its nuclear tests, and is conducting many fewer than is the U. S. This year the USSR responded to seven nuclear explosions in Nevada with a single test.

No Northerner considers the fact that it neighbors the nuclear test range on Novaya Zemlya to be a "gift of fate," and all thirst for the most rapid cessation of its activity. But, taking into account the defense needs of the USSR, we accept this range as a "necessary evil." I value highly the services of Olzhas Suleymenov in forming the public movement against all nuclear tests. It is just too bad that we do not know any such fighters in the U. S. The secretary of the international organization, "March of Peace," Andzhi Frabasilio, told me that the public anti-nuclear movement in the U. S. is still very

weak, that the military authorities do not reckon with it at all, and without hesitation employ force to disperse and arrest demonstrators.

[Rebrov] Meanwhile, our military people display restraint.

[Butorin] No argument. And I understand perfectly well that no one would bestow nuclear weapons upon us, and that in the struggle for nuclear parity there were many martyr heroes, the names of whom we must revere sacredly. Personally I do not harbor any suspiciousness toward the military, for they do not make the decisions about the tests. I do not doubt that if all countries ceased their nuclear tests our ranges would gladly fall silent forever. And I see no reason not to believe Ye. P. Velikov, vice president, USSR Academy of Sciences (his democratic strivings are well known, and he has never been an apologist for the arms race or a "hawk of the military-industrial complex"). He also asserts that it is not yet time to talk about closing the range at Novaya Zemlya.

Yes, the level of trust between the USSR and the U. S. is growing, but the international situation as a whole is such that in the foreseeable future general nuclear disarmament, unfortunately, is not anticipated, and nuclear tests cannot be discontinued. It is no accident that on 1 June 1990 the presidents of the USSR and the U. S. signed a protocol only about limiting underground nuclear tests and about strengthening monitoring of them. On 9 October 1990 this protocol was ratified by the USSR Supreme Soviet.

[Rebrov] Consequently, it is necessary to draw the appropriate conclusions and not agitate the people against the agreement, which has become law.

[Butorin] Precisely. I cannot act impartially toward the citizens of Novaya Zemlya, for here we are talking about my electors. As I became acquainted with them, I was imbued with true respect for their harsh fate. Besides military personnel, there is also the "non-uniformed population," approximately a thousand children are there, and no one complains about his health. Moreover, some decline to return to the continent following their term of service and remain in Novaya Zemlya, although the conditions here, I repeat, are harsh, the pay is low, and there are a considerable number of everyday problems.

In the discussion about the advisability of creating an island soviet, I hold the position that if the military will draw up a treaty for the leasing of Novaya Zemlya, let them also manage their own affairs further. Dual power does not make sense, and in this case friction between the civilian minority and the military majority is possible. Besides, the nuclear range is not a courtyard to be broken into without an invitation.

[Rebrov] The command of the range in Nevada is much stricter toward uninvited guests. But we are talking

about something else. The people live on rumors, and there are a great number of them going around.

[Butorin] One must not be gullible and take as the pure truth that supposedly the Northern Range is "involved in the oncological illnesses in our district," in the "balding" of reindeer, and so forth. The main danger here is represented by enterprises of the wood chemical complex and the "technological piracy" of the geologists, as well as ammunition and radioactive wastes submerged in the northern seas. And most of all it is necessary to create a committee to save the almost ruined Severnaya Dvina and its tributaries, and not put the blame on Novaya Zemlya under any pretext, or blame the military for everything. Needless to say, I am not asserting that they are not inflicting ecological damage to my native Archangel Oblast. Unfortunately they are, and a considerable amount. I will have my say about this, for in the electoral program I promised the voters to seek an independent radiological examination of the territories adjacent to Novaya Zemlya.

[Rebrov] Such an inspection, as far as I know, has already begun at Severodvinsk. Investigation of the radiation situation in the other rayons of Archangel Oblast and the Komi ASSR, which are adjacent to Novaya Zemlya, will be completed in the third quarter of 1991.

[Butorin] This is so. But until the results of the investigation are obtained, we should hold off on premature conclusions and conjecture. The problem of radiation security in Russia has not been solved either organizationally or legislatively. This problem is complex and labor-consuming, and it will not be solved in our day. God allow us to fulfill at least that which is written in section 3.4 of the recently approved state ecological program to the year 2005.

[Rebrov] But time is wasting.

[Butorin] Yes it is. In 1954-1956 the entire population of Novaya Zemlya was transferred to the continent, and from then on the military has "ruled" here. This was done according to old, secret resolutions of the USSR Council of Ministers, without any coordination with the leaders of Archangel Oblast. Today's leadership of Russia and the Archangel Oblast Soviet are filled with resolve to establish relations with the military that will be advantageous to the population of Archangel Oblast. I was able to explain that the document transferring Novaya Zemlya to the military (its territory is approximately equal in size to all of Leningrad Oblast) "for permanent and free use" was drawn up back in 1987 under the signature of V. Kovlov (former deputy chairman of the Archangel Oblast Ispolkom (today he is secretary of the Archangel CPSU Oblast Committee). I consider this document unlawful, and I requested of Yu. Guskov, chairman of the Archangel Oblast Soviet, that it be rescinded. Unfortunately, this has not yet been done. Meanwhile, the USSR Council of Ministers is readying a new resolution on nuclear test ranges. The RSFSR

Supreme Soviet and the Archangel Oblast Soviet demanded that this document be coordinated with them. However, this also, unfortunately, has not yet been done. A condition for such an agreement will be the drawing up of a Novaya Zemlya leasing treaty between the government of the RSFSR, the Archangel Oblast Soviet, and the USSR Ministry of Defense.

[Rebrov] On 29 October the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and the republic council of ministers approved the Statement on the Conduct of Nuclear Weapons Tests at the Novaya Zemlya Range.

[Butorin] I took part in the work on this document. It proposes that the coordination conditions and procedure for preparing, implementing and monitoring the fulfillment of decisions pertaining to the defense and security of the country be determined without delay.

[Rebrov] Thank you for the conversation. Let us await the further development of events.

[Butorin] Let us await them. I believe in human reason.

Founding Congress of Estonian Veterans

91UM0089A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
6 Nov 90 First Edition p 3

[Article by Colonel M. Ziyeminsh: "Congress of Veterans"]

[Text] Tallinn—The first founding congress of Estonian veterans of war, Armed Forces, and labor took place on November 3rd in the Tallinn garrison Officers' Club. This Congress determined what had been up to now the unclear legal status of this social organization.

Delegates, numbering 1,100 persons, representing every district in the republic, unanimously decided that from now on the work of this veterans' organization will be structured on the basis of their own charter.

A presidium of the Council of Veterans of the Republic was elected, consisting of 18 persons, and including such well-known figures in the republic as Reserve Major General N. Aksinin, Reserve Rear Admiral S. Smirnov, Academician G. Naan, and others.

The veterans decisively condemned the campaign being conducted in Estonia to cancel the parade in honor of the 73rd anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution. They also spoke out in favor of placing the V.I. Lenin monument in Tallinn under a protective guard.

Landsbergis: Soviet Arbitrary Use of Force

91UM0146C Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian
9 Nov 90 p 1

[Statement by the Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council: On Arbitrary Behavior by the USSR's Occupation Troops in Lithuania"]

[Text] Despite protests by the Supreme Council and government of the Lithuanian Republic on 7 November this year units of the USSR's occupation troops located in Lithuania organized a military parade. This demonstration of military force was accompanied by acts of violence aimed against the citizens of the Lithuanian Republic. In an attempt by airborne troops to seize by force the building of the Lithuanian Conservatory, where studies were in progress at the time, not only was the autonomy of that college violated but citizens of the Lithuanian Republic were seriously wounded and property belonging to the educational establishment was destroyed. Clashes between people occurred in other places in the capital and material damage was done. It was only thanks to people's self-possession and discipline that the occupation troops failed to provoke a serious incident.

These actions by the troops of the USSR again prove that the leadership of the USSR, which signed the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in Helsinki and has constantly declared in favor of the creation of a law-governed state, has no regard for sovereignty, the rights of states, or the principles of humanism. Such actions by the USSR discredit it as a partner in the talks with the Lithuanian Republic in the eyes of the world community, particularly on the eve of the Paris meeting.

It is not only the demonstration of force in Lithuania but also its use that should once again remind the progressive world public and governments of countries that the USSR and its Armed Forces continue to grossly violate the elementary standards of citizens' and people's human rights. In protesting such actions by the occupation troops of the USSR, the Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council appeals to the countries attending the Paris meeting to condemn such actions.

[Signed] V. Landsbergis, chairman of the Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council, Vilnius, 8 November 1990.

Petrozavodsk Airfield Closed by Protest

91UM0128C Moscow *LESNAYA GAZETA* in Russian
17 Nov 90 p 1

[Article by V. Litvinov, *LESNAYA GAZETA* correspondent, Petrozavodsk: "Blockade of the Airport"]

[Text] The runway of Petrozavodsk-2 Airport presents an unusual sight. Night and day there are bonfires and women all over it.

These are wives and mothers of servicemen protesting the decision of the USSR Minister of Defense to transfer local military units to the Far North. It was decided to transfer the garrison over to troops returning from Germany.

In the North, as the women found out, no preparations have been made yet: there is no housing, not even a

primary school, let alone nurseries or cultural organizations, or organizations needed for everyday living. There is no place to work for servicemen's families. Medical examinations have not been given to servicemen and their families, even though many persons cannot live in the Far North.

Colonel-General V. Tsarkov flew into Petrozavodsk. However, no constructive dialog came out of it: He did not promise any kind of improvement in living conditions in the Far North and simply called for everyone to endure and to be patriotic.

All this shows that people in the USSR Ministry of Defense still do not know how to look ahead—not even a little bit—or how to deal with the needs of their servicemen and their families. Times have changed and people no longer want to be unthinking pawns.

Civilian Actions Against Military Listed

91UM0128B Moscow *SELSKAYA ZHIZN* in Russian
21 Nov 90 First Edition p 4

[Article from the Press Center of the USSR Ministry of Defense: "Anti-Military Provocations Continue"]

[Text] Recent days have been marked by new facts concerning provocations and hooliganism against military units in a number of our country's regions.

On November 16th, in Kishinev, around thirty people burst into the garrison Officers' Club. They tried to carry out a pogrom, threatened physical violence to the staff and threatened to set the building on fire. These illegal acts were cut short by the arrival of a patrol.

In Tbilisi, on November 17th, at 2100 hours, a group of over ten persons attempted to penetrate the building of the okrug Officers' Club. Only after a warning by the sentry about using firearms and a warning shot in the air did the invading group disappear. The building was damaged.

In Vilnius, on November 17th, a group of around 300 persons blocked the entry to the military housing area. The assembled crowd put out insulting anti-military slogans and shouted out obscenities. Warnings by representatives of the command staff were ignored. When the crowd began throwing stones, bottles, and explosive packets into the area, threatening the lives of the servicemen, fire engines and blank cartridge shots were used to push back the group. When, even after all this, the hooliganism and the insults continued, the crowd was dispersed by a subunit that had arrived from beyond the housing area. The command staff had given prior warning of the impending provocation to the leadership of the republic's MVD, and assurances were received from them that necessary preventive measures would be taken. However, as had happened in similar cases earlier, no steps were taken to halt the provocation. On November 18th, in the Saldusa district (Latvia), an attempt was made to blockade the property of the

aviation training center. With the aid of tractors the road leading to the center was dug up, barricades were made out of trees, and ten support poles for communication lines were knocked over. The same day, in Riga, the staff of the Baltic Military District and the Officers' Club were picketed. The servicemen of the army and navy consider it their highest patriotic duty to serve the Fatherland. They are part of our society and our people. They do not have and could not have any kinds of intentions to infringe upon anyone's rights or to oppress anyone. At the same time they cannot sit back and do nothing when certain activities result in damaging the defense capability of our country and their legitimate interests, and create an immediate threat to the lives and health of servicemen and members of their families. All necessary measures will be taken to suppress similar activities.

Official Rebutals 'Attacks' on Defense Sector

91UM0137A Moscow PRAVITELSTVENNYY
VESTNIK in Russian No 47, Nov 90 p 3

[Interview with B.A. Bukatov, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers State Commission on Military-Industrial Issues, by PRAVITELSTVENNYY VESTNIK correspondent V. Lvov; place and date not given: "An Attack on the Defense Sector?"—first three paragraphs are introduction.]

[Text] It is becoming more and more difficult today for our people—worn out by deficits and lines, literally choking in the waves of glasnost, and carried away by the sweeping rally euphoria—to put their own worries and goals, and the events taking place around them, in proportion to such a seemingly abstract but fundamentally vital notion as national security. Yes, the new thinking is establishing its foothold in the world; there is more trust; the disarmament process has started. But there are still nuclear missiles aimed at our cities. The largest companies in America and the rest of the world are working on defense contracts. Livermore scientific laboratories are developing new-generation weapons. Underground nuclear explosions go off at the test sites in Nevada, Labnor, and Mururoa Atoll.

We have to take all of this into account today when we discuss problems—now, under glasnost, have become public—related to the defense capabilities of our country. Yes, there are still information gaps in this area, and they beget various rumors and speculations. Therefore we asked B.A. Bukatov, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers State Commission on Military-Industrial Issues, to comment on the number of issues which are now at the center of public attention.

[Lvov] Vladimir Aleksandrovich! The nuclear test on Novaya Zemlya has resonated more than ever both in our country and abroad... Why was it necessary?

[Bukatov] Soviet test sites have been quiet since October 1989. Meanwhile, the United States, France, and China conducted 13 nuclear tests this year alone. Under such

circumstances unilateral discontinuation of nuclear testing could have a negative effect on the USSR's national security. It is the opinion of scientists and specialists that a lengthy interval between nuclear tests unfavorably affects our development programs and our ability to sustain the appropriate level of safety and reliability of nuclear weapons, and therefore may lead to a tilt in the strategic balance.

The tests serve a multiple purpose: the reliability and safety of the nuclear stockpile is checked; the ability of military equipment and armaments to withstand nuclear attack is determined; and research is conducted on third-generation nuclear weapons (guided action weapons).

It is impossible to create nuclear weapons without experimental testing. It is the opinion of the scientists who work on nuclear weapons development that the combination of processes taking place during a nuclear explosion cannot be simulated under laboratory conditions, while computer simulations are incomplete and still require experimental field testing. As Academician Goldanskiy said (IZVESTIYA, 8 Nov. 1990), you cannot get needed results from "computer experimentation." Even the Americans—who possess a much more powerful computer base—believe that nuclear testing is absolutely necessary. So, this test on Novaya Zemlya was supposed to provide extremely important information on the safety of nuclear weapons. I should say that this test had already been ready to go at the end of last year. All normal time limits have expired. If we decided not to conduct the test, we would have to accomplish a large volume of dangerous—from the point of view of radiation—mining work to extract the nuclear charge from its sealed concrete test box.

During his trip to the northern test site on 29-30 May 1990, I.S. Belousov, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, informed USSR People's Deputies A.I. Byucheiskiy, A.F. Yemelyanenko, and A.A. Zolotkov, RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] People's Deputy A.N. Butorin, local soviet deputies, and Komi ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic] and Arkhangel Oblast officials of the nuclear test slated to be conducted in 1990.

As a result of his trip to the northern test site, and with the purpose of increasing the population's awareness, I.S. Belousov decided to expand the existing list and charged the Ministry of Defense with informing the Komi ASSR Council of Ministers (V.I. Khudyayev) and Arkhangel Oblispolkom [oblast soviet executive committee] (P.N. Balakshin) of the test date two days before the test, so that the population could be informed through local authorities.

I should admit that this task has not been carried out in practice. In his letter to USSR Supreme Soviet Chairman A.I. Lukyanov, V.N. Chernavin, commander in chief of the Navy, apologized to the USSR Supreme Soviet, the

Komi ASSR Supreme Soviet, and the Arkhangel Oblispolkom for not informing them of the impending nuclear test two days in advance due to severe meteorological conditions.

After the explosion, a visit by people's deputies and representatives of the test region residents was arranged. Members of the group conducted gamma and beta measurements in the area of underground nuclear explosion. These measurements matched the dosimetry data of the test site services and those of the State Committee for Hydrometeorology; they showed that at a 30-meter distance from the shaft the gamma background radiation was no more than 20 microroentgens an hour (the natural background level), and beta radiation was absent entirely. Measurements in the residential settlements of Rogachevo, Belushye, and Severnyy showed the presence of gamma up to 15 microroentgens an hour and an absence of beta radiation, that is, natural background levels. It should be noted at this point that during this test additional steps had been taken to increase the reliability of the jamming complex and to ensure absolute safety from radiation.

At the same time, public concern in regard to nuclear testing in the country is quite understandable. It seems that time is ripe to put this up for discussion in the country's highest legislative body. I should mention that the issue of underground nuclear testing has recently been discussed at the session of the USSR president's Defense Council. A draft resolution on this issue is being worked on, with the participation of RSFSR and Kazakh SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] representatives. After the resolution is approved, the USSR Council of Ministers will report on it to the USSR Supreme Soviet.

[Lvov] Both the public and the press are interested in the process of conversion on the part of the defense industry. Quite often an opinion is heard that conversion is being implemented without a long-term strategy, without any clear plan, without taking into account the coming transition to market relations. What can you say about this?

[Bukatov] Yes, it is true that there is some delay with the final approval of the program. But we have to keep in mind that not only we but all other countries, including Sweden—where they have a general plan of cutting military expenditures in half in 25 years (1990-2015)—lack the experience of development and implementation of a conversion program. However, knowing the importance of a thought-through conversion, the First Congress of the USSR People's Deputies charged the USSR State Planning Committee, the Military-Industrial Commission, and the USSR Ministry of Defense, together with relevant ministries and departments, to develop the State Program for Defense Industry Conversion. The draft program of conversion and the development of civilian production in the defense sector has been worked out and was presented in February 1990 to the session of the USSR Council of Ministers' Presidium, and in March to the session of the

USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Defense and State Security. In September the draft program was discussed at the USSR Presidential Council.

The program aims to fulfill the most socially important tasks—that is, to increase, from 1990 to 1995, the production of consumer goods 1.8 times (to the level of 71 billion rubles [R]); of technology and equipment for: light industry—1.9 times (to R2.43 billion); the agro-industrial complex—2.6 times (to R3.97 billion); trade and public catering—1.9 times (to R1.25 billion); of medical technology—2.4 times (to R3.06 billion); of communications equipment—more than 2 times (to R3.72 billion); of civilian aircraft—more than 2 times (to R2.7 billion); and of civilian marine vessels—1.5 times (to R1.76 billion). As a result, during this period the share of civilian production in the defense sector will increase from 50 to 65 percent.

The program contains a provision that under market conditions this production of civilian goods will be planned within the framework of state orders, that is, their production will offer economic incentives. The program also contains provisions for economic protection of enterprises undergoing conversion, and for social protection of the workers.

Because of the delay in the development and adoption of the conversion program, the USSR Council of Ministers issued a decree on 8 August 1990 which introduced basic measures of social protection for workers of enterprises undergoing conversion. The draft USSR Law on Conversion is also in the works.

In accordance with the decision of the USSR Presidential Council and the USSR Council of Ministers decree, a working group has been created to work out the final version of the draft program, to be presented by 1 December 1990.

[Lvov] Many speculations and untruths are floating around on the issue of our arms exports. KOMSOMOL-SKAYA PRAVDA, for instance, printed that "...the state monopoly on the arms trade has come to an end," and that the USSR Council of Ministers allegedly has given permission to defense sector enterprises to "speedily search for foreign partners..."

[Bukatov] The USSR Council of Ministers has not given such permission to anybody, and could not have done so.

I would like to emphasize here that issues of the USSR's military-technical cooperation with foreign countries have always been, and still are, under the jurisdiction of the Union and are decided by its highest state organs. This has been reaffirmed in a recent USSR presidential decree, introducing new rules for presenting proposals and documents related to military-technical cooperation with foreign countries to the higher state organs. Decisions on such issues, depending on their political significance, scale, and priority level, are made by the USSR Supreme Soviet, the USSR president, or the USSR

Council of Ministers. By the same decree, specific information on military-technical cooperation between the USSR and foreign countries has been forwarded to the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Defense and State Security and the Committee on International Affairs. This information will be made public at a later date.

At this point I can only say that arms sales by the USSR to foreign countries are conducted on the basis of inter-governmental agreements within the framework of our approach to international security, and in accordance with the UN Regulations that specify the right of each country to ensure its own security. I can also say in conclusion that appropriate all-Union legislation is being developed and will be presented to the Supreme Soviet.

Hearings On Generals' Dachas Held

Contrast With Junior Officers' Quarters

91UM0136A Moscow TRUD in Russian 2 Dec 90 p 2

[Report by V. Karpov: "Palaces for the Generals, Shacks for the Officers"]

[Text] The Commission on Privileges and Preferences of the USSR Supreme Soviet has held hearings on the privileges of the Ministry of Defense's highest military officials.

The issue is painful, and it is not new. The fact that palatial mansions for generals and marshals have been and still are being built in the most picturesque of Moscow suburbs has been known for quite a while. What do the high officials in the Ministry of Defense think about it?

Everything, or almost everything, was done by the book. This was the emphasis made by Deputy Minister of Defense N. Chekov in his presentation to the commission and in answering questions. Dachas for the generals have been allocated and built in accordance with government's decrees and directives. Huge lots—one, two, or more hectares—have also been designated for these dachas in accordance with the decisions of local authorities, not by some unauthorized acts.

Let us accept that. But let us also take a closer look at this general-marshal dacha script. In the new dachas just built for the higher military command in the Arkhangelskoye settlement (we are talking about brick mansions here) there are living rooms, entrance halls, kitchens, studies, servants' rooms, several bedrooms and bathrooms in each, a full range of maintenance support, and central heating from a specially built boiler room. Each dacha (although, how can one call it a dacha; it is more like a palace) cost the state—that is, us, the taxpayers—more than 200,000 rubles [R].

What is more, after the owner dies the dacha is reserved for use by his relatives, who get this full set of practically free services. I have in front of me the list of dachas registered as being maintained by the USSR Ministry of

Defense's department for administration and material supply. Ustinov's family, for instance, occupies the same marshal-quality dacha, which also has on its grounds a guardhouse, a servants' house, a shed, an icehouse, a cellar—all in all, 421 square meters. Plus a lot of more than one hectare! In the dacha compounds there are boiler room-laundrettes, hothouses, swimming pools, greenhouses, pool rooms, sports facilities... The list of all these free luxuries goes on and on.

Do ordinary military officers live the same way as the generals who command them? Even the official data of the USSR Ministry of Defense indicates that 38,000 retired officers do not have their own apartments, and therefore have to move in with relatives or neighbors. These are the officers of the victorious Army, famous around the world; these are the people who sacrifice everything for their Motherland.

The following example was mentioned at the session: On Sakhalin Afghanistan war veterans and their families live in an old lighthouse built by the Japanese when they owned the island. This is all our warriors have earned. And what about service time spent in rotten barracks, on a miserly food ration?

The same generals who show an exceedingly "modest" concern for their subordinates' needs—I hope they will forgive me for my perhaps excessive sarcasm—do not spare any efforts when it comes to their own well-being. Truly amazing things happen here. Army General M. Sorokin's mansion, which originally cost R50,000, underwent "restoration" of such magnitude that the work done totaled R300,000. The materials used included marble, walnut and oak veneer boards, ash and oak structural wood, granite decorative tile... But—amazingly—the price of the dacha (officially) remained the same, which allows its owner, who, by the way, is the inspector general of the USSR Ministry of Defense, to pay literally pennies for renting this palace. Is this also by the book?

In the same Arkhangelskoye settlement right next to these dachas (which have grown like mushrooms in just one or two years) there is a hospital which has been under construction for about nine years. Its prospects are still not clear.

Sometimes it is simply painful, and it makes one feel ashamed, to learn behind-the-scenes dacha details. The generals have purchased expensive furniture, television sets, and refrigerators for these dachas at half price. They stubbornly do not want to give up the mansions to be used for kindergartens and day care centers. They pay rent (and even that is a recent innovation; until recently the dachas had been fully maintained by the state) at...1958 tariffs. As if there had been no increases in the cost of construction materials, and no inflation. Does it mean that for generals and marshals everything is permitted? At our expense, by the way.

Here are some figures presented at the commission session by V. Sergeyev, senior inspector of the People's

Control Commission: Last year the maintenance of only Moscow region dachas for the military elite cost R300,000. This does not include the wages of both military and civilian personnel detached to servicing the dachas: protection, special commandants, boiler room mechanics, drivers, communications people, housekeepers, gardeners...

One reads this information and wonders. In one case a personal dacha for a high-level military official was built gratis by military construction units. Yes, those same construction battalions that have this horrible reputation. The same construction battalions which, according to statements by the USSR Ministry of Defense leadership, do not have enough manpower to build elementary living quarters for rank-and-file officers, have enough capabilities, as we can see, to build palaces. In another case—in disregard of a decision by local authorities—a general on his own cut himself off a solid piece of land.

Of course, we are against leveling—and that includes dachas. But when the measure of social justice is so obviously off scale, when the interests of rank-and-file military officers are ignored without even a pang of shame, when the law is subverted or a new, convenient version of it is created to serve a select few, how can one agree to that?

'Just Law' Urged

91UM0136B Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 3 Dec 90
Second edition p 2

[Report by V. Izgarshev under the rubric "Popular Topic": "All Those Privileges"]

[Text] The Commission on Preferences and Privileges chaired by N. Ignatovich has held hearings on a topic popular in the press, generals' dachas. I will say at the outset: Everything the commission members and other USSR people's deputies said was true, and I am ready to subscribe to their every word, whether it is "for" or "against."

Let the reader see no paradox in this statement. It is just like the fable about the famous Hoja Nasreddin. After listening to a woman's complaints about her husband, and then hearing the latter's excuses, the wise man said that both parties had been right. And when a passerby voiced his puzzlement over this decision, Hoja said: "And you, passerby, are right, too."

Why do I quote this fable? Because no matter how long we discuss this "juicy" subject of "generals' dachas" on any, even the highest and most official, level, there is no solution to it. At least until there is a law that covers these things. Otherwise, members of the commission on privileges can discuss it until they turn blue; they can evoke thunder and lightning—quite justifiably, I repeat—until the second coming. Because, beside generals' dachas, there are also ministerial ones and those of many other departments.

What is actually at issue?

Generals' dachas existed in our country long before even the rank of general was officially established. There was such a habit—to give high-ranking Soviet officials suburban palaces abandoned by their owners after the 17 October revolution. Those who were faster on their feet started to move into these palaces on their own, later also helping their deputies, assistants, and family members to the fountain of public generosity. Then later they also started building new palaces with public funds.

What we have never had was a law on dachas. There have been departmental directives, decrees, and other executive acts. But not laws. Just try to make some claim against an owner of a suburban governmental dacha. Other than purely moral reproaches on the topic that in some places soldiers live in what amounts to dirt shacks, and that there are officers with families renting inadequate private quarters without any hope of having their own roof over their heads, nobody can come up with any other means of persuasion. But just because somebody would take a dacha away from a general, 200,000 officers with no place to live would not be better off.

How many of these dachas are there—the ones that were discussed by the Supreme Soviet commission? Sixty-eight in the Moscow region and 74 in all other military districts and the fleets

The generals' dachas, as Ella Pamfilova said, is only one specific issue. It is part of a bigger political problem of an unlawful system of unearned privileges of high-ranking Soviet bureaucrats.

In fairness, all governmental dachas should be converted into rental resorts, with everybody who wants to live there paying for their use out of their own pocket by strictly defined tariffs.

Naturally there should be no leveling or catering to middle-class tastes and notions. Because, I think, everybody understands that a dacha that is being used by the minister of defense, the chief of staffs, or by a commander in chief of one of the armed services should probably have transportation and communication facilities. It should be fairly clear why. You can hardly squeeze all these gadgets onto six hundredths of a hectare.

Well, these are the particulars. The main issue is to bring law and order into this dacha issue and other problems. Therefore, as the commission members noted quite fairly and eloquently, the whole complex of problems should be taken and resolved together. We need an inventory of "little houses" (also read palaces, with saunas, kitchens, and bedrooms) at the firing ranges, in hunting preserves, on the premises of health clubs and sanitariums; we need to count the lines of black limousines at the entrances to General Staffs, and to have a look at "generals' rooms in officers' clubs and dining facilities...

I want to believe that the commission will be able to do what N. Ignatovich, V. Shapovalenko, and others have committed themselves to do; namely, to see this issue through to its logical conclusion, to get the highest organ of power to work out and pass a fair law. Something else. There is hope that not only the high military brass, but also all other citizens who have been undeservedly showered with goods and privileges, will understand that this is a complicated time both for our sick economy and for our society torn by contradictions, and will, on their own, make an appropriate decision in regard to their suburban palaces. After all, good rest does not necessarily require having three floors for three people.

Perhaps it would be even more fair if veterans of war and labor worn out by everyday struggles or combat-maimed "afgantsy" took up residence in the dachas currently allocated by the government to generals and other titled bureaucrats. Or perhaps suburban day care centers could move into these 14-room mansions. Or perhaps the local soviets, having taken possession of these dachas, will rent them for hard currency to rich foreigners?

Debate on Union Treaty Defense Provisions

91UM0152A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
5 Dec 90 First Edition p 1

[Article by Captain 2nd Rank V. Urban under the rubric "At the Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet": "Why We Need a Union Treaty"]

[Text] On Monday the parliament discussed the general concept of the Union treaty and a procedure for concluding it. This question, as everyone knows, appears on the proposed agenda for the Fourth Congress of USSR People's Deputies.

But neither the Supreme Soviet nor the congress has the authority to conclude the treaty. In this instance only the republics have the necessary authority. Why, then, are debates being conducted in the parliament? To some degree the answer was given by A.I. Lukyanov, chairman of the Supreme Soviet, at a meeting on 19 November: "But we need to approve the foundation and propose to the republics that they sign it—this is the task of the congress."

"I believe there is no need to convince anyone of the vital importance of the document which has been introduced for today's discussion," noted R.N. Nishanov, chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities, who was given the floor to present information on the general concept of the Union treaty. "This draft," he explained, "is the fruit of long efforts. Representatives of Union republics and, later, of autonomous republics and national-territorial formations took an active part in the effort. Bilateral and multilateral consultations and regional conferences were conducted."

In my view, G.S. Tarazevich, chairman of the Commission on Ethnic Policy and Interethnic Relations, described the situation in more detail when he said that

a struggle is underway for power both in the center and at the local level—and the ethnic card is playing a role in this struggle. Incidentally, G.S. Tarazevich quoted data from sociological polls: Of those questioned, 73 percent are in favor of preserving the Union within its present borders and only 16 are opposed.

According to the deputies, conclusion of a Union treaty will not take place as quickly as is supposed. At first only some of the republics will sign, and later others will join the treaty.

Many deputies made concrete remarks. For example, disagreement was expressed with the proposed principle of creating a Soviet of Nationalities of a new Union parliament. The draft states that it will be formed from delegates of the supreme representative organs of the republics and organs of power of national-territorial formations according to coordinated norms. Of course the means of cooptation will not be the most democratic. But that is how the republics have agreed on it, and they are the ones to sign the treaty.

Two deputies who are very familiar to our readers—Marshal of the Soviet Union S.F. Akhromeyev and V.N. Lopatin, deputy chairman of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] State Committee for Public Security and Ties with the USSR Ministry of Defense and KGB—gave their views on the authority of the Union in the realm of defense.

According to Deputy S.F. Akhromeyev, the concept of the treaty correctly stipulates that the functions of defense, protection of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Union, and leadership of the Armed Forces will be under the authority of Union organs. In particular, he noted that it is necessary to take into account the nuclear potential of the state, including the strategic offensive weapons which are located on the territory of the RSFSR, the Ukraine, and Kazakhstan. Tactical nuclear weapons are situated on the territory of practically all the Union republics. Administration of the weapons should only be carried out in a centralized fashion.

At the same time the deputy spoke in favor of wider participation by the republics in questions of the organization of defense, particularly in the resolution of issues concerning the stationing of units. He also noted that the republics may have their own internal forces.

Deputy V.N. Lopatin, speaking in the name of the Science Committee, called the transfer of defense questions to the exclusive jurisdiction of the center merely an opportunity to preserve the departmental approach. He believes that the new treaty must strengthen the principles of joint resolution of these questions and of the right of sovereign states which belong to the Union to have their own armed forces.

The debates in the parliament on 3 December show that conclusion of a Union treaty should be very complicated.

A draft bill on the fundamentals of social protection for invalids in the USSR stipulates that the state should not simply "pay off" invalids but rather create social and legal conditions that will ensure them a full and rewarding life in society. This point of view, which was enunciated in the report of V.I. Shcherbakov, chairman of the USSR State Committee for Labor and Social Questions, was also shared by many deputies who spoke at the morning joint meeting of the chambers of the Union parliament on 4 December.

This issue was on the agenda for the previous evening's session, but at that time the deputies only had time to hear the government's report. Therefore V.I. Shcherbakov answered questions in the morning and then a discussion of the first reading of the draft began.

Hard-Line Comments at Veterans' Plenum

91UM0138A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
5 Dec 90 First Edition p 6

[Article by Colonel (Retired) A. Smetanin: "Has It Not Been a Long Time Since We Left the Trenches?"]

[Text] "Has It Not Been a Long Time Since We Left the Trenches?" All-Union Council of Veterans of War, Labor, and the Armed Forces Plenum participants posed this question.

The first thing that struck us before the plenum's work began was the large number of people with USSR People's Deputy badges. Through an All-Union Council Presidium decision, all of them who have been elected from the veterans organization, and I recall there are 75 of them, were invited to the plenum which once again stressed the exclusive importance of the issues submitted on the agenda.

Perhaps the main thing was the issue on missions of veterans organizations under modern conditions. Marshal of the Soviet Union N. Ogarkov, chairman of the All-Union Council of Veterans, delivered a report at the plenum and noted that the all-union veterans organization is true to the socialist choice which our society has made. It decisively supports USSR President Comrade M.S. Gorbachev's shift toward more effective and specific measures to overcome the crisis of power which has taken shape and to establish order and stability in the country because for us, the older generation, the CPSU was and remains the only force capable of uniting the Soviet people and inspiring them to carry out the tasks of perestroika.

I think the main thing is in these words. All of the speakers in the debates, and there were many of them, agreed with these words. Also including the people's deputies who reported to the plenum on their work.

What did they talk about? About the main thing. About what veterans organizations should do during the economic and political crisis situation that has developed in the country.

I heard what had become traditional for many years: "We approve," "we support," and "we are totally dedicated." Nothing like that happened this time. Both the Supreme Soviet, the country's President, and people's deputies from veterans organizations were subjected to criticism for their sluggishness in making fateful decisions for the country, for their too late appeal "to leave the trenches" when the attack can occur with huge losses (as an old private, I experienced this on my own hide during the war years).

"The rebirth of perestroika is occurring," "counterrevolutionary forces are moving out," "external and internal anti-socialist forces are closing in," and "there is no opposition to them from local authorities."

These and many other characteristics of the situation that has been created in the country were the leitmotif in the speeches of A. Sitnikov (Rostov-on-Don), K. Kayris (Vilnius), V. Kabanov (Kaliningrad), and other veterans.

I listened to their speeches and I myself also thought about the following: "Fifty million veterans of war, labor, and the Armed Forces. This is not just a force, this is an enormous power! There are more than three million communists among us. So just where were you during the elections for the authorities? Did sweet-talking sirens really entice you too, hardened by war and life, having promised you the moon tomorrow? Did you also really yield to the chalices of the "T.V. boys" [telemalchiki] who have slaughtered the truth and who now recommend you spread it on your bread instead of butter? Today they are solving problems for you, how it will be with the land, and on which trees to raise bulki [translation unknown].

What does the transition to the market promise veterans? If you consider that over 24 million veterans live on their incomes of less 70 rubles, they expect nothing from the Garden of Eden.

So, what did they fight for? Why did they lay their bones down near Moscow, on the banks of the Volga, and near the Brandenburg Gates?

So that today a shrewd red-cheeked businessman at the Cheremushkinskiy Market could fleece them like sheep?

It is too bad that there are more inadequacies in our lives right now than "adequacies." Examples were presented in the plenum participants' speeches of how other newly appointed "democrats" who have joined forces with criminals are doing everything to bury even that very little that has been done considering veterans contributions and to deprive them of the smallest benefits.

For example, the increased pensions prescribed by the government of the USSR are not being paid to veterans in Estonia. They are being deprived of food orders in Lvov Oblast and in Latvia they are being crossed off the list for improved housing conditions. In Lithuania, where a coup d'etat has essentially already occurred, they have founded a "pocket" union of veterans of labor

while consciously or unconsciously recognizing the force of the mass veterans movement.

"For now, our enemies are beating us without firing a single shot," said Hero of the Soviet Union K. Usenbekov, the representative from Kirgizia. "We need to act decisively otherwise defeat is inevitable."

Veterans see reinforcing the unity of their ranks as a way out of the situation that has developed. The issue on the Soviet Committee of Veterans of War's striving for some sort of autonomy or "sovereignty" has gradually arisen on the agenda and I have already had to write about that.

The absolute majority of speakers condemned this "policy." It was easy to become convinced that only one thing could be seen behind the insistence of the defenders of "sovereignty" for the SKVV [Soviet Committee of Veterans of War]: They maintain ties with international organizations and it is impossible to break them off.

This is all true but, while thinking about the "foreigners" it is also impossible to forget the "native hearths" where people live and that is why the committee was founded. And this precisely is not enough for our SKVV.

Plenum participants clearly and decisively advocated unity of the country's veterans movement. A. Burkhanov (Dushanbe) even proposed uniting the All-Union Organization of Veterans with the Organization of Warrior-Internationalists (Afghantsy [Afghan Vets]).

Here it is appropriate to quote the Belorussian Council of Veterans letter sent to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in which they decisively oppose the creation of a Russian Republic Union of Veterans of the Armed Forces. "The current complicated socio-political situation," the letter states, "demands as never before the unity of the veterans movement. Only in unity and in a fraternal union of veterans of war, labor, and the Armed Forces can we

insure social and legal protection.... We decisively condemn those persons advocating divisive policies."

In the appeal to the 4th Congress of USSR People's Deputies that was adopted at the plenum and which stated in the name of 50 million veterans and voters their unconditional support of M.S. Gorbachev's proposal which is directed at stabilizing the situation in the country, plenum participants demanded an end to the speculation of extremists and anti-social forces on the noble ideals of democracy and glasnost and on our history and the people's disastrous situation.

The appeal stated that "In our opinion, there is one way out to urgently implement the President's appeal to inflict political defeat on those who oppose stabilization of society and the achievement of social agreement.... Veterans are decisively against the dissolution of the USSR. The time has come for action and we need to save the country. Now is the right time to say with caution: 'The Fatherland is in danger!'"

Veterans see one of the main ways to achieve this in the comprehensive reinforcement of our Armed Forces. "There can be only one strong Soviet Army in one Union.... The veterans hope that the peoples chosen representatives will find themselves up to par during this critical moment of our history."

The plenum adopted a statement in which it expressed alarm and indignation with regard to attempts to "drown in fruitless verbiage" the issue on the erection of a Victory Monument for which R194 million of the peoples money has been collected. Veterans insist that the leadership of our state take the required steps to accelerate construction of the memorial complex on Poklonny Mountain.

CPSU Central Committee Secretary O.D. Baklanov participated in the plenum's work and representatives of a number of ministries, departments, and social organizations were present.

New Appointment: Yermakov—Chief of Cadres

91UM0084B Moscow KOMMUNIST
VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian
No 17, Sep 90 p 80

[Unattributed article published under the heading: "Appointments": "Col Gen Viktor Fedorovich Yermakov Appointed USSR Deputy Minister of Defense for Personnel and Chief of the Main Personnel Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense"]

[Text] He was born on 9 September 1935, in the city of Dnepropetrovsk in a worker family. After completing secondary school in 1953, he was admitted to the Kiev Red Banner Unified School for Self-Propelled Artillery imeni M.V. Frunze and since that time has linked his life with the Armed Forces. Holding various officer positions he has served in the Baltic, Carpathian, Moscow, Odessa, Turkestan and Leningrad Military Districts, the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (presently, the Western Group of Forces). He carried out his international duty in the Republic of Afghanistan. For more than seven years, he commanded a training tank platoon and for three years a training tank company. He was the deputy training battalion commander for political affairs. After completing the Military Academy imeni M.V. Frunze, he served in the Guards Kantemirovka Tank Division as the deputy commander of a motorized rifle platoon, the chief of staff and then the commander of a tank regiment and deputy division commander. From this position, he was admitted as a student to the Military Academy of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces and this, like the Academy imeni M.V. Frunze, he completed with a gold medal, being a Lenin scholarship holder for a second time.

After the academy, he was in command of a tank division, an army corps, as well as combined-arms armies, including the 40th in the Republic of Afghanistan. He was the first deputy commander of the Turkestan Military District and the commander of the Central Group of Forces. For the last three years, he was the commander of the Leningrad Military District.

He is a Russian and joined the CPSU in April 1961. He has repeatedly been elected a member of the oblast and republic party committees and was a delegate to the 26th, 27th and 28th CPSU Congresses and the 19th All-Union Party Conference. He is a people's deputy of the RSFSR.

He has been awarded the Orders of the Red Banner (1982), Red Star (1980), for Service to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces 3d Degree (1988) as well as Orders of the Republic of Afghanistan, Czechoslovakia and numerous medals.

He was given the ranks of lieutenant colonel and colonel ahead of time. He became a major general of the tank troops in 1978; lieutenant general from 1981 and colonel general from 1984.

He married at the age of 22. His wife is Mariya Yevstafiyevna, born in 1936, an Ukrainian coming from Ternopol Oblast and she completed the Lvov Polytechnical Institute. They have two sons. Both are officers in the Soviet Army.

**From Answers to Questions of the KVS
[KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL]
Questionnaire**

[KVS] How do you view the current attitude in the officer corps?

[Yermakov] I would say that a predominant majority of the officers has a completely healthy and working attitude. They are clearly aware of and recognize their place and role in defending the fatherland and devote all their forces to this. Although there are those who approach their view of service from careerist positions and voice discontent with army reality. At present, we cannot help but take into account such attitudes even though they are isolated ones.

[KVS] What is your attitude to those officers who submit requests for discharge from the Armed Forces?

[Yermakov] It is a negative one. But it is essential to investigate each specific case. When you talk with the officer, you find out what is what and see whether he will take the request back. Although at times good men are leaving the army and they later regret it and request to return, alas, as they say, the bridges have already been burned.

[KVS] Which of the positions in which you have served do you consider the most difficult for yourself?

[Yermakov] All positions are difficult. But probably it was most difficult to command the 40th Army in Afghanistan. It was a question of the life of the men.

[KVS] And your greatest joy in life?

[Yermakov] That is my family, my wife and children.

[KVS] Have you ever experienced fear?

[Yermakov] Yes, in Afghanistan, when one of the regiments was cut off. Then I feared for the life of these men: would they survive? They did! They did not fail!

[KVS] What do you like to read?

[Yermakov] Everything related to the history of the Russian state.... Although KROKODIL is also a favorite.

[KVS] Do you feel in yourself certain changes with your appointment to such a high post?

[Yermakov] I have not felt it yet. But I know that I will have to work a great deal and I have long since been accustomed to this.

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New Appointment: Zolotov—Moscow MD Chief of Staff

91UM0084C Moscow *KOMMUNIST*
VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 17,
Sep 90 p 81

[Unattributed article, published under the heading "Appointments": "Lt Gen Leonid Sergeyevich Zolotov Appointed Chief of Staff of the Order of Lenin Moscow Military District"]

[Text] He was born on 1 November 1941, in the city of Zhitomir, in a white-collar family. He began his labor career as a mechanic at the Cherkassy RTS [repair and maintenance station] while simultaneously studying in the worker youth school.

He completed the Kiev Tank Technical School (1963), the Military Academy of the Armored Troops imeni MSU R.Ya. Malinovskiy (1974, with a gold medal. During the period of study he was awarded scholarships imeni V.I. Lenin and A.V. Suvorov), and the Military Academy of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces (1987).

He began his officer service in the post of deputy company commander for technical affairs in a training tank regiment at the Military Academy of the Armored Troops. There also he was a company commander, deputy regimental commander and regimental commander. Then followed service in the Southern Group of Forces as the deputy commander of a tank division. Later he was the commander of a motorized rifle division, first deputy commander and commander of a combined-arms army.

He is a Russian and has been a member of the CPSU since 1962.

He has been awarded the Order for Service to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces 2d Degree (1985) and 3d Degree (1977) as well as numerous medals.

He was awarded the rank of major general in October 1988.

He was married in 1961 in the city of Cherkassy. His wife is Lyudmila Grigoryevna, born in 1942, and a native of the town of Khodzhaabad in Uzbekistan, and an Ukrainian. His daughter married an officer. They serve in the Kiev Military District. His son is a Suvorov student in the Moscow Suvorov School.

**From Answers to Questions of the KVS
[KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL]
Questionnaire**

[KVS] What, in your opinion, must be done to raise the level of proper relations between the servicemen?

[Zolotov] It is essential to establish normal human relations for their service, life and recreation so that a military man has housing, a clear daily regimen, seize the

results of his labor and is content with his family and children, and can spiritually enrich himself and have recreation. Then everything will fall into place. No change for the better can be achieved by any appeals, slogans or invocations. The work of the cultural universities which exist in the military schools and in the troops is instantly cancelled as soon as an officer enters the whirlwind of life's vicissitudes.

[KVS] What years in your life do you consider the most fruitful?

[Zolotov] Generally speaking, I cannot complain of the years I have lived but the most memorable were when I was in command of a division: two years in the GVSG [Group of Soviet Forces in Germany] and three in the Moscow Military District. At that time, I felt myself to be more of the master of the situation, I saw the results of my work and all that I planned I realized.

[KVS] Do you ever have to conquer yourself?

[Zolotov] Certainly, everyday, when I must get up at 0600 hours for exercises. Then, when I am on my way to work in a good mood, each time I think to myself that today I have conquered myself again.

[KVS] What do you seek most of all at present?

[Zolotov] Planning, efficiency and organization on all levels. The district is a special one, the stress is great, there are many slips and some are inclined to speculate on this and justify their failings. Precise planning is the path to success.

[KVS] Have you kept any lieutenant habits?

[Zolotov] I have. And the most important of these is to do everything conscientiously. Ever since I have been a lieutenant, it has been extremely difficult for me to tolerate inefficiency when someone promises something but does not do it.

[KVS] What did you think about when you have finished your first day in the new position?

[Zolotov] That day I became acquainted with the men. I liked how they received me and I felt that I would be useful to them.

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New Appointment: Kuznetsov—Chief of Staff of Western Group of Forces

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VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 17,
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[Unattributed article published under the heading "Appointments": "Lt Gen Leonid Vasilyevich Kuznetsov Appointed Chief of Staff and First Deputy Commander of the Western Group of Forces"]

[Text] He was born on 13 August 1938 in the town of Arkadak in Saratov Oblast in a worker family. He began his labor activities at the Serp i Molot Plant in the city of Saratov and completed the Worker Youth School and the Saratov Technical School (in the specialty of lathe operator). In December 1961, he was called up into the Soviet Army and for two years trained in courses for the training of platoon commanders in the Leningrad Military Combined-Arms Command School imeni S.M. Kirov. With a diploma for finishing (as an external student) this school he was sent to the Carpathian Military District in the post of rifle platoon commander. He was also the commander of a reconnaissance platoon, a reconnaissance company, and chief of intelligence in a motorized rifle regiment.

Then followed studies in the Military Academy imeni M.V. Frunze and upon completion of this he became a regimental commander in the Siberian Military District. From the post of deputy commander of a motorized rifle division, he was admitted to the Military Academy of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces. After the academy, he was the commander of a motorized rifle division, the first deputy commander of a combined-arms army, and chief of staff and first deputy commander of the Order of Lenin Moscow Military District.

He is a Russian and has been a CPSU member since 1966. He was a delegate to the 27th CPSU Congress.

He has received the Orders of the Red Star (1990), for Service to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces 2d Degree (1984) and 3d Degree (1975) as well as numerous medals.

He was given the rank of lieutenant colonel ahead of time (1974). He was a major general since February 1982; lieutenant general since February 1988.

He married in Leningrad in 1963. His wife is Yelena Pavlovna, born in 1937, a native of the town of Engels in Saratov Oblast and a Russian; she completed the Leningrad Electrical Engineering Technical School. They have two daughters. The elder completed the Chernigov State Pedagogical Institute and the younger is in secondary school.

**From Answers to Questions of the KVS
[KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL]
Questionnaire**

[KVS] What do you find pleasing and what disappointing in today's army service?

[Kuznetsov] I am disappointed by the fact that the prestige of military service is dropping. I have worn a uniform for more than 20 years now and I am comparing how service in the army is currently perceived in a contradictory manner by various strata of our society. This obliges us to change the style of our work and seek out ways for emerging from the existing situation.

I am pleased by the fact that perestroika is entering all spheres of our army life with a broadening of democratic

principles, a more active solution to social problems and the carrying out of the military reform in the context of a defensive doctrine. Finally, the idea of a reasonable sufficiency for defense is gaining its embodiment and army service will be governed by such a legal enactment as the Law on Defense.

[KVS] In your opinion, does power always alter a man?

[Kuznetsov] I feel that it does. But these changes can be for the worse or for the better, depending upon what qualities a person possessed initially. If such ones as order, industry, a feeling of personal dignity and respect for others are present then the person given power will use all of this for the common good and will not employ power for selfish purposes. But if the listed qualities are lacking in a person or are warped as he advances in service, then the granted power can alter a person for the worse. There are many examples of this.

[KVS] What harmful habits have you been able to escape from and how?

[Kuznetsov] In order to get rid of harmful habits, one must possess them. That is how it seems to me. I do not smoke, I am indifferent to alcohol and other human weaknesses. I feel that it is harder to get rid of anything harmful than it is to acquire this and for this reason I endeavor to develop those habits and traits which contribute to success in service, life and family happiness.

[KVS] What is your attitude toward the military press?

[Kuznetsov] I will say directly that it is varied. First of all, it is a good thing that KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL, VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL and VOYEN-NAYA MYSL have become significantly more interesting, truthful and historical. But the military press must, in my view, provide a more decisive rebuff to all the attacks addressed against the Armed Forces and defend army interests in a bolder and more active manner.

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**New Appointment: Samsonov—Commander,
Leningrad MD**

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VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 17,
Sep 90 p 83

[Unattributed article published under the heading "Appointments": "Lt Gen Viktor Nikolayevich Samsonov Appointed Commander of the Order of Lenin Leningrad Military District"]

[Text] He was born on 10 November 1941, on the Dukhovnitskiy Sovkhoz in Dukhovnitskiy Rayon of Saratov Oblast in a white-collar family. A year after completing secondary school, he worked as a lathe operator at the Izhemskiy TETs at the railroad station of

Sosnogorsk. He was then admitted to the Far Eastern Higher Combined-Arms Command School.

He began his officer career in a naval infantry regiment in the Pacific Fleet in the post of platoon commander. He was later in command of a company. In 1972, he completed the Military Academy imeni M.V. Frunze, he served as chief of staff and commander of a motorized rifle regiment and chief of staff of a tank division. After completion of the Military Academy of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, he was the commander of a motorized rifle division and chief of staff and first deputy commander of an army and commander of a combined-arms army. For three years, he was the chief of staff and first deputy commander of the Transcaucasus Military District. He also served in the North Caucasus Military District, the Northern Group of Forces and three years in a remote locality.

He is Russian and has been a member of the CPSU since 1965. He was elected a buro member of the Gorkom of the Azerbaijan CP.

He has been awarded the Orders of the Red Banner (1990), for Service to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces 2d Degree (1985) and 3d Degree (1975) as well as numerous medals.

He received the rank of lieutenant colonel ahead of time (1974). He became a major general in February 1983; a lieutenant general since October 1986.

In 1969 he was married in the city of Vladivostok. His wife is Lyudmila Nikolayevna, born in 1946, a native of the city of Vladivostok, a Russian and she completed the Higher Navigation School. They have two sons. The elder is an officer candidate in the Moscow Higher Military Combined-Arms Command School imeni Verkhovnyy Sovet RSFSR and the younger is a 7th grader in secondary school.

From Answer to Questions of the KVS [KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL] Questionnaire

[KVS] Has everything in your service gone as you imagined?

[Samsonov] Precisely thus, and even above my expectations. I considered the post of district commander as unattainable for myself. An unachievable dream. But then our government and the leadership of the Ministry of Defense showed me the greatest confidence. I will do everything possible to show that they have not erred in my appointment.

[KVS] What is your attitude toward the systematizing of service time for the officers and warrant officers ["praporshchik"]?

[Samsonov] The most affirmative. I myself am indignant that certain officers and warrant officers have had their constitutional rights infringed. For example, there is the faulty practice when without any reason they are recalled from leave or are not given their days off. Any officer or

warrant officer will dedicate himself fully to service only when he has some respite so that he can spend time with his family and rest. I will watch this.

[KVS] What character traits have contributed most to your growth as a commander?

[Samsonov] Above all, justice in resolving all questions. This has helped and, I would say frankly, has tended to conceal at times some of my shortcomings. Also there is a desire to firmly follow the demands of the regulations and not to think up anything superfluous.

[KVS] Have you ever been insulted?

[Samsonov] I have, and more than once. I have always been insulted by a lax attitude toward me for any oversights in service but most of all by injustice.

[KVS] What is your favorite occupation?

[Samsonov] I love sports. I love to attend the theater, although in truth for many years I have not had such an opportunity. Now in Leningrad, I hope to make up for the loss.

[KVS] What would you wish for yourself upon assuming the new post?

[Samsonov] To establish as quickly as possible contact with the men, to win authority in the new collective and to move things forward evenly, without interruptions and without jolts.

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On Formation of Military Trade Union

91UM0084A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
1 Nov 90 First Edition p 1

[Article, published under the heading "At the Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet," by Capt 2d Rank V. Urban: "Are Servicemen Trade Unions Necessary?"]

[Text] Can servicemen join trade unions? The USSR Draft Law on Trade Unions, the Rights and Guarantees for Their Activities which the deputies reviewed on Tuesday in its first reading, for now provides an affirmative answer to this question.

Let me recall that on 3 October, the Parliament recommended that the initial version of the draft law be fundamentally reworked. In submitting the new draft, the Chairman of the Commission on the Questions of Labor, Prices and Social Policy, N.N. Gritsenko (incidentally, a deputy from the trade unions), said that this document is in the packet of legislative enactments aimed at stabilizing the situation in the nation and converting to a market economy. In his opinion, precisely such a law creates an opportunity to pool the efforts of the state, the entrepreneurs and the trade unions in ensuring stable relations at the enterprises and in society.

Is this the case? Up to now, as the debates have shown, serious differences of opinions have been maintained in the assessments of the view of the draft between the deputies, the representatives of the independent trade unions, the former AUCCTU and the management bodies. Speaking on behalf of the government, the Chairman of the USSR Goskomtrud [State Committee for Labor and Social Problems], V.I. Shcherbakov, was sharply critical of a number of articles. He mentioned, in particular, that the organizing of trade unions in the army was "going too far," as military service was an universal obligation. Consequently, do the trade unions "intend to protect the workers against state obligations or cancel the orders of the command?"

A second reading will settle everything once and for all. For now, the right to establish trade unions or join them, according to the draft, is to be extended to servicemen, personnel of the leadership and rank-and-file personnel of the internal affairs bodies. In truth, "considering the particular features established by the law."

The law itself does not provide for these very particular features. The other legislative enactments, as is known, do not involve such problems. A sort of legal special case

arises. And there are many such gaps. The situation on this level was clarified by the Chairman of the Committee on Legislation Yu.Kh. Kalmykov. Representatives of the committee participated in working out the draft but, unfortunately, Yu.Kh. Kalmykov complained, in the committee itself we were unable to review it due to the hurry in creating the document. This is also one of the reasons for the poor quality of the draft. So we are waiting until December when it will be brought up for a second reading.

Upon the proposal of the Chairman of the Council of Union, I.D. Laptev, the USSR Supreme Soviet adopted a decision to establish an independent parliamentary commission to examine cases involving the death of Soviet soldiers in peacetime. Recently, the chairman of the chamber announced, a group from the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers arrived in Moscow with a demand for a dispassionate examination of the circumstances involving the death of their sons. The members of parliament demanded special hearings in the Supreme Soviet and a report from the Main Military Procurator on this question. The Member of the USSR Presidential Council, the Deputy V.A. Yarin, was elected the chairman of the parliamentary commission.

Doubts on Quality of Military Aircraft

91UM0085A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
1 Nov 90 First Edition p 2

[Article by Col A. Manushkin, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "The Stingy Person Pays Twice, or Once Again About the Quality of Aviation Equipment Entering the Inventory"]

[Text] The investigation report on this aircraft accident stated: "Thirty-five seconds after the start of the Tu-22M2's takeoff roll, there was a failure of the right moving section of the wing..." Put simply, it fell off on takeoff. The aircraft crashed into the ground. One of the crew members had time to eject; the rest perished. The board established that there was a design-production flaw. They began to inspect other aircraft of this type. They discovered cracks on the lower wing panel on many of them. Modifications were quickly made to reinforce the structure. Thus, new aircraft accidents were prevented...

If you check all aviation accidents and catastrophes, two main groups of causes will be revealed. The first is fault of personnel: pilots, technicians, and other aviation specialists. The other group is not their fault—these causes are most often called design-production flaws.

This article is about the latter. Why are there so many?

Aviators joke that the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency supposedly got hold of the plans for a Soviet fighter. They began to assemble it, but it turned out to be...a tractor. They sent the agents an inquiry: "What did you send us?" After some confusion, a reply was received with apologies: They said they were unable to get the list and schematics of modifications in time...

It is an old joke; I heard it back when I was a lieutenant. To tell the truth, I do not like it because it hurts our selfless, hard-working designers and creators of aviation equipment, in which our country has a right to take pride. But there still is some truth in the fable. Visit any aviation unit and you are sure to see representatives of industry there. Plant brigades are almost registered at aviation regiments. There are constant so-called modifications of series-produced aircraft (or their engines, armament, sighting and navigation equipment, and so forth). This situation is not just in aviation. I once had occasion to serve in the Air Defense Forces—and I saw quite a few representatives of plant teams there: they were "modifying" not only aircraft but also surface-to-air missile systems and radar equipment. The situation is similar in the Navy and the Ground Forces.

Of course, both a designer and a manufacturing plant can make a mistake. But, you see, that is not the point; the point is how to keep these mistakes to a minimum so we do not waste huge amounts of money on eliminating them. Alas, the present system of "refinements" is an obstacle in the path of this.

After state testing of an aircraft (tank, ship), the following is usually recorded in a formal document: "The product can be adopted into operational service after elimination of the following flaws" (or "after the following work is performed"...). A long list follows. I counted about 1,000 of these flaws in the document for one of the fighters...

Series production of equipment is adjusted further. So-called experimental operation of equipment in the troops begins. And again there are modifications, modifications, modifications... The time period of this experimental operation—from state testing until the equipment is adopted into the inventory—sometimes stretches out for many years. Thus, the Su-27 was tested in 1983 and adopted into the inventory only last year.

But adoption into the inventory is also more than a formal act. "Unfinished" equipment is operated—even though it is counted in the strength levels of units and subunits as combat units that must carry out their assigned missions. And they generally do. As they say, there is no place to hide.

There is also another "nuance." As long as the equipment is under warranty, the plant representatives spend day and night in the units. This is understandable. But the same is true after the warranty period. That is because defects, including design defects, are detected for a long time yet, and they must be corrected. However, now this is done at the expense of the Ministry of Defense, which incurs great losses. Such is the state of affairs.

Who is to blame for this situation? The experimental design bureaus, which created these same aircraft in the plans? The plants, which manufactured them? The Air Force, which ordered them?

Very rarely is one able to find the extreme. In the Air Force, they throw up their hands. They say: We ordered a machine with such and such characteristics, and what did give us? The plant representatives refuse to have anything to do with it: after all, we only made it. The experimental design bureaus say the technology is new, and the time frames were unrealistic. So, he who operates the equipment turns out to be the "extreme:" the pilots, navigators, and technicians, for they end up in an accident or catastrophe...

All the same, in my view, the cause is in the system that has developed in our country for creating new equipment and armament. We have virtually no companies that could compete against one another, which means we have no choice. The armed forces are forced to take what they give. As they say, for the lack of anything better. And in order to have fewer complaints from the army, its representatives firmly "hook on" to the process of both creating and "breaking in" the equipment in the earliest stages. Quite powerful structures of scientific institutions have been created for this in the armed forces.

The balance sheet of the Air Force, for example, has a number of scientific research institutes. Just one of them has three doctors and more than 100 candidates of sciences. The situation is the same in the other services of the armed forces.

Are such institutes necessary in the army? Alas, under the existing system of scientific research, experimental design work, and production of equipment and armament—yes they are. One of them is engaged in prognostication, that is, studying problems of what kind of military equipment we should have in the near and distant future. Others participate jointly with design bureaus and industry in experimental development of models of armament and in bringing them to series production. It seems that this is good: it is as if a fusing of science, design developments, and series production and operation takes place in the interest of the cause. In actuality, that is by no means the case.

In the future, we must think strongly about this.

What is the practice of world aircraft construction in this regard? Take Northrop Corporation or any other American aviation company. They participate—invariably on a competitive basis—in the fight for the right to obtain an order from the Pentagon to produce some or other type of aircraft. Since this is a profitable business, they pay well for a military order—they try to win the competition. After winning, they do not dally—they produce a large series of aircraft in a short period of time. For example, more than 2,000 F-15 fighters were produced in less than three years. And production was then halted. The income received from the order covered everything, including costs for scientific research, experimental design work, and made it possible to create inventory for the future.

Let us compare this with our activities. The Experimental Design Bureau imeni P.O. Sukhoy, when it began converting its operation to conditions of direct contracts, had nothing besides debts amounting to about 16 million rubles. Why? In our country, financing of science is separate from production. That is why the firms of A. Mikoyan, A. Tupolev, and P. Sukhoy have next to nothing when it comes to money, for we are not accustomed to paying for ideas. Experimental production is also unprofitable, since they manufacture the machines by hand, as the designers and testers say, "on the knee."

How else is mass production of aircraft of the same type in a short period of time advantageous? The first series-produced plane almost does not differ at all from the last one. This simplifies and reduces the cost not only of production but also of operation and training of personnel. And vice versa. The first model of the MIG-23 and the last one, the MIG-23MLD, are as different from one another as the earth and sky. They are totally different planes—in airframe, engine, armament, and sighting and navigation equipment. How many series of this plane in all were produced during the years of its production! And significant design changes were made

to each of them. It was necessary largely to adjust production anew and retrain personnel. This complicated operation and repair of the aircraft due to the lack of interchangeability of many parts, components, and assemblies.

I hear objections: they say, we did not and now still do not have either the manpower or the money (especially given the present state of the economy) to produce large batches of aircraft in a short period of time. And one could agree with this. But has anyone calculated how much money was wasted on costs associated with the established "drawn-out" system of development and production of aviation equipment and other armaments? After all, every aviation plant annually wastes many thousands of norm-hours just for modifications associated with improving the design of aircraft, engines, armaments, and so forth. And this is no less than millions of rubles for each enterprise.

There is a reason they say the stingy person pays twice. And we are paying for the "savings" in science and for the lack of competition among firms. It would be okay if these sacrifices were only in rubles; as we see, we also have to pay with pilots' lives.

It must be said that neither the experimental design bureaus, nor industry, nor the customers, in the person of the armed forces and the Ministry of Defense, are satisfied with the present system of scientific research, development, production, and operation of equipment and armaments. Attempts are now being made to change something in the system. But if these attempts last as long as the "refinement" of equipment and armaments, we will be reaping the fruits of the present system for a long time yet.

Response to Questions on Tu-160

91UM0085B Moscow VOYENNYE ZNANIYA
in Russian No 8, Aug 90 pp 12-13

[Article by Col (Ret) V. Knyazkov: "The Strategic Missile-Carrier Tu-160"]

[Text] *We can finally fulfill the request of A. Bessonov (Balakovo), V. Sysoyev (Blagoveshchensk), Kh. Mudarov (Chechen-Ingush ASSR), and many other of our readers and tell about the Tu-160.*

...In the distance, where the wide runway seems like a narrow school ruler, an initially faint light suddenly flashed. Approaching swiftly, in several seconds it turned into two powerful spotlights bursting forth with a raging light...

The roll and takeoff of the giant weighing 275 tons are an impressive sight. The beak-shaped nose lifted upward, and the entire machine sort of picked itself up and tore away from the ground with a deafening roar. The spotlights went out, and the landing gear disappeared into the aircraft body. The aircraft, gaining altitude in a tight spiral, hid behind the clouds.

That is precisely how the Long-Range Aviation aircraft start each day and leave on many-hours-long training flights, flying over the Arctic and the ocean expanses in rather close vicinity with NATO aircraft carriers and fighter interceptors.

The "weapon of a nation" is how foreign military experts speak of the Tu-160 missile-carrier developed by the collective of the Experimental Design Bureau imeni A.N. Tupolev. Is there not an "excess" in such a characteristic?

The program for creating the Tu-160 was adopted in the late 1970's. This was a forced and also costly measure in response to the development of the B-1B strategic bombers in the United States. And it must be said that domestic designers made a credible showing. They creatively followed modern trends in creating aircraft of this class, the most important of which were: a long operating range; a considerable payload; the ability to penetrate enemy air defenses at low altitudes at transonic speed or at high altitudes at supersonic speed; minimum signature, above all, radar, thermal, acoustic, and optic.

What was the result? A large, beautiful machine, which has entered the fighting team of the USSR Air Force, soared into the sky. Of course, it is not a matter of beauty, but a matter of the combat qualities which the Tu-160 possesses. Does what I have stated above pertain to the new Tupolev offspring? Fully. Today, the aircraft is considered by military experts of the world to be the best strategic supersonic missile-carrier. Actually, this is a powerful air-based missile launcher capable of hitting targets in the deep rear. As NATO experts say, it can do everything. The NATO strategists hastened to nickname it "Blackjack."

Evaluate the aircraft's specifications and performance characteristics. It is 54 meters long and has a wingspan of 55.7 meters at minimum wing sweep. With such a size, the missile-carrier can barely fit even on half a football field. The aircraft is 12.8 meters high. The Tu-160 is considered to be a world record holder for these characteristics. But what about the performance characteristics of this giant? Earlier, the term supersonic was used regarding the Tu-160. Really, the powerful and at the same time economical propulsion system drives the missile-carrier at altitude to a top speed of 2,000 km per hour (Mach 1.9) and even more. The aircraft, weighing several hundred tons, also pierces the atmosphere with ease, like a frontal aviation jet fighter. This attests to the perfection of the large aircraft's design and its remarkable aerodynamic qualities.

Let us turn to the picture [not reproduced]. What catches your eye first of all? The smooth, "slicked down" contours and the relatively thin wing, which, moreover, has a variable geometry. Of course, you will not surprise anyone now with such a wing design if you were talking about a jet fighter. But this is unusual when it comes to a strategic missile-carrier. What efforts must be exerted

to control the multi-ton swing sections of the wing directly in flight, and when they are so long (the wingspan is just under 56 meters)! But they move surprisingly easily, smoothly, and precisely. In addition, the designers were able to decrease the cross-section of the fuselage: they moved the cockpit forward somewhat, beyond the nose strut, which lengthened the nose cone and made it possible to place the onboard radar in a radome with smoother contours. In addition, not a single panel and not a single external suspension point, much less missiles and bombs, can be seen under the wing. The entire combat arsenal is located inside the aircraft. The wing is smooth and "slices" the air mass without disturbance.

The crew has an abundance of aircraft maneuver capabilities from which to choose. A flick of a switch and the huge aircraft turns into a slow-moving aircraft with a minimum wing-sweep angle of 20 degrees. Hardly gaining altitude, another switch is turned on and the wings obediently fold back to the maximum angle of 65 degrees, and the missile-carrier itself begins to literally "devour" the airspace: more than 1 km every 2 seconds!

The creators of the Tu-160 sought to have the aircraft possess the same operating range both during high-altitude flights at supersonic speed and during low-altitude flights in the terrain-following mode. Western experts recognize the value of such a wide range of its flight capabilities. After carefully studying the flight modes of the Soviet missile-carrier, they gave an answer to the main question—the Blackjack is capable of penetrating enemy air defenses.

What does high-altitude supersonic flight mean? This is equivalent to a shell shot from the barrel of an artillery gun rushing toward the target. The terrain-following mode can be compared to crawling on your stomach. It cannot be said that the Tu-160 moves in the same manner, for its environment is air, but it is a fact that during low-altitude flight at transonic speed it is almost pressed to the ground. During this time, a highly accurate automatic system operates. It vigilantly follows the terrain: What is beneath the aircraft—a hill, valley, hollow, river? The Tu-160 responds instantly to this system's commands, moving swiftly upwards over the slope of an elevation, then rushing downward, as if rolling over a small hill and then floating over the glassy surface of a river. These are flight modes which make the task of air defense weapons extremely complicated: they do not have time to react to the appearance of the missile-carrier, which is capable of penetrating the impact zone of the surface-to-air missiles in a dash. As far as an intercept by fighters is concerned, try to catch up with an "artillery shell."

Experts from the West have concluded that the Tu-160's flight modes for penetrating air defenses are equivalent to using the "Stealth" technology used in development of the American B-2 bomber. Its goal is to make the aircraft inconspicuous for air defense weapons, and the skin of the aircraft is made using a special technology. As a

result, a bomber having a surface of several dozen square meters appears on the radar screen as a small aerial target with a cross-section of about 1 square meter or even less. Of course, it is fairly difficult to detect such a target. However, "Stealth" technology requires large expenditures. And it is not by chance, therefore, that in the West they believe that the methods used in the Tu-160 for penetrating air defenses are more preferable.

The aircraft's armament is a special subject. It carries missiles on board; however, this is not quite a conventional missile-carrier but a strategic missile-carrier. Every sortie by this giant is an event, and this is no exaggeration. Whereas during the Great Patriotic War a crew of a long-range bomber, immediately after dropping bombs on Berlin, was authorized to report mission accomplishment by radio directly to the supreme commander in chief, there is no need to talk about the importance of the Tu-160, capable of delivering nuclear strikes against targets. All of its armament is housed in two compartments located directly in the fuselage. Each compartment has two revolving-type launchers. What are in these launchers' "drums?" Variations are possible here. In one instance, the launchers may be equipped with cruise missiles with a firing range of 3,000 km (6 in each launcher, for a total of 12). In another, they can be equipped with air-to-surface attack missiles (12 in each,

for a total of 24). It is also possible to carry aerial bombs. The total combat payload with a maximum fuel reserve on board is 16,330 kg.

As far as the airborne equipment is concerned, it conforms to the highest modern level. The fuselage is literally crammed with all sorts of electronics: there are more than 100 computers, which perform numerous and important functions of guidance, control, vectoring, navigation, and communications. For example, the navigator's position alone has eight computers, a comprehensive bombing system, an onboard radar, and a super-long-range navigation system. In order to make it easier for him to estimate the accuracy of course plotting, a special computer operates continuously, drawing out the actual flight route on an aerial navigation map. Now it is becoming clear why the aircraft, ranked as a strategic aircraft, is controlled by a small crew: two pilots, right and left; and two navigators, one called the navigator-operator. They are charged with monitoring and making critical decisions. Highly reliable automatic equipment will accurately perform everything else.

Let us add that the military pilots speak highly of the Tu-160's combat qualities. The supersonic strategic missile-carriers perform all combat training missions with a grade of "excellent."

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Operations of Center for Hyperbaric Research Described

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10 Nov 90 First Edition p 4

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Captain 3rd Rank Yu. Gladevich: "Now It Can Be Told: Double Life of the 'Ichthyoids'"; first paragraph is KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] The Center for Hyperbaric Research (TsGI) of the USSR Navy is carrying out an experiment involving prolonged underwater stays by aquanauts at a depth of 500 meters. Our correspondent tells us about the nature of the experiment, the work being done by researchers of the "underwater space," and the problems encountered by the TsGI of the VMF (Navy).

These people lead a double life. The first one is that of an ordinary person, one with his involved but usual—officer's or warrant officer's—duties that are determined by the unit's establishment and daily rush of affairs. The second one is definitely not typical of humans, for the conditions to which the aquanauts are subjected have little in common with those on the earth.

Judge for yourself. What do we breathe here on earth? This is the kind of question and answer we experience in grade school: about 80 percent nitrogen, something more than 20 percent oxygen, and hundredths and even thousandths of a percent of other gases. The air breathed by aquanauts located at a depth of 500 meters consists of only tenths of a percent of oxygen and about 1.5 percent of nitrogen. The rest is helium.

There are more unusual conditions under which the aquanauts live and work for days on end. There is the unusual pressure: 50 atmospheres. The density of the gaseous environment is extremely high: The air can be "packed" with the hands like a snowball. True, it does slip through the fingers; air is not snow, after all. Heat transfer and other processes occur in a different way in a gaseous environment. Probably the most amazing thing is what happens in the blood and tissues of a human, something most strange to us. In a word, it is another life, almost another planet.

"It goes without saying that this duty is harder than most," said Doctor of Medical Sciences Valentin Vladimirovich Semko, scientific supervisor of the experiment. "Believe me, I am not exaggerating when I refer to the people you see through the pressure unit's viewing ports as heroes. Every second is for them a risk. They realize that in case something occurs—illness, injury—expert medical assistance may be some time in coming. That is something that can be rendered only after an aquanaut undergoes many days of decompression."

Incidentally, I think that Valentin Vladimirovich is laying it on a little thick. The splendid instrumentation used to monitor the aquanauts' condition is capable of detecting the slightest pathological changes occurring in

their bodies at extremely early stages. There is nothing amazing in that, since monitoring is effected at the organ as well as the cell level.

Nonetheless, there is still substantial risk. Why do these young, strong lads—officers and warrant officers—subject themselves to it?

It is common knowledge that man has worked hard to conquer space. And he has gained much in the process. However, the ocean, whence he came, his companion for thousands of years, is essentially for him a little-known and often hostile environment. Be that as it may, continued development of our civilization requires that we relentlessly enrich our knowledge of the ocean.

Take the problem of energy resources, for example. Scientists virtually everywhere in the world are of the opinion that extraction of petroleum—that most important energy source—will decline. This means that only the ocean can come to mankind's assistance.

To enable man to one day freely search the ocean for mineral resources and organize their mining, all countries are carrying out extensive research and are developing technologies and equipment to extract petroleum from the ocean floor. This is also being done in our country, including the TsGI of the Navy.

Until the beginning of the 1970s, divers employed the short-term dive method to achieve great depths. However, it permitted a diver to descend no more than 200 meters; there was also a limitation to the time he could remain on the ocean floor: only about 30 minutes. With this method, it was not possible to overcome the physiological barriers to descending to greater depths, since a human would begin to feel the toxic and narcotic effects of the inert gases, oxygen, and increased hydrostatic pressure.

Scientists sought ways to overcome the barriers. A solution was found when they developed a method of remaining submerged for extended periods of time. This represented a substantial leap forward in underwater technology.

"At a depth of 300 meters," said Valentin Vladimirovich Semko, "we got to the point where the aquanauts could remain submerged up to 45 days, working an 8-hour day every day; at depths to 450 meters, up to 25 days. In recent extended submersion experiments at the 500-meter depth, we increased this to 10 days. The present experiment has the purpose of stretching out submersion at the half-kilometer depth to 20 days. That would be a singular record."

So much for research and records, but what good is this for practical application?

"After we conquered the 300-meter depth," said Captain 1st Rank G. Belenitsyn, "we devised techniques a diver can employ at that depth, built special sea complexes, and turned all the documentation over to the State Committee for Science and Technology for use in the

national economy. The USSR Minneftegasprom [Ministry of the Petroleum and Gas Industry] was successful in negotiating these depths, thus enabling it to prospect and extract petroleum at the depths of the continental shelf in northern seas and the Pacific Ocean.

"Considering the Navy's needs in the area of underwater technical work and the interests of the national economy, in 1985 the USSR Council of Ministers issued a special decree charging us with the responsibility of negotiating depths down to 500 meters, with this to be accomplished by 1991. We are presently working on this. Much depends upon the results we attain in our researches, since we are the only ones with the capability of developing precise biotechnical requirements applicable to the construction of specialized diver life-support systems for use at such depths and of testing the technology of underwater technical work."

Let me digress a bit at this point. I was told by the Naval Search and Rescue Service that the Navy and other ministries and departments presently have no vessels and other technical materiel that can operate at depths of 300 to 500 meters, and that the prospects of acquiring them in the future are quite dim. On top of that, even the Navy's equipment that can operate at lesser depths is not in much better shape.

That aside, let us return to the Navy's TsGI. Actually, watching as the experiment is in progress, a person sees in all clarity the urgency and importance associated with the TsGI researches. The aquanauts' condition is constantly monitored in real time. There is an accumulation of truly priceless data that are not only of immediate value (an extremely important factor), but also of long-term significance.

The aquanauts are: Captain 3rd Rank L. Solodkov; Lieutenant Colonel of Medical Service S. Ganenko; Major of Medical Service A. Boytsov; and Warrant Officers P. Fedoruk, V. Razumovich, Ye. Krupa. Today they are young and healthy. However, how will their health be affected in later years, after having spent thousands of hours at extreme depths? There is no way to judge at the present time. But this must be done. It must be done, because the work at these depths will soon leave the experimental stage and enter the practical, and a legion of practical aquanauts will start testing these effects on themselves. Before that happens, we must have at least a general idea of how the extreme depths affect the human body and of how its functions may be disrupted.

That is why the aquanauts are working so selflessly in the pressure unit. They are working under patently stressful conditions. They should be handled more carefully, but—alas!—there is no other way. There are no other personnel. This also means that there are no replacements. The people who are descending into the depths could do with a rest and take better care of themselves.

"We are undergoing a reduction, the same as many Armed Forces units and facilities," said Captain 1st

Rank A. Pivak, chief of the NII [scientific research institute] to which the Center for Hyperbaric Research belongs. "It seems that not much thought is devoted to whether the usual criteria should be applied to a research institution when the time comes to effect a personnel reduction, compared with the case of, say, a motorized rifle regiment."

But is it really necessary to apply cuts to something like the Navy TsGI? Perhaps it should be expanded, instead?

The Center has unique equipment with which it can carry out complex medical, physiological, and other research. It is in a position to perform research in a wide spectrum of scientific and applied problems.

The Navy TsGI has been visited a number of times by "competitors" - delegations from foreign firms and hyperbaric research centers. This includes the Comex of France, Sfay of England, Dregger Werk of West Germany, and experts from the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.

They admitted that the Navy TsGI is fully capable of offering serious competition to foreign centers of this type. However, much remains to be done in this area.

First and foremost, the Center should be elevated to all-union status. This will make it possible to effect a major solution to the problem of financing, which would be on the basis of share participation on the part of ministries and departments, thus assisting start-up efforts. Once it achieves its start, the Center could compile a list of areas of interest peculiar to the ministries and departments, while continuing—and even expanding—the kind of researches lying within the purview of the Navy. Also, the Center, having attained all-union status, would of course service orders submitted by foreign partners, thus earning the sorely needed foreign exchange.

Of course, when there was a strict taboo on entrepreneurship in our country, there probably was no other way but to subsidize a scientific institution (one capable of making money, so to speak), releasing personnel and cutting the budget when times became difficult. However, the situation is changing. Is it not time to take advantage of these changes to reorganize the Navy TsGI?

In any event, some Navy TsGI specialists are making suggestions such as that above. Within the framework of the far-reaching reforms that are taking place in the country and in the Armed Forces, they seem to be coming at the right time.

Paying for Protection of Fishing Fleet

91UM0143A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
1 Dec 90 First Edition p 6

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Captain 3rd Rank V. Maryukha: "Trawlers and Minesweepers: At Times Our Fishermen Catch Fish in this 'Paper' Shuffle"]

[Text] Recently A USSR Presidential Decree awarded Ushakov and Nakhimov Medals "for valor" and "for distinguished service" to Pulemetchik ocean minesweeper crewmembers Captain-Lieutenant N. Kuznetsov, Lieutenants O. Volochinskiy and I. Usov, Petty Officer 2nd Class I. Ibronov, and Seaman O. Sorokin.

The fishing vessel Kapitan Orlikov left the fishing area near the territorial waters of the contiguous state accompanied by a coast guard cutter. The cutter's large caliber machineguns were aimed at the trawler's bridge on which, besides the fishermen, there were armed people in paramilitary uniform. The minesweeper Pulemetchik, which was rushing to assist the seized vessel, compelled the unusual cortege to stop with a warning shot. Landing sailors onboard the trawler completed its release.

The episode, which was recorded in the fishing vessel's and minesweeper's ship's logs and submitted as the basis for the award, could become the plot for shooting a movie on "pirates of the twentieth century." And it is far from the only one during a time when seamen are serving in the fishing area off the coast of the Western Sahara.

A CPSU Central Committee Politburo decision determined the advisability of having military vessels sail in this area ten years ago. At that time, frequent attempts by uncoordinated political forces who were conducting a struggle for power in the region to discredit the existing government through provocations against fishing vessels, threatened the safety of the fishing fleet. According to the concept of the decision made, showing the Soviet Naval Flag should serve as a restraining factor and prevent possible incidents.

The area designated for the naval ships to perform their duties was determined with the calculation that a trawler being subjected to attack could be reached in the shortest period from any of its points. At the same time, the somewhat remoteness of the area from direct proximity with the border of territorial waters permitted trawlers to avoid conflicts with coast guard vessels.

But changes have occurred since that time. Right now up to hundreds of fishing vessels under various flags are conducting the fishing season here. Fishermen are crowding each other and some at times are involuntarily on the verge of violating territorial waters. But for now we are only compelled to protect our own fishermen. In the world, we very rarely have to resort to the services of our navy to protect fishing outside the limits of our own territorial waters or of a declared economic zone. When choosing between paying to use the navy for protection and paying a possible fine in the event of a flagrant violation of foreign economic borders, foreign firms prefer the latter. Otherwise, the fish that is caught really becomes gold [play on words—goldfish [zlotaya rybka]].

Apparently no one has seriously become involved with these calculations in our country. And previously the navy did not even think about attempting to receive

compensation for its expenditures from the fishermen. Market relations are making this compensation a vital necessity. Judge for yourselves: Appropriations for defense needs are being reduced and only one day's stay in the fishing area for an ocean minesweeper costs 16,600 rubles. The Navy's expenses to protect fishing exceed R16 million per year.

And how seamen provide this protection! Ocean minesweepers' endurance is not great. Transit from basing facilities to the area takes up to 30 days and a stay in the fishing area can reach up to six months. It is nearly 3,000 miles to the nearest base where the crew can relax and perform routine ship systems maintenance. Under these conditions, one cruise consumes up to two years of a ship's equipment life.

The Ministry of the Fish Industry, in whose interests the seamen actually serve, not only does not pay for ships' stays in the area but has refused to lease ships to the navy in 1991 to deliver fuel, water, and food. This refusal is juridically well-founded—there is no governmental decision, therefore the fishermen have no obligation to the navy. And the Ministry of the Fish Industry does not have funds for such payments. Ships in this area are on the verge of obsolescence and the fish that are caught mainly go to the domestic market where fishermen get purely symbolic payment for a centner of mackerel or horse-mackerel.

"The Ministry of the Fish Industry, as compensation for the navy's losses, could provide fresh fish to the seamen, repair minesweepers at their bases (they have the capability to do this), and supply ships in this fishing area. For now they are only demanding from us what we in principle should not be involved with," says Captain 1st Rank V. Vazhov, deputy chief of a Naval General Staff directorate whose ships are sailing in the fishing area. In confirmation of his words, Vladimir Ivanovich showed me the latest telegram signed by N. Anikeev, deputy commander of the BPO [not found] Yugryb: "On the southern edge of the fishing area, a trawler was subjected to firing by an unidentified cutter, we need to increase surveillance for safety of navigation...."

Cooperators are also sending their vessels into the fishing zone along with Ministry of Fish Industry vessels and they are also hoping for protection. Here is an example of that: The fishing vessel Novouzensk, which was purchased by "Russkaya berezka" Cooperative from Sevryb Association, was fired upon by a coast guard vessel. The captain was wounded. The ocean minesweeper Artillerist, which was located approximately 30 miles from the trawler when the incident began, cut short an attempt to seize the vessel. While skillfully maneuvering, the seamen drove back the attackers. A medical assistance team aided the wounded man and the trawler was escorted to an area that was safe for navigation—this is how this episode looks in the terse lines of the encrypted message.

Well, we can also sympathize with the fishermen—it is difficult for them to catch fish. The seamen understand this and they understand that they cannot abandon their comrades. But sympathy will not solve the worsening problems of their mutual stay in this

area. If fishing is needed and is profitable for the country in this area of the Atlantic, then we also need to resolve the series of issues associated with our fishing off the Western Sahara on a modern, economically justified level.

Financial Costs of Professionalization

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[Article by Major General S. Yermakov, professor and deputy chief of the Military Finance and Economic Department at Moscow Finance Institute, and Colonel S. Vikulov, Armed Forces Department professor and economics chair, under the rubric "Military Reform: Problems and Proposals": "How Much Will Professionalism Cost?"]

[Text] Today perhaps it is already obvious to everyone that the implementation of military reform under conditions of the country's transition to market relations will require comprehensive transformations in the sphere of military economics. The authors of a series of articles in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA also point this out while basing their conclusions on analysis of the changes that have come into being in recent years in interrelations between the Armed Forces, state structures, and the national economic complex. And when we begin talking about methods to overcome the contradictions which have come to light, the overwhelming majority of economists see them first of all in confirmation of the principle: To insure reasonable sufficiency for defense under minimal resource expenditures. But how can we attain the most acceptable proportions under modern conditions? How do we determine them?

The search for answers to these questions resulted in the widely held idea of Armed Forces reductions with their transition, either totally or to a significant degree, to the voluntary manning principle. They propose that the Army will become highly professional and will be able to accomplish all missions assigned to it with maximum effectiveness as a result of implementing such measures. Without becoming concerned with the purely military and political aspects of the possible realization of this idea, I would like to offer some economic calculations on the problem under discussion inasmuch as the controversy is primarily about how much the army and navy's transition to the new manning system will cost in monetary terms.

Proponents of one point of view assert that expenditures associated with professionalization of the Armed Forces will not exceed current expenditures for maintenance of the army and navy. In the opinion of others, these expenditures in comparison with 1990 (which will be used as the base year in subsequent calculations) will increase by approximately up to 60 billion rubles, that is, additional appropriations of no less than R40 billion will be required. As we see, the discrepancies are quite substantial. But why? They are explained by the variation in approaches to the assessment of the amount of the effect obtained under partial or total professionalization of the army.

In our opinion, it is advisable to make this assessment while necessarily proceeding from the following preconditions: First of all, to consider both positive and negative consequences of changing the Armed Forces manning principle; second, to examine not one but several variations; and third, to determine both direct and indirect expenditures. This method allows us to quite objectively approach the resolution of this important economic issue.

Thus, first of all we need to list among the positive consequences of professionalization of the army the relative reduction of expenditures associated with the reduction of Armed Forces strength and the increase of the size of national income as a result of the influx of active young population into the national economy. Furthermore, we must anticipate an economic impact from the reduction of the quantity of manufactured military equipment needed by the troops, from the reduction of expenditures for officer personnel training and the reduction of their fraction of total personnel strength, from the reduction of the number of accidents and disasters, injuries and deaths of people in the forces due to the increase of professional training of military specialists, and also from the land area freed up and its use in agricultural production, the reduction of expenditures for the draft and for the release of servicemen, and the replacement of servicemen by civilian personnel who far from always validly hold many positions.

As for the most substantial negative consequences, we obviously need to include among them the increase in payment of pay and allowances, expenditures for servicemen's clothing and rations allowances, and expenditures for construction of housing and barracks for those who will transfer to the category of professionals. Expenditures will also certainly appear for the maintenance of new organizational structures which will be involved with conducting work that is presently being performed in the troops using the organizations' own resources and the efforts of personnel. We will also have to cover expenditures associated with the acquisition of civilian specialties by those servicemen who will terminate their service. And add to all of this the expenditures to increase comfort during military transport movements of professional soldiers and sergeants and to increase the number of their trips during annual leave.

Now let us examine the variations for conducting Armed Forces reform proposed by various authors. Some advocate total professionalization of the army and others advocate partial professionalization of the army when only sergeants and the most highly skilled junior specialists will transition to the new capacity but soldiers will remain in the existing state and under current wages or those close to them. And under the first variant, they have in mind a transition to voluntary recruitment of all personnel with determination of appropriate wages for them. The totals of pay and allowances payments for each specific category of serviceman and also the standards of expenditures for rations, clothing, and housing allowances varies.

This last aspect also is the subject of the fiercest discussions. While attempting to sort out how much expenditures for personnel maintenance will increase and, in particular, for pay and allowances payments, the opposing sides can in no way definitively determine the amount of various categories of servicemen's monthly wages. Rapid transformations of the economic situation in the country are influencing peoples' opinions on this issue. And the future approval of free market prices is also intensifying this effect. If during the spring and summer of 1990, an actually established salary for voluntarily recruited MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] internal troops private and sergeant personnel of R300-330 per month (PRAVDA, June 13, 1990) was considered to be acceptable, in November they were already talking about increasing this sum to R500 (SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, November 13, 1990). Just what will the figures be in 1991 when 25 percent inflation is anticipated?

While proceeding from the assessments of many economists that at the present time the minimum living wage totals R120-130 per person, and while accepting the most widespread composition of a serviceman's family to be three people, it appears possible to us to make service in the army on contract "prestigious" with average monthly pay and allowances for professional soldiers of R450-500 and sergeants and warrant officers of R550-600. And while examining the semi-professional army variant, it is entirely logical to propose pay and allowances of somewhere around R100 for a conscripted serviceman.

In this case, they demonstrate that with the frequently proposed reduction of Armed Forces strength to 2.5 million men, total pay and allowances of a totally professional army will be nearly R20 billion which is 3.5 times greater than in 1990 (R5.8 billion). Obviously, the state will be incapable of handling such expenditures during the next few years without turning on the printing press. And it is no coincidence that practically all sensible supporters of 100 percent professionalization of the army think that implementation of Armed Forces reforms according to their program is only possible under a gradual and significantly lengthy transformation period. In other words, we nevertheless cannot avoid a stage with a transition to a semiprofessional army which is voluntarily and compulsorily manned. And it (with retention of conscripting soldiers for service but with payment to them of R100 per month) can cost R14 billion. This is already two times greater than the expenditures for 1990.

However, in an interview recently published in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces General of the Army M. Moiseyev discusses a proposed reduction of the army and navy to three million men. If you assume total professionalization of the Armed Forces in this variation, it will cost R24 billion and a partial transition to service by contract will cost R17.1 billion. But I would like to point out for the sake of justice: In the calculated figures, more than

R4 billion is the increase of expenditures for maintenance of officers and warrant officers which does not have any relation to the transition to the army's contract manning principle since it is caused by the general trends of increases in prices and the population's income.

Thus, it is certain and indisputable that an increase of expenditures for maintenance of the army and navy awaits us although it does not always depend on the nature of the processes that are occurring in the Armed Forces. Unfortunately, many people dwell on this and come to conclusions. And it is understandable what kind of conclusions these are.

If we continue our discussions with regard to the transition to a semi-professional army with a strength of three million men, we see that in comparison with 1990, expenditures for personnel pay and allowances will increase by R11.3 billion. Furthermore, expenditures will increase approximately R1 billion for clothing, rations, and everyday services support, nearly R0.2 billion for construction of housing (in calculations per year, based on a 50 year period of operation for houses), and R1 billion for payment of work currently being performed by the organizations' own resources. It is logical to anticipate that expenditures to support more intensive combat training will also increase by approximately R1-2 billion. Thus the total increase of expenditures totals nearly R15 billion.

Furthermore, we must not forget about the positive effect of these transformations. If we proceed from the fact that due to the diversion of each person into the Armed Forces society under receives nearly R4,800 of national income, then reduction of army strength from four to three million men (with rational utilization of the released work force) can provide an effect of up to R4.8 billion. Let us also consider that the training of an officer at a military school costs an average of R50,000, then a reduction of graduates, for example, by 15,000 men, will permit us to obtain savings of another R750 million. And the corresponding reduction of expenditures for training in military academies will also permit increased savings here of up to R1 billion. Other positive factors already named also provide their effect of approximately up to R1 billion: Reduction of expenditures for the elimination of damage and accidents, expenditures for conscription and release of servicemen, and for the industrial sphere of the army and navy.... If at the same time we consider that, with a reduction of army strength to the indicated size, we will succeed in reducing expenditures for development and purchase of weapons by 10-15 percent in comparison with 1990, the total positive effect can total R11-12 billion. Let us correlate them now with the R15 billion expended and then we can already come to some sort of conclusions....

It is true that there is one more important nuance of possible changes to the structure of military expenditures in favor of increasing the share of expenditures for personnel maintenance. In our calculations, they total 14-15 percent altogether and in the military budgets of

the United States, France, Great Britain, and Germany—not less than 30 percent. This is something for our legislators to ponder.

Of course, these types of calculations are only approximate. The transition to professionalization is a multifaceted phenomenon that has not only economic but

also ethnic, social, demographic, and other nuances. Nevertheless, an objective economic analysis, even a rough one, provides the possibility to see that a multi-fold increase of expenditures for defense which must allegedly accompany the army's transition to a voluntary or mixed manning principle does not take place.

Storage of Toxic Substances

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[Article by M. Maksimov: "Protection Against Toxic Substances"]

[Text] From the numerous requests of readers who are Civil Defense (CD) workers and specialists at enterprises producing or employing toxic substances in production, the editors are beginning to publish a cycle of articles which have been prepared by the leading specialists of the USSR CD Staff as well as various national economic sectors.

Safety in chemically dangerous facilities depends, as is known, upon many factors including: the physicochemical properties of the raw materials, semiproducts and finished products, the nature of the production process, the design and reliability of the equipment, the conditions for the storage and transporting of the chemicals, the state of the metering devices and automation, the effectiveness of the safety equipment as well as other engineering-technical facilities and measures. Moreover, to a significant degree this is also influenced by the level of organizing preventive work to prevent emergencies, the promptness and quality of planned preventive repair measures, the training level of the personnel, as well as the system for supervising the condition of safety equipment.

An analysis of the structure of the enterprises which produce or consume toxic substances indicates that the production lines here handle, as a rule, an insignificant amount of toxic chemicals. A significantly larger amount of toxic substances is to be found at the enterprise warehouses. Consequently, during emergencies in the shops, in a majority of instances, we are involved with local contamination where basically the production personnel at the facility is afflicted. But in emergencies at warehouses, where large-tonnage capacity can be destroyed (damaged), the toxic substances spread outside the enterprise and the safety zone, sometimes leading to the mass injury of not only the workers but also the public, as well as the workers of other close-by facilities.

In accord with the existing departmental (sectorial) construction and republic standards¹, ground-level tanks with toxic chemicals, as a rule, are to be located in groups. In each group, provision is made for a reserve tank for pumping in toxic chemicals in the event that a leak in one of the other tanks has occurred. Moreover, for each group along the perimeter a solid embankment should be put up or an enclosing wall out of noncombustible and corrosion-proof materials (at least 1 m tall). The inner area of the enclosed territory is calculated for the complete volume of the group of tanks. For example, a group of five ground-level tanks contains 500 tons of chlorine. Then the inner area for this volume will equal $500:1.6 = 312 \text{ (m}^2\text{)}$, where 1.6 is the arbitrary safety factor. With a wall height of 1 m and a tank length of 10

m (plus 2 m for clearance from the base) the width of the area can be within the limits of 12 m and the length 26 m (312:12). The distance from the tanks to the base of the embankment or enclosing wall is equal to $\frac{1}{2}$ the diameter of the nearest tank but at least 1 m.

The distance from the toxic chemical warehouses with a volume of over 8,000 m³ to population points should be at least 1,000 m and from warehouses with ground-level placement of the tanks to places of the mass accumulation of persons (stadiums, parks, skating rinks, theaters and so forth) double this amount. These distances usually determine the location of the zone of possible dangerous chemical contamination,² where the entire range of measures is to be carried out ahead of time for the chemical protection of the production personnel and public against toxic chemical contamination with major emergencies and accidents.

Protection against toxic chemicals is organized and implemented primarily directly at chemically dangerous facilities. Basic attention is given to measures of an organizational and engineer-technical nature the aim of which is to create conditions for the prompt localization and elimination of the possible consequences of an accident and namely: for ascertaining and eliminating the causes of accidents, for a maximum reduction in possible destruction, loss and so forth.

All of this should be reflected in the "Plan for Protection Against Toxic Chemicals" and to which, in addition to the text, as a rule, they append the necessary diagrams which would explain the location of the facility, the forces for eliminating the consequences of the accident, their organization, capabilities and so forth. The chief of the CD Staff works out a plan on the basis of the decision of the CD chief who is the director of the enterprise but without fail calls in all the main specialists at the facility.

The section of engineer and technical measures in the Plan for Protection Against Toxic Chemicals should provide for the following: dispersing the supplies of toxic chemicals, the construction of buried or semiburied storage facilities for them, the moving of the warehouses to the suburban zone; reinforcing the protective properties of the storage capacity and the piping (reducing the "exposure" of the surface of the structures, increasing the strength and rigidity of the structures, the enclosing wall and so forth) building emergency tanks, pits and traps (emergency pits) for the toxic chemical storage, directional drains, ground-level tanks for establishing and storing supplies of water; building cul-de-sacs for tank trucks carrying toxic chemicals and having locking gates; providing equipment which prevents the leaking of toxic chemicals in the event of an accident (shut-off valves, excess pressure valves, temperature control devices, overflow or release devices and so forth); the installing of equipment which provides for the opportunity of emptying in an emergency situation particularly dangerous areas of the production system into underground capacity considering the specific characteristics

of the product including a tendency for rapid polymerization, spontaneous decomposition with reduced or increased temperatures, strong corrosiveness and so forth.

For transferring the toxic chemicals to emergency containers, provision must be made, as a rule, for automatic activating of the draining systems with an obligatory back-up with manual activation of the drainage.

The plan also provides measures to localize accidents at each area having toxic chemicals with the indicating of the responsible executors from the leadership of the facilities, the forces to be involved, their tasks and the time provided to carry out the work. As is required, the plan for protecting the facility against toxic chemicals can be corrected.

The trouble-free operation of chemically dangerous facilities can be greatly aided by the accelerated introduction of production systems aimed at excluding from the processes high pressures and temperatures, at employing corrosive materials, using new catalysts, intensifiers, plasma and electrochemical methods, radiation stimulation, cryoengineering, separating membranes and so forth.

We recommend that specialists study the given problem more thoroughly in the following publications:

1. Kuleshev, V.P., "Osnovy tekhniki bezopasnosti na predpriyatiyakh khimicheskoy promyshlennosti" [Principals of Safety Equipment at Chemical Industry Enterprises], Moscow, Khimiya, 1974.

2. "Khraneniye i transportirovaniye khimicheskikh produktov" [Storage and Transporting of Chemical Product], Moscow, Khimiya, 1973.

3. Bard, V.L., Kuzin, A.V., "Preduprezhdeniye avariyy v neftepererabatyvayushchey i neftekhimicheskoy promyshlennosti" [Prevention of Accidents in the Oil Refining and Petrochemical Industry], Moscow, Khimiya, 1984, p 315.

4. Beschastnov, M.V., Sokolov, V.M., "Preduprezhdeniye avariyy v khimicheskikh proizvodstavakh" [Prevention of Accidents in Chemical Production], Moscow, Khimiya, 1979, p 392.

5. "List of Types of Production in the Designing of Which Special Measures Should Be Worked Out to Prevent Possible Emergency Situations and Eliminating Their Effect on the Environment in Accord With the Requirements of the Decree of the USSR Council of Ministers of 26 May 1987," Gosgortekhnadzor, No 599, 1989.

6. Legasov, V.A., Chayvanov, B.B., Chernoplekov, A.N., "Scientific Problems of Safety in the Technosphere," BEZOPASNOST TRUDA V PROMYSHLENNOSTI, No 1, 1988, pp 44-51.

Footnotes

1. SNIP [Construction Standards and Rules], 2.01.B1-90, VZN (SRSN) ITM GO.

2. The zone of dangerous chemical contamination is the territory adjacent to a chemically dangerous facility within which, with the destruction of toxic chemical containers, there is the possibility of its spread in concentrations causing injury to unprotected persons.

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**Chief of Main Motor Vehicle Directorate
Responds to Questions**

91UM0087A Moscow KOMMUNIST
VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 17,
Sep 90 pp 47-54

[Journal readers' questions answered by Chief of USSR Ministry of Defense Main Motor Vehicle Directorate Colonel General Vasiliy Fedorovich Popov under rubric "Interviewed by the Reader": "A Time of Difficult Roads"; Popov's photograph is included]

[Text]

[Captain V. Malkovskiy, motorized rifle company commander] The life of pilots, seamen and missilemen—in short, people of so-called prestigious professions—is shown to one extent or another in the periodical press, but in fact military motor transport personnel also do a big job. Could you tell briefly about the specifics of their service and problems which face them today?

[Popov] Yes, military motor transport personnel also do a big job, if only for the reason that they support the official activity of pilots, seamen and missilemen to a significant extent. By the way, the profession of military motor transport personnel also is prestigious. This is now the most massive profession in the Army. Many drivers are team members of systems and take a direct part in combat work, i.e., the driver no longer can be distinguished from the missileman, for example, and it is the same for signalmen, chemical warfare personnel and engineers. Motor vehicles long ago ceased to be only a means of transportation; they have "stepped" into the combat formations. Now the Army already has more combat and special vehicles than others (trucks, truck tractors, passenger vehicles). For example, there are 53 percent of them in the combined-arms formation, over 60 percent in missile and air defense [forces] and up to 70 percent in the chemical warfare [troops].

What problems now face motor transport personnel? They include those common to the Army and Navy, about which much is said and written. They also include specific problems, the principal ones being to ensure traffic safety, preclude people's deaths in highway transportation accidents, sharply reduce injuries in servicing armament and equipment, and provide technical training of drivers and other service specialists. The fact is, it is impossible to ignore the country's growing accident rate. It is becoming more "crowded" and dangerous on highways, and our drivers are young men who have served less than two years. And this is with certain restrictions on transporting dangerous cargoes and people. For example, a driver must be at least 21 years of age in order to have the right to transport people in the national economy, but in the Army he is already completing service at age 20.

What is to be done? The fact is, missions have to be accomplished—transporting cargoes and people. Call up for three-four years? Or call up later, but then for two-three years?

It has become more complicated now to handle problems of motor transport technical support to units and sub-units when we are greatly understrength in drivers and motor vehicle repairmen, and industry has sharply reduced vehicle deliveries, especially ambulances, passenger vehicles and vehicles of the national economic type.

[Lieutenant K. Konopko, platoon commander] Many of the motor transport officers have been called up from the reserve. How do you assess their professional training compared with graduates of military motor transport schools?

[Popov] There really are many motor transport officers who were called up from the reserve into USSR Armed Forces cadres who previously completed civilian higher educational institutions in a motor transport specialty. Their professional training objectively provides equal capabilities with graduates of higher military motor transport schools for successful performance of duty with the troops. While at first they are appreciably inferior to graduates of higher military motor transport schools in military bearing, in know-how and ability to organize fulfillment of demands of military regulations, and in professional field combat proficiency, this distinction is erased when they gain practical experience. Many of them completed military academies and became good leaders during their time of service. For example, Colonel I. Yakimets is chief of the Transbaykal Military District Motor Transport Service, Colonel G. Talpa is deputy chief of the Kiev Military District Motor Transport Service, and Colonel B. Zhitnik is chief of the Turkestan Military District Motor Transport Service. A number of officers perform duty in the USSR Ministry of Defense central apparatus.

[Major Sh. Umanzhabakov, missileman] Now, when the prestige of the "man in the greatcoat" has begun to drop (not without the help of certain mass media covering the Army), some officers are writing requests for early discharge from the Armed Forces. Has this wave affected motor transport officers?

[Popov] It has, but in our view it affected those who came into the Army not because of their convictions. For example, referring to the fact that they allegedly erred in choosing a profession, lieutenants I. Chuprina, I. Zakharov and V. Berdnikov were discharged from the USSR Armed Forces at their request soon after completing schools. We see the reasons for such phenomena in the fact that mistakes were made in selecting candidates for entry to our schools. This is why the selection to higher military motor transport schools is made today by acceptance commissions which have professional selection teams in their makeup called upon to qualitatively

evaluate candidates' professional suitability. The priority for entering schools is given to the best first-term servicemen who have consciously chosen the profession of regular motor transport officer, and to young men who already have a period of labor service even if they are somewhat inferior to their comrades in general educational disciplines (this will come in time; such cadets are given help in schools after entry). Preference is given to school-leavers who are reentering our schools.

[Private First Class B. Dzhaferov, military driver] **Why have the best drivers who are first-term servicemen not been awarded the 2nd Class for decades, although a number of units have all the conditions for their good training?**

[Popov] In accordance with a decree of the USSR State Committee for Labor and Social Problems and AUCCTU Secretariat, the 2nd Class qualification can be conferred with a continuous period of work of at least three years as a 3rd Class driver.

But there are opportunities for raising the class qualification in the Army. Drivers of B, C and E, or B, C and D, or D (D and E), as well as B, C, D and E category transportation vehicles; drivers of special multiaxle wheeled chassis and prime movers and of tracked vehicles; and drivers of tractors who have been decorated with one of the badges ("Outstanding Person of the Soviet Army," "Outstanding Person of the Navy," "Outstanding Person of the Air Force," "Outstanding Person of Military Construction") have a reduced period of service for conferral of the next class rating: by one year for drivers of any categories of transportation vehicles; and by six months for drivers of special multiaxle wheeled chassis and prime movers and of tracked vehicles, and for tractor drivers.

The period of work on transportation vehicles in the national economy is counted for those drivers who were deferred from call-up, in the presence of confirming documents (excerpts from the labor book certified by a stamp at the place of work).

[Warrant Officer S. Kolotilo, motor transport company first sergeant] **The principal Armed Forces specialists receive financial compensation for a class rating, but drivers, even motor transport officers and warrant officers, do not receive it. Will such an injustice be eliminated?**

[Popov] Yes, it will. In accordance with a USSR Ministry of Defense order, officers and warrant officers will be paid an increment for a class rating. The corresponding 1988 USSR Ministry of Defense order now is being reworked; it will provide a procedure for conferring a class rating on all servicemen, including motor transport personnel.

We have submitted our proposals and hope that they will be supported by commanders in chief of branches of the USSR Armed Forces and the USSR Minister of Defense.

[Lieutenant Colonel Ye. Terletskiy, motor transport battalion commander] **What transformations are planned to be carried out in motor transport units and in the Main Directorate itself within the scope of military reform?**

[Popov] New conditions of economic operation and direct ties with industry forced us to revise the logistic support system, focus efforts on primary, priority topics, and provide additional measures for saving vehicle resources and for sensible use of spare parts. The point is that it is impossible to work under the new conditions by old methods. There will be a qualitative development of military motor transport equipment within the scope of military reform through military-technical-economic substantiation, development, and realization of promising concepts and directions of equipment development; optimization of the structural makeup of the vehicle fleet; and expanded capabilities and increased qualitative level of military motor transport equipment.

[Colonel I. Rzhatskiy] **Much is being said and written now about the need for shifting to an all-volunteer Army. An experiment already is planned within the framework of military reform: beginning next year a contract service option will be selectively tested in the Navy. What is your personal attitude toward this?**

[Popov] I favor an increased number of professionals in the Army insofar as economically possible. In checking the contract service option, we will propose that this also be applied to drivers of the most complex equipment models and to motor transport repairmen (automotive electricians, master-rated personnel and so on). Nevertheless, we cannot get by without universal military obligation.

[Senior Seaman T. Aliyev, Northern Fleet] **How do you explain the fact that a military driver serves three years in the Navy, although all his service takes place ashore, while he serves two years in the Ground Forces?**

[Popov] I cannot. I never could understand this. I have asked the question, but have received no answer. Insofar as I know, the matter now is being resolved.

[Warrant Officer A. Usmanov, motor transport platoon commander] **Costly equipment is being installed on multiaxle chassis. For example, costly equipment has been installed on the MAZ-543, but the vehicle is driven by a young driver out of DOSAAF school. Perhaps it makes sense to place a professional such as a warrant officer on such a vehicle?**

[Popov] This is not so. The MAZ-543 is not driven by young drivers out of DOSAAF. They are driven after five and one-half months of training at central schools and in training units and subunits. As a rule, young men are sent there who have licenses to drive C or B and C category transportation vehicles.

Nevertheless it must be admitted that this is a very serious question, and it is not just a matter of high cost. There are even more serious reasons involving traffic

safety. In my view, it makes sense to assign warrant officers to such vehicles or chassis carrying costly armament and special equipment, as is done in the Strategic Missile Forces. This understandably involves the T/O&E structure of formations and units of other branches of the USSR Armed Forces and high physical inputs, but a solution has to be sought.

[Senior Lieutenant S. Bronevitskiy, motor transport company commander] **There are warrant officers with miserly (5th scale) pay in equipment inspection station chief positions. There is a high turnover of personnel because of this. Warrant officers leave and first-term sergeants are put in their place who do not provide for exemplary technical condition of motor vehicles setting off on a run. Perhaps it makes sense to introduce the position of traffic safety technician and raise the scale to the 9th category?**

[Popov] The USSR Ministry of Defense GLAVTU [Main Directorate of Rear Services] raised it earlier. Recently there also was talk about this at the All-Services Conference conducted by First Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR General of the Army K. Kochetov. Now the question is being studied on the USSR Armed Forces General Staff.

[G. Sivokon, Soviet Army employee] **I heard that military drivers in supporting units, and particularly motor transport units, will be replaced by civilian specialists, as is done in many foreign armies. Is this so?**

[Popov] Total replacement of military drivers with civilian specialists in motor transport units is not envisaged. But T/O&E's of certain military units and establishments and of military educational institutions provide for Soviet Army employees in driver positions.

[T. Levicheva, pedagogue] **My son is serving as a military driver in the Army. Judging from letters, he likes this. He writes that he is constantly making trips and is constantly behind the wheel. I have a question: When is professional training and educational work conducted with them?**

[Popov] Training is conducted with such drivers on days established by the military unit commander based on an order of the district commander. As a rule, this is every Tuesday or Thursday. On this day the departure of all vehicles, and especially of the transportation team, is sharply restricted, the exception being duty vehicles, ambulances, and vehicles for carrying food supplies.

Educational work is conducted continuously in the morning and evening hours as well as during work and on a run. But unfortunately, the Army now is greatly understrength in personnel, especially drivers, and so the loads on them have grown. This naturally entails certain costs in educational work.

[Captain V. Svirskiy, motor transport subunit political officer] **The quality of educational work with driver personnel has not increased of late, and this is with political officers present in the subunits. But then just what can be**

expected if they are not there? How do you regard depoliticization of the Army?

[Popov] I regard depoliticization of the Army extremely negatively. The high-flown statements that the Army must be outside of politics which have become more frequent of late are insincere. Whoever states this is for politicization, but the opposite kind, although he conceals this. Commissars in the past and political officers now are the support of commanders in accomplishing all tasks, above all in questions of educating privates, NCO's and officers and showing concern for them. The personal qualities of every political officer are another matter. We need cultured political officers who are trained in all respects.

[Major A. Potayenko, battalion commander] **Motor transport personnel have been used in the national economy for a long time. This includes work in the harvest and at various construction sites... Is this to the detriment of unit combat readiness?**

[Popov] Yes it is, and we talk and report about this. USSR Minister of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union D. Yazov knows about this. This year as well the government made the decision to involve servicemen in work of taking in the harvest. True, the feature of this year is that drivers and motor vehicle repairmen will be called up from those areas where the motor transport subunits will be stationed.

[Lieutenant Colonel I. Deynekin, squadron commander] **I received an orchard and garden plot and spent much time and effort getting motor transport for delivery of construction materials. Meanwhile I heard that it is also permissible to use military motor transport for these purposes for a certain payment. How is this done?**

[Popov] The procedure for assigning transportation vehicles of military units for pay to Soviet Army servicemen, workers and employees is defined by a corresponding USSR Ministry of Defense order and is done by instruction of unit commanders and their immediate superiors. Settlements for transportation are made under the procedure provided by the statute on military unit financial services.

[Captain-Lieutenant V. Ignatovich, ship executive officer] **The question of privileges, particularly concerning personal vehicles, was raised very sharply at the past Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR. To what extent did this apply to the USSR Ministry of Defense?**

[Popov] It applied directly. Personal vehicles now have been abolished and official-operations vehicles have been introduced. The number of official vehicles has been reduced by 10 percent. On-call passenger vehicle support for official trips by officials of the USSR Ministry of Defense central apparatus, branches of the USSR Armed Forces and districts has been introduced and expanded based on a conveyor system within established time and vehicle resource limits. Motor transport service for leadership personnel who previously were given

Chayka official-operations vehicles has been organized with Volga passenger vehicles. The time limit for using on-call passenger vehicles has been restricted to no more than 20 hours per month for persons granted such a right by government decision.

[Lieutenant Colonel V. Ursu, military construction detachment commander] **A considerable amount of equipment including passenger vehicles is being freed up in connection with the reduction in the Armed Forces. I know precisely that many of them are being sold to civilians. What is this? Again social injustice? It is possible for civilians but not military?**

[Popov] By order of the USSR Minister of Defense, the sale of passenger vehicles to civilians for personal use including to servicemen is prohibited. Equipment is being transferred from the USSR Armed Forces in accordance with USSR Council of Ministers Decree No 123r of 1990 to USSR Gosnab entities for further sale to the populace. Direct sale from military units is prohibited. Motor transport equipment of old makes (basically motor vehicle chassis) that is freed up and unneeded by the troops is subject to transfer. It is prohibited to transfer passenger vehicles to the national economy and USSR Gosnab entities in view of their insufficient numbers in the troops.

[Colonel I. Dergalev, staff officer] **To what extent did conversion affect the motor transport service?**

[Popov] Very directly. A portion of special wheeled chassis, trucks and special vehicles has been freed up as a result of the INF Treaty and the reduction in the Armed Forces; they are being used to bring troops up to prescribed strength levels or are being transferred to the national economy by decree of the USSR Council of Ministers. Motor vehicle repair plants are being reoriented for producing consumer goods at the expense of a portion of freed-up capacities and also are offering paid services for motor vehicle repair to organizations of the national economy.

[I. Slyusareva, Soviet Army employee] **My question, so to speak, is of a personal nature. You commanded a combat subunit for a long time and then became a rear services officer. Do you regret this?**

[Popov] No regrets. In fact I did complete the Kharkov Guards Tank School, commanded a tank platoon, a tank training platoon and a tank training company, then went to study in the Military Academy of Rear Services and Transportation and became a motor transport officer. Our motor transport service officers work in the rear and in combat units. After completing the Academy I had occasion to serve specifically in combat units.

[Captain V. Pusev, subunit commander] **Every day tens of thousands of vehicles with military drivers behind the wheel move over the country's roads. Many civilian motorists try to stay as far away from them as possible and are afraid of them. Why does that happen and what are the**

reasons for the large number of highway transportation accidents that are the fault of military drivers?

[Popov] I will begin by analyzing the question of the "large" number of highway transportation accidents committed by military drivers. The USSR Ministry of Defense accident rate is the lowest of all other ministries and departments, and this at a time when military drivers as a rule have a work period of less than two years and drive Army vehicles which substantially differ from national economic versions in their indicators. We believe that this is the result of higher efficiency and discipline among military drivers and greater attention to their training and education.

Just what is the talk about danger on the part of the military driver based on? First of all, there nevertheless are highway transportation accidents, even with the deaths of people. Secondly, people always pay more fixed attention to instances of traffic rule violations on the part of military drivers. Thirdly, an uproar is raised in almost every instance of a highway transportation accident involving a military driver and people attempt to use it for anti-Army purposes, even when the military driver is not at fault.

We have addressed other highway traffic participants more than once already both from the pages of newspapers and by radio, telling them not to be afraid of our military driver but help him, respect him, and create a "most favored status" for him, if only because 18 and 19-year-old lads are performing an enormous amount of work necessary to the Army and the people. Remember those who now are carrying grain, working on building roads in the non-Chernozem area, and supporting the enormous amount of construction being done by our military construction detachments. There are instances of military drivers behind infringed upon (they are not given the right-of-way, they are forced to the shoulder and the like), thereby creating an accident situation.

[Private R. Mukhametzyanov, military driver] **There was a press announcement that Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov's vehicle collided with a military bus, but later it appeared that this was not a military bus. Just what was the situation in fact?**

[Popov] In fact there was an accident involving the vehicle in which the USSR Council of Ministers chairman was riding and a military bus. The military driver was at fault in that he did not let a vehicle with a special signal by and did not stop. The bus belonged to a KGB military unit. Fortunately no one was hurt.

[Private First Class Ye. Smirnitskaya] **Are there women military drivers?**

[Popov] There are no women military drivers.

[Colonel I. Rodionov] **There are rumors that commanders and officers in charge who are authorized to use official vehicles because of position allegedly will be**

permitted to drive motor transportation themselves with appropriate training. To what extent is this correct?

[Popov] A driver also is prescribed by the table of organization for commanders and officers in charge who are authorized a passenger vehicle in support of official activities. Officers are permitted to drive official motor transportation only in special driving classes.

[Captain 2nd Rank I. Bayseitov, unit chief of staff] The number of amateur drivers among officers and warrant officers now is increasing, but the number of accidents committed by them also has increased. Is something being done to raise their professional skills?

[Popov] Much now is being done in this direction. There is a USSR Minister of Defense order, and a serious conversation about this was held at a conference this summer, but we are not satisfied with the results of our work. Officers are dying, often with families. It is very grievous. It damages combat readiness.

What is being done is that conferences and meetings are being held, orders and information briefings about highway transportation accidents are being made known, and classes on traffic safety rules are being organized, but this work most often reduces to a statement of fact.

And further, the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Ukase of 6 February 1989 about an increase in fines is not functioning for us for now. Fines are not being levied against officers or servicemen. Commanders must act on receiving a representation from the State Motor Vehicle Inspectorate, but often they do not know this. Essentially there is no one to teach them. Military motor vehicle inspectorates are low-powered and have poor qualifications.

[Colonel (Reserve) S. Brykov] I saw a military motor vehicle inspectorate inspector lecture a civilian driver for running a red light. What are a military inspector's rights with respect to civilians and what are the relationships with the State Motor Vehicle Inspectorate?

[Popov] The military motor vehicle inspectorate operates in close coordination with the State Motor Vehicle Inspectorate. With respect to civilian drivers who violate the Traffic Rules, the military motor vehicle inspectorate inspector has the right to admonish them and inform the State Motor Vehicle Inspectorate inspector about this.

[Lieutenant Colonel D. Kosogorov] I often have occasion to perform official business in my personal vehicle. Is compensation for expenditure of gasoline authorized in such cases?

[Popov] In accordance with USSR Ministry of Finance Letter No 73 dated 22 April 1988, payment of compensation for use of personal transportation for regular official trips is not provided for in the USSR Ministry of Defense, inasmuch as no appropriations are allocated for these purposes. Organic official-operations vehicles must be used. At the same time, there are provisions for

paying for the cost of official trips made by servicemen, workers and employees using city passenger transportation.

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Meat Combine Refuses To Provide Meat to Garrison

91UM0140A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
4 Dec 90 First Edition p 2

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel V. Kovalev, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "It Was Yours—Now It's Ours"]

[Text] Transbaykal Military District—Let me point out at the outset that the phrase in the headline was not uttered by the leaders of the Chita production association of the meat industry, but, unfortunately, they acted completely in keeping with it. Judge for yourselves.

This autumn when mass slaughter of livestock began in the oblast the chief of the district's food service, Colonel G. Sofin, went to the association requesting that it accept the steers, hogs, and sheep that had been raised on military sovkhozes [state farms]. This request was satisfied. Without hesitation, the district animal raisers immediately turned the livestock over to the meat combine. And they were processed just as expeditiously. They "came out" with 350 tons of meat products.

The district food service, naturally, gave the military units awards for obtaining meat, but here an unpleasant surprise awaited the military servicemen—at the meat combine...they refused to turn over the processed meat, saying that these were the orders from their leaders.

"For more than a month now we have been engaged in litigation trying to get our meat back," says the chief of the district food service Lieutenant Colonel F. Denisov, "but so far without success. The deputy general director of the meat industry association, Comrade Yamshchikov, responds to our appeal: 'We will not turn over the meat until we receive permission from the Chita Oblast ispolkom [executive committee].' On 15 November, an official letter was sent to the chairman of the oblast ispolkom, Comrade Shabarshin. There has been no answer so far. Telephone conversations did not lead anywhere either: Instead of meat we got complaints about difficulties. We understand all this, but we have to have something to feed our military servicemen, and we are not asking for anything from anyone else—we are asking for what is ours..."

One can understand Lt. Col. Denisov's chagrin, the more so since for several months now the Union Government has not been sending the meat supplies allotted to the district. In the third quarter of this year these arrears amounted to 600 tons. The situation got even worse this fall—blaming it on failing to receive permission from the

RSFSR Government the oblast ispolkom stopped meat deliveries to the military units altogether.

The district commanders managed to have this decision overridden, but still the meat is being delivered with interruptions. From the supplies for the fourth quarter, as Lt. Col. Denisov reported, the military units failed to receive a single kilogram of meat products. For the time being they are giving out meat preserves, but that is all.

Incidentally, meat is not the only thing that is bothering the minds of the officers of the food service now. The last butter has been given out from the storehouses and the deliveries of eggs and flour are always being interrupted. The Far East is not receiving in exchange its fish supplies for the rations of the officers and ensigns. Procurement prices for vegetables have jumped sharply: While last year a kilogram of potatoes cost 13 kopeks, now it is necessary to pay an average of 50-60 kopeks for them. Cabbage has almost tripled in price.

No, it is not clear how deliveries will be next year. What prices will the suppliers demand from the Army. Will budget allocations for buying food increase and by how much? So far there are no answers to these questions. One can only hope that the problems arising among the Transbaykal people will be solved and they will not be left on starvation rations.

Factory To Cease Production of Parachutes

91UM0140B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 4 Dec 90 First Edition p 4

[Article by Colonel O. Vikhriv and Colonel V. Shalkeyev: "Keep the Parachutes Aloft"]

[Text] "If we do not take the most immediate measures, the country will soon be without parachutes..."

We were greeted with this, frankly, discouraging statement by Sergey Nikolayevich Shipin, head engineer of the enterprise that produces an extremely specific, complicated, and very necessary product. And he justified his persistent invitations to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondents to this ancient city, to sewing plant No. 3, by the extreme concern of the leaders and the entire collective about the extremely grave situation in which the enterprise has found itself, and our parachute construction along with it.

Come, come! Some readers will have their doubts: Is that all? If one plant will not produce parachutes, assign them to others.... But the problem is that there is nobody to assign them to: This sewing enterprise is unique, if only because it is the only one in the country that specializes in producing "human," as everyone says here, parachutes. That is, those that are intended for people themselves—from inexperienced boys making their first jump to paratroopers, pilots, specialists in various rescue services and forest fires, and an immense army of DOSAAF [Voluntary Society for the Promotion of the Army, the Air Force, and the Navy] sportsmen.

We shall not try to pin down the exact number of parachutes the plant produces each year; we shall simply note that it runs into the tens of thousands. Nonetheless, there are not enough of them; they are in critically short supply. Tens and hundreds of applications, requests, and categorical demands come here from all corners of the country: "Give us parachutes, our combat training plans are not being fulfilled"—we read in a letter from the commander of an airborne unit. "The taiga is on fire and we have nothing to use for our jumps, help us!"—the leaders of the forest fire fighting units beg. "Parachutes are urgently needed for performing work for supplying drift-ice and polar research units"—it says in the application from the Central Aerological Observatory...

"Is there any way the plant could help all of the applicants?" we ask the head engineer.

"To our deep regret, no," Shipin answers. Then, after thinking, he adds: "I am afraid that in the near future we will be forced to shut down production altogether. One of the sewing shops has already been converted to produce special work clothing. The others will be next. We have tried for a long time to postpone this moment, but there is no other way out; they have given us our assignment for reprofiling the whole production. The situation is simply catastrophic—our suppliers have practically ceased to supply us with special fabrics."

And again from the mouth of the head engineer we heard: The country is about to be left without parachutes....

The specialist is not thinking about himself—he is young, but fairly experienced and respected; he will always be able to find an outlet for his knowledge and energy—he is concerned about their work, about his plant, which is threatened with the fate of being lost among the multitude of other sewing enterprises in light industry. He is concerned about the collective of many thousands of skilled workers, who are in a class by themselves, each of whom can say without any exaggeration that he has golden hands. They are leaving, and it will not be possible to bring them together again when people in the spacious offices of the main administrations, ministries, and departments start to understand that if they do not support the plant, if they do not provide it with raw material, if they deprive it of the opportunity to produce these products that are extremely necessary to the society and the Army, they will be making a mistake. A mistake that will cost all of us very dearly and may turn out to be irreparable.

The enterprise leaders went everywhere they could think of with their request for urgent assistance: the USSR Council of Ministers, the Ministry of Defense, the DOSAAF Central Committee, and even their own association, Roslegprom....

Some could sympathize, some could empathize, but none could provide any real assistance. Some people remained completely silent, as if nothing unusual were happening.

At the plant we were shown copies of several official letters that had been sent to various authorities. It was sad to see and read them. Is the situation really so hopeless that nobody can stop this process that has already started—that of reprofiling the plant to produce other products? Are the enterprises that are supposed to manufacture and deliver parachute fabrics to the plant so all-powerful and uncontrollable “from above” that there are no levers for influencing them?

Who are they—these suppliers? They are the Moscow Silk Combine imeni Ya.M. Sverdlov, the Moscow Silk Combine imeni P.P. Shcherbakov, and the Kemerovo and Naro Fominsk silk fabric combines. Can it be that nobody there understands that we are not talking about women's scarves, but about parachute fabrics, and that the safety and even the lives of thousands and thousands of people depend directly on them? While still in Moscow we called one number. The telephone was answered by the deputy director of the Combine imeni Ya.M. Sverdlov, Viktor Alekseyevich Khokhlov:

“Do not think that we do not want to help the plant, but our suppliers from the Shchelkovo silk combine are not sending us the industrial fabrics....

“The person with whom you are speaking probably has his own difficulties. And if we call over to the silk combine they will most likely blame the chemical workers for the shortage of raw material. That is the kind of chain that is developing.”

But this does not make it any easier for the parachute plant. It has a critical need for fabrics. And the plant workers have quite reasonable complaints against their suppliers. It seems to us that it is not without reason that they think that all the plant's problems come from the fact that recently Her Majesty Commerce has dictated the “rules of the game” and the rules are not always gentlemanly. When we used to say that the main thing was to earn money, and as much as possible, we had in mind, of course, the West; that is, over there, “for them” money is money and it does not matter where it came from. Now the same thing can be said about ourselves. Or, rather, about the leaders of the enterprises that seem to have been just waiting for the time to come when they would be able to replace products that were not advantageous for them, which they delivered to their partners at fixed state prices, with others that were profitable and could be sold at commercial rates.

For quite understandable reasons, the parachute fabrics must be delivered to the plant at a fixed price. And that being the case, they fell into the category of “disadvantageous” for the manufacturing enterprises. It was as though they were a millstone around the neck of businessmen who had developed a taste for profit. And this idea comes to mind as soon we mention the West and the entrepreneurs over there. It would be interesting to know what would happen to them if they suddenly decided to curtail or completely halt deliveries for tanks, powder for ammunition, or fabrics for parachutes. They would

probably not last a day. Here the “oxygen is being cut off.” It is not important who—the state or a business acquaintance; what is important is that there is always a way to apply pressure effectively. But, judging from the critical situation in which this parachute plant has found itself, in our country nobody can force the suppliers to steadily fulfill their commitments and take on new commitments.

“The plant leader,” we were told by one of the veterans, the section chief Andrey Vladimirovich Gitterman, “still has one last hope that the enterprise will be preserved as it is now. We again turned for help to the country's government and to a number of ministries and departments. Colonel V.S. Podziruk, a people's deputy and a flier who understands quite well what can happen to the situation with respect to the output of parachutes, promised to inform the USSR Supreme Soviet of the disastrous situation with respect to fabrics. And the plant itself was in a pathetic condition.”

Along with Gitterman, who had worked here for more than 13 years, and another veteran, Ivan Alekseyevich Batishchev, we went through the shops and services of the enterprise before the production of the main product was shut down. Indeed some people might envy this plant: The light, spacious shops were equipped with modern machines from Singer and other firms, and the work places of the sewing machine operators were equipped with noise-absorbing and at the same time “musical” earphones, there were convenient amenities, and a good dining room in which, by some miracle, they managed to maintain a tolerable assortment of goods for these times.... In a word, it is a good, quite modern plant.

Not so long ago one of us had an occasion to visit a parachute factory in Spain in the small city of Granuero. So we have something with which to compare ours. And in this comparison, with the exception of the fact that the production was “stuffed” with electronic equipment, our plant came out ahead.

But still the main thing of which we can be proud here are the people. The sewing machine operators and the workers of metal production (one must mention that all parts and components of the systems are produced by the plant itself), the engineers, the technicians, the foremen, and the workers in the technical services. The wages of the majority of them are somewhat less than for sewing specialists of other enterprises of the city, and the administration has no possibilities of “helping out” their people even a little bit by ordering food packages or acquiring goods that are in short supply. Then why are just a few people leaving, even though it is not hidden from anyone that unless there is a miracle the plant will have to switch over to consumer goods.

In one of the shops we made the acquaintance of Natasha Aleshina. Just a little before that, from the plant veteran Lyudmila Grigoryevna Smirnova, who had made her way through the ranks here, from seamstress to production commander and chief of a large shop, we

heard very good words about Natasha. She is both a leading worker and an excellent comrade, and at only 20 she is a model for the girls who recently came to the shop from the special vocational and technical school, although it is not called a parachute school. Even the most experienced specialists are not above consulting with Natasha. One must say that the conversation with her was curious.

We asked her what kept her at the plant when at any neighboring factory, not to mention the cooperatives, the wages were higher and there was less responsibility.

"It is responsibility that keeps me here," she answered. Many girls, not to mention workers with long tenure, think this way: We shall not leave the plant as long as we are making parachutes. They are very necessary, right? And as of today we are needed right here."

"Would you be afraid, Natasha, to give a parachute you made to your best friend and have him jump from an airplane?"

"Not at all. Everyone here understands that someone's life depends on how she has cut the fabric, sewn the canopy and the pack, how she has processed the straps, how the item is put together and packed...."

And that is the way it is with all of them: responsibility. In conversations with us, the people linked this feeling with concern for the fate of the plant. And they said with conviction: If the enterprise changes over to a product other than parachutes, it will be a crime. This is what is thought by Tatyana Nikolayevna Simontseva, the chief of the shop where they "bless" the prepared parachutes, giving them, almost like people, passport-service records. We heard the same thing from the former paratrooper Vitaliy Vlasov, who is not the leader of the brigade of parachute packers, who during his years of service jumped many times with parachutes made here.

And nobody we met at the enterprise had finally lost hope that the higher departments would come to their aid and keep the plant from perishing.

"Let us fantasize together," we suggested to head engineer Shipin, "let us imagine that you were producing parachutes as before. Not the kind you are producing now but ones that could compete successfully with the best foreign models. Can you hold your own in a competitive struggle?"

This was a bit of a dirty trick. We had written repeatedly in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA about the fact that our sports parachutes are clearly not as good as their foreign analogs, for example, from the United States and France. When attending world parachute championships, we were sad to hear from members of the competing teams, armed with the latest elegant and light "parafoils" and "paragears" not to mention the "challengers"—the latest rage in parachute fashion—the insulting nickname of our domestic systems. They are called nothing other than the "Russian camel."

We understand that the people who work at the plant here are not to blame, but the ones who work on new models in the specialized Moscow institute. The plant workers merely turn their developments into reality. And regardless of how hard they try to make a parachute that is convenient and modern in all respects, the design shortcomings and also the fabrics supplied to them (so far they are still being supplied), which are far from the best in quality, make it impossible for them to do this. The fabrics are thick and twice as heavy as foreign fabrics, and they do not have the proper aerodynamic qualities....

Let us emphasize again that this is not the fault of the plant workers. But here is what bothers us: They are the ones who are stung to the quick by our critical articles. Proof of the fact that they can and should be producing excellent parachutes, at the plant they showed us not the institute's brainchild, but their own Talka sports parachute, which is named after a little local river that is calm and pure at its source.

We also met the people who, right here at the plant, on the basis of the series-produced "wing"-canopy, developed a practically new sports parachute. There are many orders for the Talka. They come from everywhere. And the tests have been carried out, frankly, at the very top—by USSR combined teams. The responses were good. Only a couple dozen of the parachutes were manufactured with the help and participation of cooperators. The Talka is not yet in series production. What is wrong here?

A half year was spent on the manufacture of the first test models. But for some time now the "parents" of Talka—the plant deputy director for quality Stanislav Sergeyevich Baytsov, the designer Yelizaveta Fedorovna Kucherenko, and the coach of the Air Force combined parachute team, an international class sports master, Senior Warrant Officer Vladimir Aleksandrovich Malayev, the one who had the idea of creating this parachute and whose practical experience is invested in its development—cannot "baptize" their first born and give it an official right to exist. They are hoping that this will happen in March of next year. Well, we will wait a little longer. The more so since, as we were told, it sometimes takes much longer for series-produced systems from the time of their development to the beginning of mass output—a whole five years. Alas, such is the sluggish, undeveloped chain we now have: developer-manufacturer-client-operator.

"If only we had at least a small design bureau here at the plant!" the Ivanovo workers said to us. "We could take into account right here how much time we have saved and also what the requests and requirements of the operations workers are. Perhaps the Talka-2 which we have conceived will take this shorter and more efficient path."

We left this ancient Russian city with a certain ambiguous feeling. For instance, why did these talented and

capable people who love their work, this strong collective that is capable of great accomplishments, have to wage a battle for the plant's survival and prove to the higher authorities that its products are of special significance and hundreds of thousands of people cannot do without them? It is difficult to imagine our new acquaintances looking for hand-outs. But that is the way it is! If we do not help them today, the country and the Army will indeed be left without parachutes.

AUTHORITATIVE OPINIONS

Air Force Lieutenant General S. Ivanov, deputy Air Force commander in chief of rear forces: We have a great demand for parachutes and the quality requirements are stringent. But we military people must also think about the youth, about those for whom the sport of parachuting is a means of getting used to the sky and developing high moral qualities; it is a real school of courage. This is why we cannot but be alarmed about the fate of the plant and the prospects for changing it over to some other product. The safety and lives of hundreds of thousands of people cannot be compared to consumer goods.

Lieutenant General V. Lebedev, deputy commander of paratroopers for airborne training: Because of the situation that has developed in the country's economy, the mechanism for providing for the safety of our state has begun to misfire. As a result, airborne troops, even if they are not in a combat situation, today are experiencing a critical need for means of landing personnel. If things now are leading to reprofiling the only enterprise of its kind with developed technical and personnel structures, this is simply inadmissible.

Air Force Lieutenant General S. Maslov, deputy chairman of the Central Committee of the USSR DOSAAF—chief of the air training and air sports administration: The defense community is one of the main consumers of products from the parachute plant. For we are training the next generation of the Army. Many young people are engaged in parachuting in DOSAAF aviation-sports clubs, sections, and teams. The problem with parachutes is exceptionally crucial, and each year we receive only 30 percent of the required replacements of parachute rescue equipment and sports parachutes. Today we should not be winding down production but, on the contrary, we should be increasing it.

Supplying Troops in Hostile Market

91UM0148A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
6 Dec 90 First Edition p 11

[Interview with Army General V. Arkhipov, USSR deputy minister of defense for rear services, by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent P. Altunin, published under the rubric "Timely Interview"; place and date not given: "Problems Posed by The Market Economy"]

[Text]

[Altunin] Vladimir Mikhaylovich, until recently the words "Army" and "market" seemed to stand very far apart. In our country, as well as in countries dominated by a market economy, all the needs of the armed forces are inevitably provided for by the government...

[Arkhipov] That is correct. But now we are faced with a specific situation. Why so? Our country is entering a market economy. Our initial position is that of a deep economic crisis. Production volumes have decreased, established economic relations are being disrupted, goods are not easily available, and we have ethnic conflicts. All this affects the state of the military, and it definitely affects its supplies.

It is no longer any secret what kind of difficulties we are running into every day now. For instance, local authorities and suppliers in Astrakhan, Volgograd, and Vladimir Oblasts are delivering less meat to the units than we have contracts for. We are receiving smaller than planned supplies of such items as boots, hats, metal accessories, underwear, etc. In Belorussia supplies of fuel are being disrupted. The extremist forces of Latvia have indulged in an outright provocation by refusing to honor food requisitions from the military district.

[Altunin] To all this we evidently have to add the dramatic reduction in the social protection of officers and warrant officers and their families. Apart from the lack of housing, some other facts surfaced also; they were quoted recently at meetings of the country's leadership with our servicemen. They are: In Chelyabinsk officers have to pay up to 120 rubles [R] a month to enroll a child in kindergarten, the cost of a boat ride from Sakhalin to the Kurils has gone up from R27 to R130...

[Arkhipov] I could continue citing similar facts. They serve to prove that our problems do not diminish as we transfer to the market economy. On the contrary, they are multiplying, because of our withdrawal from Eastern Europe. This means we have to become more resourceful, learn to use our reserves better. What does this mean? We have to act more bravely within the legal limits and introduce a lot more economic accountability than before, use more commercial approaches, and become more like entrepreneurs. These are the principles on which we built our draft concept of how to enter the market economy. The draft was prepared at the request of the USSR minister of defense.

[Altunin] Please tell us, at least briefly, about the main concepts of the draft.

[Arkhipov] The essence of our concept is a gradual transfer to mostly economic ways of supplying the military. For the period of the transfer we intend to preserve the necessary organizational structures, both in the Armed Forces and in the national economy.

The final goal of our planned transformation is to make up a new system that will be capable of complying with military requirements; it should be adjusted to the market economy and ensure that the defense potential of

the country can be sustained at the reasonable sufficiency level with all expenditures cut to the minimum. It also outlines certain reliable social guarantees for servicemen and members of their families.

We fully realize that the implementation of this task will become the responsibility of those who work in the rear of the districts and fleets. For this reason we have to start dealing with this problem immediately.

It goes without saying that we will have to utilize our initiative and perseverance to the fullest to honor this year's and the next year's orders. The requirements of the Army and Navy, primarily in food, should be fully met.

As market relations are developing and the new organizational structures are being established, we must at the same time switch to direct contacts with the manufacturing enterprises. We will preserve the state order only for those material assets that immediately affect the combat preparedness of units and ships.

Next. The military sovkhoses [state farms] and subsidiary farms have to raise the level of their agricultural production considerably. For that they need to switch to intensive technologies and employ professionals. It might be worth buying these technologies from other countries, together with complete equipment for them.

[Altunin] You mentioned employing professionals. As far as I know, regular attempts have been made to hire permanent workers for the subsidiary plants rather than bring in odd people for a short period of time.

[Arkhipov] We have to treat this issue very seriously now and propose it to the General Staff after submitting the feasibility report. I think that organic subunits should be added to the military units and they should be set up on the basis of alternate service.

I am sure that we need to have our own facilities to process agricultural products. This concerns dairy items, meat, meat and vegetable products, canned food, etc. Some of this food can be sold to civilians.

[Altunin] This was done well, by the way, in the Kiev Military District. We wrote about it in our newspaper.

[Arkhipov] Yes, it was. But in other districts they are sitting and waiting for orders. But the Army has to be fed now. We have only one way out—start direct contacts, raise the interest of our partners, even to the extent of helping them with the harvest.

Moreover, as we develop our economic relations we should not lock ourselves within the territories of our districts; we should serve as intermediaries for each other. People from the North Caucasus District could, for instance, help those who work in the Leningrad District rear services to stock up on Kransnodarskiy Kray vegetables; Leningraders, in their turn, could mediate the contracts on, say, supplies of fish from Murmansk Oblast.

Next issue. Our main and central administrations must quickly decide what technical means and assets should continue and what can be terminated without particular losses.

As we speak of establishing direct ties with Union enterprises, we should not forget about the construction of our own small but well-equipped plants to produce military-related goods that are not material-intensive. They can be used in such a way that some of their capacity allows us to produce consumer goods, which would bring additional profits.

[Altunin] Generally speaking, many of the rear services workers have enough initiative and entrepreneurial spirit for two, but they are used to running into obstacles placed in their way by numerous regulations and instructions. Will these be changed in view of the new conditions?

[Arkhipov] The possibilities for economic-legal work on the part of commanders and rear services chiefs have recently expanded considerably. This process will continue to increase.

[Altunin] We cannot resolve all the problems of our transfer to market economy with enthusiasm alone. We need people educated in economics. Where do we get them?

[Arkhipov] We definitely need specialists. We need them for the military representation, for the troops administration, for the commercial services in garrisons, for work in the rear services headquarters economic groups in military districts, for the fleets, for the main and central administrations. Finally, we need them for the Ministry of Defense economic administration which we feel should be established.

Starting with the next academic year we plan to introduce special courses in economics and commercial operations in the curricula of our logistics colleges. But this will take time. You would ask what we are going to do now, today. We want to send our most promising officers to various courses in economy and management so that they get involved in our work as soon as possible.

We are of the view that the commercial and economic activity in units and on ships should be assigned to the rear and financial services chiefs. They should be given more rights as they render or receive paid contracted services, providing the corresponding paperwork, to the local population, enterprises, and organizations. It goes without saying that there should be sufficient control exercised over all of this activity.

[Altunin] It seems to me that lately we have seen a diminished effort not to allow any waste of material resources. Though you have to agree that this is directly related to a market economy.

[Arkhipov] I agree. However, we work with our districts and fleets, and the annual economic effect of our work there is R270 to R280 million for rear services alone.

But, to be sincere with you, there is still a lot of potential there. So far it all depends on rear services chiefs at the lowest level. We have no profound scientific approach to balancing the expenditures, and they are not being planned in any way. As a result, quotas are not complied with—too much fuel is burned unnecessarily.

The first step, I think, is to increase material incentives for the immediate manufacturers. So far we have been guided by obsolete stereotypes; useful offers come in and get shelved indefinitely.

As we speak of economizing, we also have to talk of waste. A transfer to a market economy is incompatible with an increase in waste. Fires still cause a lot of losses, especially in clothing.

[Altunin] It was decided at some point in the past to remove all the dated equipment and hardware from units, to remove surplus clothing from warehouses and storage facilities, and to hand them all over to the State Committee for Material and Technical Supply [Gos-snab] organs so that they could be sold to the civilian population. How are things in this respect?

[Arkhipov] I have to be honest with you. This is being done slowly and painfully. During the nine months of this year, the Gosnab organs were given materials to the sum of R353 million. That is 65 percent of the planned amount. Our Strategic Rocket Forces, the Odessa and Siberian Military Districts, and the Baltic Fleet failed to fulfill their requisitions. The main reason for the failure is the lack of material incentives for those who should be doing the job.

It has been suggested that the USSR Council of Ministers give us the right to sell our material assets ourselves. In this case up to 70 percent of the profits, including hard currency sums, would remain at the disposal of our Ministry of Defense. This money will be used to resolve the problems caused by the withdrawal of our troops from Eastern Europe. We will use it to improve social and living conditions for our servicemen. We will also provide material incentives for the personnel involved in the sale of the surplus equipment. In this respect, military organizations should be allowed, I think, to conduct barter deals.

[Altunin] And the last question: The military helps with the harvest and transports various cargoes—would it be reasonable to switch to contracts in this area also?

[Arkhipov] This is a legitimate question. We do an incredible amount of such work. In 1989, for instance, our trucking fleets carried more than 26 million tons of various cargoes for the national economy. Our transport planes carried 54 thousand tons. This year they are transporting even more cargo. We were paid for this work at rates that were far indeed from contractual rates. I must tell you that the money we receive for this will be used to improve the material and living conditions of our servicemen.

The market is inevitable for the military. We are going to move toward it together with the rest of the country, and I am sure that we will do the job well. [The following slogan appears in a box centered on the page: "Toward a new supplies system—We need managers, where do we find them?—We have saved 280 million, and that is not all—...Barter deals too."]

On Fulfillment of Ukrainian Statute on Military Service

91UM0104A Kiev, PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian
12 Oct 90 p 1

[Decree of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet "On the Status of Fulfillment of the 30 July 1990 Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet Decree on Military Service by Citizens of the Republic"]

[Text] The Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet observes that the decree adopted on 30 July 1990 by the UkSSR Supreme Soviet is being fulfilled unsatisfactorily by the republic's government. The reason for this lies primarily in the fact that according to the UkSSR Constitution, the call-up procedure and the conditions of service are regulated by all-union legislation, which does not as a rule foresee that citizens may perform compulsory service within their own republic. The situation is also affected unfavorably by the fact that the UkSSR Council of Ministers failed to take steps to promptly create the corresponding government structures and to consult as necessary with the USSR Council of Ministers, and that it did not provide for the return of all servicemen who were UkSSR citizens and workers of the republic's law enforcement organs, used in the resolution of international conflicts.

The Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic **resolves:**

1. That the UkSSR Council of Ministers and the executive committees of oblast, city and rayon soviets of people's deputies:

- provide for assignment of conscripts to military units on the republic's territory to serve their compulsory term beginning with the fall call-up of 1990, except in the cases foreseen by this article;
- that citizens of the UkSSR are to be called up for compulsory service outside the republic: in fall 1990 and spring 1991, within the quotas established by the UkSSR Council of Ministers, necessary to man the arms and services of the Soviet Army and Navy, and ensuring strategic defense in the republic's interests; in order to acquire military specialties, with the guarantee of being able to return to the republic; in all other cases, on a volunteer basis;
- exclude cases in which UkSSR citizens serving their compulsory term are sent outside the republic for the resolution of international and other conflicts without the consent of the UkSSR Supreme Soviet.

2. That the UkSSR Council of Ministers shall:

- form, by 1 January 1991, bodies with the responsibility of organizing conscription at the republic, oblast, city and rayon levels, under organs of executive power;
- create, by 1 November 1990, a state-public expert commission to examine conflicts involving conscription and compulsory service of UkSSR citizens;
- submit, by 1 May 1991, proposals to the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet regarding establishment of alternative service in the republic;
- ensure the return of UkSSR citizens serving compulsory duty outside the Ukrainian SSR in units used to

resolve international and other conflicts and in military construction detachments, back to the republic during October-November of this year.

3. To establish that besides in cases of exemption from military service foreseen by law, persons in families that have lost members due to death or disability in the performance of military duty are not subject to mandatory call-up. Servicemen possessing children up to 10 years old or married servicemen may perform compulsory duty only within the republic. Conscripts with children up to three years old are granted a deferment.

To introduce state health and life insurance for compulsory-service servicemen, and to foresee compensation for losses resulting from impairment of the physical or mental health of servicemen.

4. That it would be suitable to create a UkSSR Supreme Soviet permanent commission on matters of foreign and internal security, and an empowered delegation to consult with the USSR Supreme Soviet, the USSR government and the USSR Ministry of Defense. That the Presidium of the UkSSR Supreme Soviet is to submit proposals on these issues.

5. That the executive committees of oblast, city and rayon soviets of people's deputies are to ensure organized conduct of the 1990 fall call-up. That assignment of UkSSR citizens to units outside the republic for compulsory service is to be suspended until such time that union organs adopt decisions creating the necessary conditions for fulfilling this decree, and that this practice is to be reinstated when so decided by the UkSSR Council of Ministers.

6. That a report of the empowered delegation on the results of consultations with the USSR Council of Ministers is to be given at a session of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet, and that the quota established by the republic's government for the fall 1990 call-up of UkSSR citizens who are to serve their compulsory term outside the republic is to be approved.

7. Prior to creation of the UkSSR Supreme Soviet permanent commission on matters of foreign and internal security, the responsibility of monitoring fulfillment of this decree is to be assigned to Comrade V. B. Grinev, deputy chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet, and to the UkSSR Supreme Soviet commissions on youth affairs, on human rights, on law enforcement and crime prevention, and on women's affairs and protection of the family, maternity and childhood.

8. This decree becomes effective at the moment of its adoption.

L. Kravchuk, Chairman, Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet.

Kiev, 10 October 1990

Armenian Supreme Soviet Resolution on Draft
91UM0104B Yerevan GOLOS ARMENII in Russian
20 Oct 90 p 1

[Decree of the Supreme Soviet of the Armenian Republic on the 1990 Call-Up of Citizens of the Armenian Republic]

[Text] Basing itself on provisions of the Armenian Republic's declaration "On the Independence of Armenia," the Armenian Republic Supreme Soviet resolves:

1. To suspend the 12 October 1967 USSR law "On Universal Compulsory Military Service" on the territory of the Armenian Republic.
2. That citizens subject to call-up in the Armenian Republic in 1990 are to perform their compulsory service in military units located in Armenia. Citizens of the Armenian Republic may serve outside Armenia in accordance with provisions set forth by the Armenian Council of Ministers, if citizens subject to call-up so desire.
3. To instruct the Armenian Republic Council of Ministers to carry out the necessary preparatory work in accordance with Clause 2 of this decree, and conduct the call-up from 22 October to 22 December 1990.

L. Ter-Petrosyan, Chairman, Armenian Republic Supreme Soviet.
A. Saakyan, Secretary, Armenian Republic Supreme Soviet.

17 October 1990, Yerevan

Lt Gen Ter-Grigoryants on Fall Draft
91UM0104D Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT
in Russian No 42, 15-21 Oct 90 p 6

[Interview with Lt Gen N. Ter-Grigoryants by N. Gabrilov: "The Landowners Are Fighting..."]

[Text] The regular fall call-up of youngsters to active military service is being conducted in October-December. The USSR Council of Ministers adopted a decree to this effect on 25 September of this year.

As we know, during the spring call-up of this year the military commissariats encountered great difficulties. The armed forces fell short by around 25,000 new recruits. And in general, the vacant military "work stations" currently number over 400,000! Such is the personnel shortfall in the armed forces.

And how are things going with the fall call-up? Our correspondent turned to Lieutenant General N. Ter-Grigoryants, deputy chief of the Main Staff of the Ground Forces and a directorate chief.

[Ter-Grigoryants] This spring a large proportion of the Oblasts of the RSFSR, the Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan met the call-up plan. The shortfall was due primarily to Armenia (the call-up satisfied only 7.5

percent of the plan in Armenia, 28 percent in Georgia, 40.7 percent in Lithuania, 42.1 percent in Estonia and 55.5 percent of the plan in Latvia).

But difficulties were encountered with the call-up before as well. Except that while a year or two ago the military commissariats were interfered with primarily by various informal organizations, now it is the legislative bodies of a number of republics that are currently taking a stand against the call-up. Some of the legislation they are adopting takes no account at all of either the USSR Constitution or the law "On Universal Compulsory Military Service." Last spring for example, the Armenian Supreme Soviet resolved to suspend call-up of youngsters of Armenian nationality for service outside the republic "...until final resolution of the matter with central organs of the USSR." Three weeks before the USSR Council of Ministers adopted its decree on the fall call-up, the Uzbek SSR Council of Ministers adopted its decree "On Implementing the Ukase of the President of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic 'On Measures to Improve Call-Up and Military Service of the Republic's Youth'." Here is what it says: "...terminate the call-up of youngsters to military construction units stationed outside the Uzbek SSR as of fall 1990...."

A decision was made in the Ukraine to go on with the call-up, but not to send conscripts outside the republic. Thus it is not individuals complaining loudly about "dedovshchina" and other negative phenomena in the army that are a hindrance to service, but the state bodies of the republics themselves that are offering opposition to Soviet laws. They are dealing a blow on the fundamental principles of the current system of armed forces manning.

[Gavrilov] The republics do not recognize the union law, and in a sense they are waging a silent war with the center. But it is the young people that stand between them like millstones. Specific individuals are being punished for draft evasion, they are being subjected to court proceedings, and the records of the youngsters are being soiled.

[Ter-Grigoryants] Yes, youngsters are being taken to court....

[Gavrilov] The result is like in that old saying: "The landowners are fighting, but it's the serfs that are getting hurt." Are the president of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the country's Supreme Soviet aware of this situation in the draft?

[Ter-Grigoryants] I would think that they should know. There have been press reports about this situation, and competent organs have reported on it. Moreover the President and the Supreme Soviet can't help noticing the republic legislation that is aimed not simply at causing the call-up to fail but actually causing the collapse of the entire state's armed forces.

[Gavrilov] What measures should be implemented in your opinion so as to create order in keeping with the interests of the motherland's defense capabilities?

[Ter-Grigoryants] In the present situation it would be desirable for the USSR President and the country's Supreme Soviet to resolutely condemn all legislation pertaining to the armed forces call-up that is contrary to law right now, in the current session of the Supreme Soviet. This legislation must obviously be deemed invalid. I think that the responsibility for the call-up into the armed forces should be given to the supreme soviets of the country and the republics. All of this should obviously be reflected in a union agreement as well. In any case, things need to be established in such a way that there would be no conflicts between the republic and union laws in something as important as development of the armed forces.

[Gavrilov] But let's suppose that certain republics prevail in their insistence upon having "their own" armed forces. Let's assume that this is legalized, that it is confirmed by a union agreement. Would this not mean that the might of the armed forces would decrease immediately and noticeably, and that they would cease to be unified?

[Ter-Grigoryants] I'm certain of that.

Let us make a slight digression here. Lieutenant General Ter-Grigoryants's conviction is explained not only by his high rank. It is based on considerable knowledge and substantial military experience. He is one of those generals who made his name on something other than the drill pad. He graduated as a senior sergeant in record time—three years. Then, after receiving a full taste of soldier's bread, he entered tank school. He served as commander of a reconnaissance platoon and of a reconnaissance and a tank company, as battalion chief of staff, as battalion commander, and as regiment commander. He underwent training in the academy of armored troops, in a unit command, as chief of staff and commander of a division, and in the Academy of the General Staff (incidentally, Ter-Grigoryants graduated from all educational institutions with outstanding grades). Then he became first deputy chief of staff of the Turkestan Military District. And finally in Afghanistan he served as army chief of staff. I asked the general: "With Gromov?" "No, Colonel Gromov was then the division commander...."

[Gavrilov] But if we digress from what we might call the global causes hindering the call-up, there are also ones, Comrade General, which have to do with the command of the armed forces.

[Ter-Grigoryants] Like what, for example?

[Gavrilov] Well, here's one as an example. The editor's office often receives letters from conscripts: They graduate from DOSAAF school in one specialty, but they are called up to serve in another. You must agree that there's

little good in that: It's wasteful, and from a moral standpoint it doesn't have a very healthy effect on young people.

[Ter-Grigoryants] I agree that such things happen. They will go on happening. And for the time being we will apparently be unable to avoid such things. Service out of one's specialty can be explained only in rare cases by the bungling of some military worker or mistakes in the planning of technical specialist training. Such things are correctable, and we will correct them. But the main cause lies in a shortage of conscripts. That means we are forced to maneuver people, and retrain them with the purpose of filling the places that are most important to maintaining combat readiness.

[Gavrilov] I would like to hear from you what sort of help military commissariats are receiving in their work from public organizations, and from DOSAAF in particular.

[Ter-Grigoryants] We maintain complete contact with DOSAAF committees and training organizations. But we have complaints toward them as well: It is far from always that we receive well-trained specialists from their schools. Many have to be given further training, while some have to be retaught the same specialty which according to the documents the youngster has supposedly acquired in DOSAAF school. Such a complaint can be levied against a number of special vocational-technical schools as well.

[Gavrilov] The influence of the clergy upon the mood of the people, including on whether they should be pro-army or anti-army, is now growing more and more. Do you take this into account in your work with conscripts?

[Ter-Grigoryants] The military commissariats have received recommendations on this account—to maintain working contacts with the local clergy.

[Gavrilov] Some young people are refusing to serve out of religious motives.

[Ter-Grigoryants] Not all that many on a countrywide scale. There were 398 such people in 1988, and 451 in 1989.

[Gavrilov] Is there a tendency for growth?

[Ter-Grigoryants] Apparently so. We will see what this year will bring. But let me also say that as a rule, when believers are called up, they do serve well. This is true not only for the Orthodox but also other religions.

And so, the armed forces call-up is under way. Time will tell how it goes, and what tendencies will prevail in formation of the armed forces.

Armenian Resolution on Extra-Republic Service by Citizens

*91UM0104C Yerevan GOLOS ARMENII in Russian
20 Oct 90 p 1*

[Decree of the Supreme Soviet of the Armenian Republic on Servicemen of Armenian Nationality Who Are Citizens of the Armenian Republic and Other Soviet Republics and Who Were Compelled to Abandon Military Units of the Soviet Armed Forces Stationed Outside Armenian Territory]

[Text] Observing that the 3 May 1990 decree of the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet "On Further Service of Servicemen of Armenian Nationality Who Were Forced to Abandon Military Units of the Soviet Army" has not been fulfilled, owing to which many servicemen are unable to complete their compulsory military service, which in turn bars them from further civilian activity, the Supreme Soviet of the Armenian Republic resolves:

In execution of the above-mentioned decree of the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet dated 3 May 1990, to instruct the Armenian Republic Council of Ministers and the military commissariat of the Armenian Republic to resolve, within two months' time, issues associated with allowing servicemen of Armenian nationality who are citizens of the Armenian Republic and citizens of other republics of the USSR and who were forced to abandon their military units to finish out their tour of duty in military units located within the republic.

L. Ter-Petrosyan, Chairman, Armenian Republic Supreme Soviet.

A. Saakyan, Secretary, Armenian Republic Supreme Soviet.

17 October 1990, Yerevan

Moscow Military Procurator on AWOL Problem

*91UM0099A Moscow VECHERNAYA MOSKVA
in Russian 2 Nov 90 p 2*

[Interview with Major General of Military Justice L. Obyektov, military procurator of the Moscow garrison, conducted by Lieutenant Colonel N. Medvedyev, under the rubric "From the Point of View of the USSR Ministry of Defense Press Center": "Why Are Soldiers Fleeing"?]

[Text] It seems that the army and society are confronted with yet another serious problem. Occurrences of absence without leave have become more frequent in military units. Soldiers are running away one at a time and in groups. The scope of this phenomenon is assuming an increasingly alarming nature. According to data from the USSR Ministry of Defense, 2,500 fugitives are currently being sought.

And what does the situation look like in the capital? Major General of Military Justice L. Obyektov, military procurator of the Moscow garrison, answers this and other questions.

[Obyektov] Let us begin with some statistics,—Leonid Alekseyevich suggested. In 1989, 149 cases of evading military service were recorded by our procurator's office, but for the first nine months of this year, there are already 273 cases. This "disease" has mainly taken root in the military construction units. Furthermore, almost every day patrols from the military commandant's office arrest soldiers, who are absent without leave from their duty stations in various regions of the country, at train stations. The road home runs through the capital.

During the last nine months, twice as many criminal cases have been instituted against these servicemen, as during the corresponding period last year. As you can see, this is progress, but certainly not for the better.

[Medvedyev] You used the word "evading". But is this not really desertion?

[Obyektov] The exactness of legal wordings is of principal importance. At all times and in all armies, desertion was and still is considered as a manifestation of cowardice and faintheartedness. Article 247 of the RSFSR Criminal Code specifies severe punishment for this heinous military crime: from three to seven years imprisonment for soldiers and sergeants and from five to seven years for officers and warrant officers. However, if a serviceman did not intend to completely evade the performance of his duties, in this case his actions are not desertion, they are symptomatic of the crime specified in article 246 of the RSFSR Criminal Code (unauthorized absence from one's unit or place of duty), for which punishment is also stipulated.

Lately, as a rule, we encounter exactly this sort of violation. Muscovites, who have been called up to the army, are no exception, although I must say: many of them serve with dignity.

[Medvedyev] Who exactly is running away, where to, and why?

[Obyektov] Each fugitive has his own motives. Sometimes after hearing a confession, one is simply amazed: "I was fed up with everything and decided to have a change of scenery", "I was homesick", "I wanted to see a girl"... Otherwise, one would not call such things overgrown infantilism and flippancy. It just so happens that unauthorized absence from one's unit entails grave consequences.

Literally a day or two ago, we had to approve the imprisonment of Private A. Lyapin. He has been in the army since June 1989. He was called up by the Kirovskiy rayon military commissariat. He was serving in Ulyanovsk, but recently went into "hiding". As he now explains to the investigator, "he wanted to reach an understanding with his wife". She had left him. He hid at

a dacha belonging to friends. One day he went to a dormitory at 21 Yaroslavskaya Street "to enjoy himself" with some other friends. In a state of intoxication, he picked a fight and wounded a casual passerby, the father of two children, with a knife. Why did he have a knife in his possession—for "amusement"? Thus one crime brought about another. Lyapin will have to answer to a military tribunal. One should think that it would be reasonable to ask: has the army trained him in this manner?

Of course, the "hazing" of new conscripts by those conscripts having 18 months of service is also one of the reasons for evading military service. A tough and uncompromising struggle is being waged against hazing, including the use of publicity and public opinion. The military procurator's office is also taking aggressive measures. The situation is stabilizing in the garrison's units, although there is still a long way to go, particularly in some of the military construction units. In this year alone, the tribunal has convicted 32 servicemen for barracks hooliganism.

I would especially like to single out one more incentive, if one can call it that, for desertion. I have just been informed about the arrest at a train station of several soldiers, who were called up to the army from Georgia. They claimed that they had left their unit without authorization in order to call home from a public telephone. Was it necessary to sneak away to the train station for this purpose? Among the detainees and those who are being sought are a particularly large number of soldiers called up from the Baltic and Transcaucasian republics, the western oblasts of the Ukraine, and other regions of the country. Only a blind man cannot see the reason.

[Medvedyev] Do you mean to say that someone is inciting the soldiers to desertion?

[Obyektov] Exactly. There is an extremely low level of law and order in the country, the antimilitary campaign is becoming more active, and in a number of republics opposition to the draft is spreading and attempts are being made to do away with it. Incidents of direct incitement to desertion are frequent. Cases have been recorded in which emissaries from various social organizations come to military units under the guise of relatives and try to persuade their compatriots not to serve in the Soviet Army.

Quite recently in one of the units, seven Georgian soldiers were found to be missing at the same time. An investigation was announced and shortly after the commander received the following letter: "I am informing you that Nachkebiya, Givi Guramovich; Arboleshvili, Giya Georgiyevich; Abramishvili, Kakhaper Vazhayevich; Tonoyan, Zaza Khachikoyevich; Zakutashvili, David Giurovich; Maziashvili, Nodar Giviyeich; and Kevelashvili, Givi Avtandilovich are on Georgian territory. According to statements written by them, they refuse to serve in the Soviet Army. They all

are under the protection of the national front of Georgia and after the raising of the Georgian national army, the question of their military service in its units will be decided". The seal, surname, and signature of the author were that of a certain Khakhishvili, "a member of the committee to boycott the Soviet Army". Of course, it is difficult to bring fugitives back. They enjoy the protection of not only social organizations, but also of local law enforcement agencies.

And this is not an isolated incident. Attempts are being made to pull the army apart into ethnic headquarters. Bills on "military issues", which contradict our country's Constitution and its Law on universal military service, are being passed in a number of republics. Thus, the "Declaration on the state sovereignty of the Ukraine", adopted on 16 July, states that the Ukraine has the right to maintain its own armed forces, and, as a rule, its citizens should perform their military service in the territory of their own republic. And the mechanism for realizing this thesis was approved literally a day or two ago at a session of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet. In September, the Moldavian SSR Supreme Soviet passed a resolution which established that the republic's citizens could not be called up for military service in the ranks of the USSR Armed Forces, and that military reservists are not subject to call-up for active duty training.

A whole series of bills, which contradict All-Union laws, have been passed in Estonia, Latvia, Armenia, and Uzbekistan. In February, the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet adopted a resolution according to which deserters are released from criminal liability.

All of this places young soldiers, who are not well versed in political games, in a difficult situation. It is clear that the commanders' work with personnel becomes considerably more complicated. They have to explain that from a legal standpoint such bills are simply groundless and that they contradict the USSR Constitution. And only one thing remains for us military jurists: to follow exactly the spirit and letter of the law. And the military commissariats, which, wherever they are located, are called upon to promptly implement All-Union laws, operate in a similar manner.

However, I must state that the number of criminal cases instituted does not reflect the true picture. Due to extenuating circumstances at their place of duty, only disciplinary actions are taken against a number of fugitives. Why destroy the future of youths, who have made a mistake under the influence of unconstitutional and illegal laws passed in the provinces.

[Medvedyev] Do you have examples?

[Obyektov] As many as you wish. Here is one of them. Compatriots came to visit Private A. Zubkov, a military construction worker and a Lithuanian by nationality. After their persuasions and "explanation" of the recently approved appropriate laws of the republic, the soldier left his unit without authorization. To put it plainly, his countrymen drove him home—to Panevezhis. He

reported to the local government authorities, registered, put his passport in order at the militia office, and stayed at his mother's place for a month. As he admitted later on, this was a difficult month for him: his mother demanded his return to his place of duty, constant emotional turmoil, and joyless and disquieting meetings with those, who like himself were Lithuanian fugitives... In short, he could not endure the mental anguish—he went back. Taking all the circumstances into account, we believed that he could be released from criminal liability, and the law gives us this right. The soldier continues to serve in his unit.

[Medvedyev] Does that mean that others, who are being sought, have a chance to return to their military units?

[Obyektov] Absolutely. One only has to take advantage of this chance in time. Friends, relatives, and everyone who cares about the fate of young people, who are considering their life, but have already stumbled, could assist in this. While telling Zubkov's story, I intentionally emphasized his mother's wise position. In conclusion, I would like to once again stress: a great many things in a son's military service depend on the parents. For example, a call-up is under way right now. How important it is that every young man, who is facing military service, hears kind parting words from his father and mother and leaves for the army with an unburdened heart and a willingness to fulfill his constitutional duty.

Massive Decline in Leningrad DOSAAF Membership

91UM0142A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
2 Dec 90 First Edition p 4

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Captain 1st Rank A. Zlydnev: "They Are Quitting Without Regret: Or Why the DOSAAF Organization Is Emptying"]

[Text] The white hot passions that flared in the Leningrad city and oblast defense organization during this past summer and at the beginning of autumn have not subsided even today. DOSAAF Chairman Rear Admiral Yu. Pivnev's work style has become the stumbling block of the extended confrontation. They had to convene two plenum committees to resolve the conflict situation but the i's still have not been dotted and the t's have not been crossed.

Sober statistics are evidence that there were more than two million DOSAAF members in the city and oblast on January 1, 1989 and now this figure has been reduced by almost half.

In a conversation, Reserve Captain 1st Rank N. Vashchenko, DOSAAF Primorskiy Raykom chairman, specifically stated:

"In many rayons, including our own, there are squalid training facilities and there is no prospect for improving them. We do not clearly know how the significant

resources Leningrad City and Oblast Committee has at its disposal are being spent. And since this is so, people are becoming disillusioned with the meaning of their presence in DOSAAF and are quitting without regrets. For example, 15,000 people have recently quit in our rayon."

The situation is similar in Kirovskiy Rayon where Reserve Captain 2nd Rank I. Gorbulin is the committee chairman. Here 17,000 people terminated their memberships in the society this year alone. A particularly alarming situation has developed in such enterprises as Znamya Oktyabrya and Krasnyy Khimik Production Associations. The causes are the same plus Leningrad City and Oblast DOSAAF Committee Leadership's inadequate attention to the concerns of leading organizations. For example, this year Rear Admiral Yu. Pivnev has not once visited the raykom, without discussing visits to leading organizations. These facts are alarming and require energetic steps to restore the social organization's prestige and to review and radically improve the work style of leaders of all ranks, first of all the committee chairman, his deputies, and other officials.

A thorough discussion that occurred at the July 25, 1990 DOSAAF Committee Presidium session was about this in particular. The Presidium decided to convene an extraordinary plenum to develop specific ways to transfer the defense society to new management methods and at which it heard reports about the work of the committee chairman and his three deputies. We must point out that such hearings were not held previously and the plenum was awaited with great impatience. It was preceded by a comprehensive inspection that was carried out by a committee headed by Colonel A. Shcherbakov from the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee.

Let us frankly state that the inspection document is depressing. Quite a few complaints were directed at Rear Admiral Yu. Pivnev who "does not always rely on the collective in his practical activities and ignores the opinions of Party and trade union organizations." Through an individual decision, he issued an order to merge the mass organization work and military-patriotic propaganda department and the sports department without considering public opinion and this caused indignation among workers among a number of the society's committees and organizations.

This last observation requires commentary because it confirms the Rear Admiral's command-administrative work style and his intolerance of criticism. You do not have to go far to get the facts. For example, G. Kuznetsov and M. Cherenets only had to criticize the committee chairman at the previously mentioned Presidium session and the next day he decided to combine the departments headed by these comrades.

The Rear Admiral did not forgive DOSAAF Moscow Raykom Chairman Reserve Lieutenant Colonel I. Polyakov for criticism directed at him. While still agitated

from the discussion and without pondering the essence of those critical observations, he ordered one of his assistants: "Tomorrow, conduct an inspection at Polyakov's and dig up a few more discrepancies there...."

This is a strange reaction to criticism from the arsenal of bad memories of the years of stagnation. Certain of the Rear Admiral's other actions also cause bad feelings. Let us say, sending the driver of his "personal" automobile to inspect the work of DOSAAF rayon committees. And, as KRASNAYA ZVEZDA reported, it is no coincidence that on September 29, 1990 that "DOSAAF Leningrad City and Oblast Committee extraordinary plenum, having declared Comrade Pivnev's work to be unsatisfactory, expressed no-confidence in him."

DOSAAF Central Committee Chairman Colonel General N. Kotlovtshev's reaction to this assessment was immediate. He wired: "The Central Committee Presidium Bureau concurs with the unsatisfactory assessment of Yu. S. Pivnev's activities and with convening a closed DOSAAF Leningrad City and Oblast organizational plenum at which the question about the advisability of his tenure in the position will be examined...."

There are concurrences for the sake of concurrence but for the sake of justice we need to say that the Central Committee of the country's defense society inadequately studied the situation in the collective accountable to him. That same last inspection document is filled with mainly negative facts. Positive factors (and there are some) are hardly mentioned in passing.

A secret ballot also did not reflect unanimity. Rear Admiral Yu. Pivnev remained in his position with two votes to spare....

The uproar of two plenums was over but passions, I repeat, did not subside. The voting results did not satisfy many people. Complaints against Rear Admiral Yu. Pivnev were once again sent to the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee, to Leningrad State Institution Employees Oblast Trade Union Council, to the Ministry of Defense.... We think that they could not get by without the third, once again extraordinary, plenum—otherwise it is difficult to count on the defense society's smooth operation.

And at this time, as Leningrad City and Oblast DOSAAF Committee Deputy Chairman Colonel G. Govorin told me, the number of DOSAAF members both in the city and in the oblast continues to steadily decline....

Details of Somali Boarding of Soviet Trawler Recalled

91UM0090A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 6 Nov 90
Union Edition p 6

[Interview of G. F. Shipulya, fishing ship captain, by B. Pilyatskin: "Imprisoned by Somali Insurgents, As Well As Bureaucratic Instructions"]

[Text] Those who followed in our paper the odyssey of the Soviet fishing trawler Kaff, seized off the coast of Somalia by a group of armed insurgents (issue numbers 208, 209, 216, 223) possibly remembered the name of the ship captain—Shipulya. I met him by accident on a pier in the seaport of Maputo. The Kaff, which was ransomed for \$250,000 from the pirate prison, came to Mozambique and intended to set forth soon to its home shores at Kaliningrad. We decided to speak only about what is not yet known to the reader.

So, let me go in chronological order. On 9 December of last year the Kaff, which belongs to the Pionerskiy base of the Kaliningradrybprom oceanic fishing fleet—a cost-accounting organization in the system of the USSR Ministry of the Fish Industry—left on a trip assignment to Maputo. The assignment consisted of catching shrimp and lobster using Japanese stationary traps. The Kaff was to test the imported innovation, which looked like a cone-shaped bucket made out of metal rods covered by a net.

"How much was paid to the Japanese for the 'buckets'?"

"To the best of my knowledge," answers Georgiy Fomich, "\$80,000."

Equipped with 900 Japanese traps, the vessel made fast on 25 January 1990 at a Maputo wharf, and here learned like a bolt of lightning out of the blue that the Kaff was not included in the contract concluded by the supervisors from Minrybkhhoz [Ministry of the Fish Industry] for the current year. It says nothing about stationary traps, and provided for this type of fishing in the previous year of 1989. At that time the Kaff was undergoing lengthy repairs. According to the logic of things, in 1989 it was also necessary to equip with the modern Japanese invention any of 10 Soviet fishing vessels trading with Mozambique under the agreement. Why? As the reader will see, there are still many such questions ahead.

Having placed the thus untested imported traps in storage in a local warehouse, and with great difficulty gotten trawling equipment in Maputo, the Kaff, by agreement with a Minrybkhhoz representative, began to fish by the usual, old method. And in order to observe the formalities of the contract, it was necessary to make the fishing a sideline, and mainly be simply on-call to do miscellaneous tasks—to haul water, fuel, and food to the other trawlers, transport their catches, etc. Naturally, the crew lost pay doing this. But it was not even a matter of the money, stated the captain. Sailors are people of habit. It was vexing to them that they were not doing

their jobs. This is not to mention the fact that almost a month was lost on organizational troubles, during which they were able to catch about \$80,000 worth of shrimp; i.e., the amount laid out for the Japanese "buckets."

At the beginning of May the planned time of the trip ended and the captain, along with the crew, having left the Kaff in Maputo for preventive maintenance, flew home. In Kaliningrad no one was especially surprised at the story. There are plenty of blunders. Shipulya was given a new trip assignment to go to the north of Somalia to work as part of a joint Soviet-French company, Fransov.

On 11 June at the port of the Somalian capital of Mogadishu the captain received a license to catch shrimp and lobster in Somali waters. After he was already on site he learned that there was nothing to do off the east coast of Somalia. From May through October the wind and currents here change, and in general it is practically impossible to work in the stormy, force-9 waves. To send a ship here at this time of year, as Somali observers who were on shore under the conditions of their licenses stated, was completely absurd.

"I will tell you honestly," continues the captain, "I heard about this from my fellow captains back in Kaliningrad. Therefore, I immediately stated at the office: 'Let us not lock ourselves in to one means of fishing, but for insurance let us take with us some high-quality trawling nets.' The office refused. And I had a crystal ball."

"Well, alright, you saw on site the senselessness of fishing with the Japanese traps. Did you report it?"

"I sent radiograms."

"And what happened?"

"Nothing. They answered: 'Develop the type of fishing.' I answered them: 'The type of fishing has been developed.' They stated: 'You have not found a concentration; expand the area of search.' And we 'expanded' it, and lost over a month of valuable time and 150 traps. It is true, I will tell you frankly, that there was one trawl on board, which we were able to get by way of self-initiative, so to speak. But authorization from base was required to put it into action."

Personally I do not understand why the captain of a Soviet fishing fleet, who answers with his life for every member of the crew, for his trawler, and for its property, does not have the right to decide independently the elementary question of what to use to catch crustacea in the Indian Ocean, traps or trawls. It turns out that this is much clearer to bureaucrats who sit at their desks 10,000 km from the place of the ship, in the city of Pionerskiy, Kaliningrad Oblast.

It is most interesting that in the end permission to fish using a trawl was received. And the Kaff began to work off the north coast of Somalia. There, on the night of 17-18 July, when the ship was at anchorage near the uninhabited islet of Mayd (cleaning the trawl), 6.5 miles

off the coast, the trawler was seized by a group of people from the opposition Somali National Movement, armed with grenade launchers and Kalashnikov assault rifles.

But is it possible that none of us really knew that the north coast of Somalia is a danger zone where fishing vessels should not appear. In an interview given to an IZVESTIYA correspondent, the chief of the Africa Directorate, USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, laid responsibility on inexperienced Soviet enterprises (in this case the Pionerskiy base), that "consider it unnecessary to consult with the embassies. Even in countries where a civil war is going on."

Let us assume this is so. But does this really allow the embassies to be impartial observers who wash their hands of the situation? What became of the information about an entire international flotilla which, before the Kaff, was subjected to the attacks of 20th century pirates? Can you imagine that for a long period of time they did not know about all this in our embassy in Mogadishu? And if they knew, why did they not do everything to ensure that the contracts that were carelessly, and let us say further irresponsibly, concluded by representatives of Minrybkhov, to fish in Somali waters, were immediately annulled?! They recalled only now, after too high a price has been paid.

Another question that requires an answer is why military sailors abandoned their civilian comrades in their trouble. In the same interview a senior Ministry of Foreign Affairs official expressed justifiable amazement with the fact that, as the Navy Main Headquarters stated, to liberate Soviet people is not included among military functions. True, the Main Headquarters corrected itself. A minelayer, on orders of the command, set out to the required area and unsuccessfully attempted to communicate with the Kaff. Then it departed. It is true that on all these attempts to find out what had happened to the missing fishermen, for some reason a half hour was expended. This is the military version. Now I will cite the words of G. Shipulya:

"By agreement with the captain of the trawler Gerant, who was trawling in the open sea not far from us, we had continuous open communications on one of the frequencies. Thus, had the minesweeper really called us the Gerant would necessarily have responded. I have irrefutable evidence. On the second day of our sail we succeeded in diverting the attention of the pirates, who had sealed up the radio room, and over a spare portable radio, which they did not notice, transmitted for a brief instant. We reported where we were located and who had seized us. Gerant responded immediately. Although later the insurgents destroyed the portable radio, it was too late: News about us had gone to the homeland. So I have great doubts about any attempts to find us made by the minesweeper."

Sixteen days later, following difficult negotiations, an agreement about ransom was concluded, and the trawler was released. To where should it set sail? Initially it went

to Aden. There they received instructions to go to Kaliningrad, home. Then, suddenly there came another instruction: Go to Maputo. As we learned once we got there, the trip to Maputo was entirely unnecessary.

So, let us sum up the results. Compared with the amount paid to the captors, the remaining damage, of course, can seem trivial, but let us add it up also. Let us also add the inactive Japanese gear, loss of pay of the sailors, thefts by the "freedom fighters" of wedding rings, jeans, and Keds from the crew. Who now will reimburse for all this and, and how will the idle time for the period of captivity be paid for? The captain does not know. And what can compensate for the psychological stress and the illnesses (almost everyone with the captors on shore had stomach problems). An entire year has gone by for both the crew and the captain, who were released from prison, but who continue to be bound by their own country's bureaucratic ropes.

Commentary on Changes in NATO 'Autumn Forge-90' Exercises

91UM0150A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
6 Dec 90 First Edition p 3

[Article by Colonel G. Veselovskiy: "Autumn Forge-90"]

[Text] The training series of the combined and national armed forces of the NATO countries in Europe has been conducted every year since 1975 during the period from September through November under the general name "Autumn Forge." It is essentially the culminating measure of the annual cycle of operational and combat training of the troops. These are command staff, troop, and special training sessions that vary in terms of scale, goals, and number of participants, organized against a unified organizational and strategic background. During the course of this training the Northern Atlantic bloc conducts practical verification of the new points in strategy and tactics and investigates the capabilities of their armed forces for waging war.

In past years the "Autumn Forge" series combined up to 30 different training sessions, with more than 300,000 participants. In 1990, as was reported in the foreign press, within the framework of autumn maneuvers NATO conducted about 20 large- and medium-scale operational measures with the participation of more than 150,000. This is the lowest level in recent years, which, in the opinion of specialists of the bloc, was brought about by the diversion of troops of the United States and other NATO countries into the Persian Gulf zone, the transformations in the Eastern European countries, the process of unification of Germany, and the progress in negotiations for reducing conventional arms in Europe. In this same connection, military and political leaders of the United States, the FRG, Great Britain, Denmark, and other countries of the bloc have officially announced their refusal to participate in certain NATO training programs, which led to the cancellation of a number of large-scale operational measures, above all in

the Central European theater of operations (the "Bold Guard," "Keystone," "Hessenshield," and "Quarter Final" training programs).

According to the estimation of NATO commanders, the cancellation and reduction of training sessions, on the whole, had an effect on the intensiveness of the combat training of the troops. It was kept at the previous level mainly at the expense of concentration of forces on the development of problems at the battalion-brigade level carried out during the autumn period. Thus the load on one military serviceman has stayed the same.

Under the conditions of the reduction of the scale of training and the forces and equipment involved in it, the bloc command conducted a search for new forms of operational training of leadership and command personnel. As a promising form of this training they began to use computer command staff training and war games. As a rule, they were conducted in the permanent duty stations without actually spreading out into the local areas. Extensive application of modern electronic computer systems, in the opinion of the military specialists, has made it possible to develop a significantly larger number of problems while reducing the number of personnel, arms, and equipment involved and also saving money and materials.

The investigation of the variants of the first operations in the war in Europe was conducted in the theaters of combat operations. The arena for training of the NATO groupings consisted of broad expanses—from Nordkapp (Northern Norway) to Eastern Turkey, and also the northern part of the Atlantic Ocean.

Most of the attention in the North European theater of combat operations was devoted to the development of joint operations of ground troops, the Air Force, and the Navy while providing antiaircraft defense of the coast of Northern Norway, and in the zone of the Baltic Straits—defense of the gulf zone while waging war with conventional weapons. Problems of changing over to the application of nuclear weapons were also developed.

In the Central European theater of combat operations large-scale training (from the army corps and higher)

were abolished, and in order to compensate for them the number of battalion and brigade training operations was increased. A typical plan for practically all training operations was to conduct deterrent measures with the troops subsequently moving on to the counterattack.

NATO troops looked the most militant on the southern flank of the bloc, right on the borders of the Iraq-Kuwait conflict. According to announcements in the foreign press, in this region Atlantic solidarity was demonstrated on land, at sea, and in the air. Thus against a unified operations-strategic background in the Mediterranean Sea, at the same time training operations were conducted for the combined NATO naval forces, "Display Determination-90," "Deterrent Force-90," and "Damsel Fea-90" and also national training sessions of various arms and kinds of troops of the armed forces of Turkey and Greece. There was a verification and practical testing of measures for shifting troops from peacetime to wartime conditions and conducting joint operations in a limited war.

At the same time on the northern flank of NATO and in the Atlantic, there was training of various types of armed forces of the bloc with the leading role played by the Navy in "Timework-90." In this they developed problems to taking and retaining dominance in the Baltic and Norwegian seas in order to create a reliable blockade and destroy the USSR Navy and also land troops on the unarmed coast lines.

Against a unified background with maneuvers of the bloc "Autumn Forge-90," a training series was conducted for armed forces of France and Spain that are not included in the NATO organization. But certain subdivisions and units from these countries also participated in the NATO-wide measures.

One can judge the effectiveness of NATO combat training from the example of the diversion of American troops into the Persian Gulf zone. Taking advantage of the experience gained in training, carefully developed plans, and also the training of military servicemen, in relatively short periods of time the United States was able to create a grouping of more than 200,000 of their troops here.

Defense R & D Organizations Struggle With Cost Accounting

91UM0107A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
14 Nov 90 First Edition p 2

[Article by Colonel A. Stefashin, chief of the Air Force Scientific Research Institute, USSR State Laureate, candidate of Technical Sciences: "Economics and Us": "Cost Accounting and Science"]

[Text] USSR Ministry of Defense scientific research organizations [NIO] have logged two years of experience in working under conditions of total cost accounting making it now possible to assess the degree to which this mechanism is in keeping with the status of a military organization where centralized management [yedinonachaliye] is the cornerstone of the management system.

Let us recall what served as the basis for the NIO's switching over to cost accounting. Only one reason was given: military-related scientific institutions must be incorporated into the economic system underlying the national economy, which is changing over to cost accounting. We can accept this. But why were scientific institutions within the system of higher education, the scientific research organizations, not converted to a cost accounting basis at the same time?

We all know very well that the management system must correspond to the economic mechanism. This is a universal law. And so if a collective enterprise is converted to a total cost accounting basis, then the enterprise is responsible for its own success or failure. This success or failure is dependent upon the capabilities and enterprise of its employees and upon their organizational skills. The freedom to manage one's own activities is necessary under such an arrangement, and NIO's within the Ministry of Defense do not possess this freedom.

Cost accounting presupposes a fluctuation in the level of salaries, depending upon the fruits of the labor. But this is not possible as pertains to the army. After all officers must receive a set monetary allowance. And in addition holding elections to determine the managers of a collective enterprise runs contrary to the principle of centralized management. The incompatibility between the proclaimed economic freedom and the existing system of management is obvious.

To date there has not been any sharp conflict surrounding this issue. After all, to be honest, we still haven't seen real cost accounting. At the present the NIO's are financed totally by their main customer, often at the expense of other organizations which have not switched over to cost accounting. And in addition, they have acquired the opportunity to fulfill their financial obligations "on the side". And they live, as a rule, free from any special financial difficulties, which in no way is a consequence of their enterprising spirit or increased labor output. But on the other hand, the potential

instability of such a system is obvious. And this, I am convinced, will become manifest when real cost accounting is implemented.

Is there a scientifically based escape from this situation? There are various possibilities. First and foremost, these organizations can be demilitarized. Then the economic mechanism will begin to work without friction. More favorable conditions for retaining career soldiers and raising the level of professionalism will be created as, for example, age criteria, such as exists in the army, will be revoked. The opportunity for specialists to transfer to their counterpart scientific subunits in the defense industrial sector and vice versa will give rise to competition.

A second variant for increasing performance among military scientific organizations involves partial conversion. This scenario can be justified in the event the decision is accepted to preserve centralized financing and material and technical support to science. The escape in this case will be made possible all the same by allowing a budget organization to carry out disbursement in the interests of various clients.

Such possibilities exist. Ministry of Defense organizations which conduct research and experiments have substantial fixed assets which, objectively, are not expended evenly, and their effective utilization can be enhanced and still allow them to carry out their primary tasks.

For example it is totally realistic that the economic performance in the area of transportation can be enhanced by combining non commercial and commercial shipments. Satisfying tasking relating to the national economy by enlisting the help of military transport aviation is already a reality. But aircraft constitute only one element of our primary assets. In addition there are laboratories, computer centers, and other assets. Here again the situation is analogous. Their workloads are also uneven, and there is a demand on their services as well from civilian organizations and enterprises.

Of course a conversion program of this nature will result in all proceeds going into the budget and this will not serve as a stimulus for anyone. It is essential that a part of the proceeds go to develop lower echelon scientific organizations and to meet the needs of the people.

What is hindering this brand of perestroyka? Only one thing, interdiction from above. It's not authorized and that's all there is to it. The main argument of the defenders of the "purity" of principles is that budget organizations receive everything in centralized fashion that they need to meet their tasking, and that distracting them with extraneous orders will prevent them from carrying out their primary work. Indeed nothing prevents the creation of normal conditions for living and working like centralized funding of budget organizations. The number of families without housing of military officers alone numbers in the tens of thousands. There is a shortage of kindergartens, schools, medical

facilities, and moreover, it can be said in truth that the working conditions for officers is spartan.

It was proven long ago that the practice of saying no without reason is very tenacious, that it shackles wholesome initiative and stands in the way of the effective use of resources. Who can explain, for example, why the chief of an organization does not have the flexibility to reclassify military job positions without the approval of the General Staff and a year-long exchange of documents. One could not count the number of incidences of this kind of petty overmanagement.

I am certain that even minimal economic freedom will help even if only partially to compensate for the shortfalls of the center relative to normal functioning of scientific collectives in the army, that it will allow us to attract qualified specialists released into the reserves during the reduction of armed forces personnel, and for the collectives to acquire experience in commercial activity under the new economic conditions. All of this is worthy of consideration.

Trials of 'Polet' Association with Washing Machines

91UM0131A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
19 Nov 90 Union Edition p 2

[Article by S. Suslikov, IZVESTIYA correspondent, Omsk: "Who Hides Goods in Military Plants?"]

[Text] Of all the shortages, probably the largest one is the lack of truthful information. It is not even because this information does not exist, but rather because the people have lost their faith. Today no one believes in Presidential Directives, government resolutions, or assertions of highly placed leaders... People have been placed into a situation where each one has to think and worry only about himself. It is no wonder that thousands of workers of "Polet," a manufacturing complex that after its conversion is now producing the "Siberia" semi-automatic washing machine are frightened by imminent and irrevocable price increases. They are literally attacking the reception offices of the directors of this complex, inundating them with hundreds and thousands of requests for obtaining these goods that are in short supply.

Most improbable rumors are circulating in the city: that allegedly a special, military-industrial mafia has appeared.

"Two days ago," says K. Kozin, Director of the TNP plant of the 'Polet' complex, "I received a phone call from L. Polezhayev, the angry chairman of the Omsk oblast executive council, who asked me: 'Why are you hiding your output from the people and not shipping it out for sale?' Now we have people here from IZVESTIYA... I wouldn't be surprised if tomorrow people would come from the KGB, the oblast Soviet would organize a special commission, or the KRU would send auditors... The work of the enterprise will become paralyzed, since time has to be spent on everyone who

comes here to check up on things, and there is little time. We are all living nerve-wracking lives... In the last three years the production of washing machines at these same plants tripled and, according to preliminary figures, will reach a record 450,000 units this year. In the past we received component parts and materials from stocks, but now an entire army of suppliers and middlemen and the entire transport aviation section of the "Polet" complex are involved in this matter. Everything—motors, metal, packing material—is transported by air and more often than not, traded for finished products. So our little machine is worth its weight in gold...

We looked at every square meter of the plant area with the chief of the shop that produces the washing machines. I was convinced that there was no place where the finished goods could be hidden and, if you will excuse my saying so, it would be stupid to hide them. "Let's assume that the directors of the complex decided to hold back 5,000 - 10,000 machines. Where would they get the space to store them, transportation to move them, people to load them, guards?... And then any move involves breakage, thievery, and foul ups. This means additional costs which will be applied to the cost of the machine. And the machine is already high-priced without all this. We earn ... 12 kopeks on each machine..."

"Where do the rumors come from about hiding the goods?"

"It is all simple to explain: We have had serious problems recently with the packing weight [tare weight]. This is like a natural disaster. The shop and the railroad depot are choked up with unpacked machines... We had to put on additional armed guards and beg the merchants to transport the unpacked goods themselves. Not for the first time, with their own transportation and in an unpacked state. We are still trying to get out of this mess. First of all, some of the machines were stolen anyway, and another one thousand reached the consumer in a beat-up condition. We had to put six licensed specialists on taking care of the damage. No, it would be senseless to hide them. After all, we live on production; we have to pay wages..."

The situation with these machines that I have described in such detail is typical in many ways and for all practical purposes is repeated almost exactly in other Omsk military plants that produce consumers' goods. The irresponsibility of suppliers and interruptions of component part deliveries lead to warehouses and plants being packed full of goods ready to be shipped out, but which nevertheless cannot be shipped because of some petty detail. And if one takes into consideration the fact that people are tensely awaiting price increases and are anxious to part with their rubles, then rumors of machinations with hidden goods crop up with the force of some kind of ironclad rule. In my presence, trade representatives asked for the release of a promised 300 kitchen sink cabinets... All 300 cabinets, meanwhile, were standing in the furniture shop of the enterprise because they did not

have faucet attachments! There is a "shortage" of stainless steel in the country, and this is what these attachments are made of.

But three hundred people found themselves on the cherished list to obtain the cheap kitchen sink cabinets, taking the stores by storm, and not believing one word of the sales people...

'Znamya Truda' Plant To Convert MiG-29 Production to Il-114

91UM0155A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
11 Dec 90 Union Edition p 6

[Article by IZVESTIYA Special Correspondent B. Belikov: "Airliners Instead of Fighter Aircraft: Moscow's 'Znamya Truda' Aircraft Plant Transitions from Manufacturing the MiG-29 to Production of the Il-114"]

[Text] During early spring 1989, IZVESTIYA (No 63) was the first to report that the capital's oldest aircraft manufacturing enterprise—the 'Znamya Truda' Plant—is manufacturing the Mig-29 fighter aircraft that has received recognition throughout the world as an excellent combat aircraft. Right now preparations have begun here to produce the Il-114 64-seat local airline turbo fan airliner and its variants.

Experimental Design Bureau imeni Ilyushin Deputy General Designer V. Terentyev:

"With this plant we are not only neighbors territorially but we are also linked by many years of cooperation in aircraft production—from the Il-2 to the mass passenger Il-18 whose first models incidentally were called 'Moskva.' With the increased dimensions of the aircraft we design, other locations have also become involved in their series production. So the same thing initially occurred with the Il-114—Tashkent Aircraft Plant set up series production jointly with its branch in Fergana.

"Judging by everything, the airliner will become one of our most widely used civil aviation aircraft and will have good export demand. I will add that five other utilization versions of the Il-114 have been developed based on the basic model—with a large number of seats in the cabin, increased flight range, cargo and passenger capacity, skis for the polar regions, and an ice and ocean fish reconnaissance aircraft. Altogether "circulation" may reach 1,000 aircraft and we are faced with a minimum of 15-20 years work."

Aircraft Association General Director A. Manuyev:

"We will still continue to manufacture the MiG-29 for two more years for export deliveries while simultaneously preparing the facility for Il-114 production. It requires a transition to a qualitatively different technology. A fundamentally new engine is being utilized that is being produced by the capital's Production Association imeni Chernyshev. The Il-114 may be equipped with similar foreign produced engines for sale abroad.

"Our experts just visited Tashkent Aircraft Plant where they became acquainted with all of the airliner's production stages. The trip also turned out to be very useful because it permitted us to really imagine the amount of expenditures required to reequip production. The fund allocated from the State Budget turns out to be inadequate—we will have to ask for bank credit in order to rapidly conduct the required re-equipment.

"Will you not have difficulties with personnel for parallel production of the MiG-29 and to set up production of the new airliner?"

"That is a painful issue! Conversion is obviously lagging behind—three years ago we had already proposed authorizing initiation of preparations for manufacturing the Il-114 while taking into account that the Uzbek aircraft builders alone could not deal with the enormous production volume. Well-known events subsequently occurred in Fergana after which many highly skilled workers, technicians, and engineers who are not members of the native population left this city. The Il-114 program is on the verge of collapse....

"Unfortunately, time has been wasted and now we must make up for lost time. Because of the uncertainty that has arisen with the 'Znamya Truda' Plant workload, permanent workers have begun to leave. So that these losses do not turn out to be irreversible, we have in part managed to hire people for production of machinery and equipment for the food and processing industry."

"Foton" Joint Venture has also been founded and has begun production of the small engine (64 horsepower) Yuniur [Junior] Mini-Biplane which was designed by MAI [Moscow Aviation Institute imeni Sergo Ordzhonikidze] Public Design Bureau. They propose producing up to 500 of these small patrol aircraft for GAI [State Automobile Inspection], the timber industry, and pipeline surveillance. Each aircraft will cost nearly R30,000 or \$15,000.

Then, at the end of 1992, the first series production Il-114's will leave the 'Znamya Truda' Plant assembly shop and climb into the sky.

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